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Abstract
The requirements of a modern guided weapon will be established based on the
current and perceived threats at the time the design is commissioned. However
the design of a modern guided weapon is a long and expensive process which can
result in the weapon entering service only for the original threat to have changed
or passed, inevitably inducing a capability gap. The defence budgets of the ma-
jor military powers such as the UK and USA continue to shrink. As a result the
emphasis of military research is being placed on adapting current legacy systems
to bridge these capability gaps. One such gap is the requirement to be able to
intercept small relocatable, highly manoeuvrable targets.
It was demonstrated a number of years ago that the performance of a legacy
weapon against manoeuvring targets could be potentially increased by retrofitting
a data link to the weapon. The data link allows commands to be sent to the
weapon in flight. The commands will result in the weapon executing one or more
manoeuvres which will change the shape of the trajectory. This has the potential
to improve the performance of current Advanced Anti-Armour Weapons (AAAW)
against manoeuvring targets.
The issue which arises from data linking any weapon including an AAAW, is
that the ability to shape the trajectory of the weapon will be limited due to the
original design parameters of the non data linked system. Therefore in order
to obtain the maximum performance increase, the trajectory shaping (retarget-
ing) capability must be efficiently utilised over the duration of the weapon fly out.
It was postulated in this thesis that this could be achieved using an integrated
fire control system which would seek to calculate an optimal shaped weapon tra-
jectory. The optimal trajectory should maximise the ability of the weapon to
respond to target manoeuvres, thereby improving the probability of a successful
intercept occurring.
The potential effectiveness of an integrated fire control system was explored by
i
considering the scenario of a generic data linked AAAW which is to intercept a
small highly manoeuvrable surface vessel.
A total of three integrated fire control systems were developed which calculated
the optimal trajectory for different criteria.
The first system optimised the weapon trajectory considering multiple predicted
target trajectories. Each trajectory had an associated probability. For a given
weapon trajectory the seeker would be able to detect the target at one or more
locations along certain predicted target trajectories. The sum of the probabili-
ties associated with the detectable locations represented the total probability of
intercept. The weapon trajectory was optimised by calculating the trajectory
which achieved the maximum probability of intercept using simulated annealing
and simple search optimisation algorithms.
The second system optimised the weapon trajectory considering only the most
probable trajectory (M.P.T) from a distribution of predicted target trajectories.
Appropriate commands were calculated such that a location along this M.P.T
trajectory was detectable at some instant in time.
The third system presented in this thesis optimised the trajectory considering
the maximum probability of intercept initially and then only the M.P.T trajec-
tory later on in the engagement.
The three integrated systems and a Fire and Forget system were tested against 80
random target trajectories. In each of the integrated fire control systems, the per-
formance of the AAAW against manoeuvring targets was significantly improved
when compared to the Fire and Forget results.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
World War II saw the first operational use of a guided weapon, when the German
Luftwaffe successfully deployed the Fritz X radio controlled bomb against the
Italian Battleship Roma on the 21st July 1943. The Fritz X was equipped with
moveable control surfaces, which could be deflected by an operator sending con-
trol signals over a radio link. By deflecting the control surfaces the bomb could be
steered onto the target thereby increasing the probability of a successful strike [1].
In the 70 years since the deployment of the Fritz X, guided weapon technology
has advanced rapidly with an assortment of weapons being developed to fulfil a
variety of roles and operational requirements across a wide range of launch plat-
forms. The configuration of a guided weapon depends on a number of factors such
as the desired weapon stand off range, operating conditions and launch platform.
For example, the Storm Shadow missile was developed as a long range, air
launched cruise missile, which is deployed against high value targets. The long
stand off range (maximum range at which the weapon can be launched such that
it can reach its intended target [2]) allows the aircraft to engage a target beyond
the engagement range of enemy air defence systems thereby increasing the surviv-
ability of the launch platform itself [3]. Another example of a guided weapon is
the Sea Wolf missile system which is designed as a last resort naval point defence
weapon to destroy enemy ships, aircraft and missiles [4].
The design of a new guided weapon can be incredibly expensive, with the weapon
often taking many years to enter service after the initial specification was estab-
lished. The specification will have been developed based on the current and
anticipated threats and associated requirements at the time that the design was
commissioned. However, the long design process of many systems can often result
in the weapon entering service when the threat that was originally anticipated
1
has changed or disappeared.
The Brimstone Missile system for example, was originally selected to meet the
RAF requirement for a long range Anti-Armour Weapon in 1997. This require-
ment was identified from the substantial use of tanks and armoured vehicles by
Iraq forces during the 1st Gulf War. However the weapon only entered into ser-
vice in 2005 after a development cost of £370 million [5], by which time the Gulf
War was over.
Over the past few years a requirement to be able to intercept highly manoeu-
vrable relocatable targets has emerged [6], especially within Naval operations as
demonstrated by the emergence of the small boat threat [7]. As the defence
budgets of prominent military powers such as the UK and the USA continue to
shrink, greater emphasis is being placed on adapting current legacy systems to
respond to new operational requirements such as these.
In 2006, an Enhanced Paveway II (ePwyII) bomb was fitted with a data link
and released from a Tornado GR4 aircraft [8]. In a standard ePwyII bomb the
weapon would have followed a trajectory to a preset target location. The tra-
jectory flown by the weapon would have been governed by the onboard guidance
system.
However in this weapon trial the target co-ordinates where updated in flight
using the data link. The bomb would then have performed one or more manoeu-
vres thereby changing the shape of its trajectory in order to reach the updated
target location. The trial was successful, with the weapon successfully flying to
the updated target location.
The demonstrated ability to shape the trajectory of an inflight data linked weapon
has the potential to significantly increase the performance of some legacy systems
to intercept highly manoeuvrable targets. One possible candidate for this type
of approach is the Advanced Anti-Armour Weapon (AAAW).
Research is currently being conducted in the UK S.P.E.A.R program to add a
data link to this type of weapon [9]. The issue which arises from data linking
any weapon including an AAAW, is that the ability to shape the trajectory of
the weapon will be limited due to the original design parameters of the non data
linked system. Therefore in order to obtain the maximum performance increase,
the trajectory shaping (retargeting) capability must be efficiently utilised over
2
the duration of the weapon fly out (maximum flight time of the weapon).
It is postulated in this thesis that this can be achieved through the use of an
integrated fire control system. The system will seek to calculate an optimal
shaped weapon trajectory which should maximise the ability of the weapon to
respond to target manoeuvres thereby improving the probability of a successful
interception occurring.
The potential effectiveness of an integrated fire control system is explored by
considering the scenario of a generic data linked AAAW which is to intercept a
small agile highly manoeuvrable surface vessel.
1.1 Structure of thesis
This thesis is divided into seven chapters :
• Chapter 2 - Weapon Model, describes the fundamental concepts associated
with tactical missile design and the specification of the AAAW model.
• Chapter 3 - The Small Boat Threat, discusses a realistic target model rep-
resentative of a small boat threat. A performance evaluation of the AAAW
as a Fire and Forget system using 80 random target trajectories is provided.
• Chapter 4 - Integrated Tracking and Trajectory Prediction, describes the
design and implementation of an integrated tracking and target trajectory
prediction system
• Chapter 5 - Integrated System One (S.A.S.S), describes the design, im-
plementation and results of the first integrated fire control system to be
discussed in the thesis.
• Chapter 6 - Integrated System Two (M.P.T), describes the design, imple-
mentation and results of the second integrated fire control system to be
discussed in the thesis.
• Chapter 7 - Integrated System Three (S.A.M.P.T), describes the design,
implementation and results of the final integrated fire control system to be
discussed in the thesis.
• Chapter 8 - Summary and Conclusions, presents a summary of the work
discussed in this thesis. A number of conclusions from the results of this
thesis are produced. Recommendations for further work are then provided.
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1.2 Original contributions of this thesis
The contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that an integrated fire control
system can significantly improve the performance of a weapon against manoeu-
vring targets.
Though the focus of the research is the scenario of an AAAW intercepting a
small boat, the techniques and systems discussed in the thesis can potentially be
applied to a wide range of targets and weapon systems.
The results of this study are also relevant to current industrial programmes which
are seeking to use Advanced Anti-Armour Weapons to intercept small boats [10].
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Chapter 2
Weapon Model
The research discussed in this thesis is based around a fixed launcher Advanced
Anti Armour Weapon (AAAW) which is simulated using the Matlab program-
ming language. The AAAW model is classed as a tactical missile. The details
surrounding the model itself and the justification for its selection in this particular
project will become apparent later on in the chapter. However many of the con-
cepts and much of the terminology surrounding tactical missiles will be unknown
to the non expert. Therefore the purpose of this chapter is firstly to present
a brief overview of these fundamental concepts such as aerodynamics, weapon
guidance and control and rocket propulsion and then to outline the specifics of
the model and its role within this research project, beginning with the definition
of a missile.
2.1 The Main Components of a Tactical Missile
A missile can be defined as a self propelled aerospace vehicle designed for the
purpose of inflicting damage on a designated target [11]. There are two main
classes, strategic and tactical. Strategic missiles are long range weapons designed
to inflict a significant amount of damage onto a target, with the most widely
recognised form of strategic missile being the intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM), which carries a high yield nuclear warhead. Tactical missiles are gener-
ally much smaller weapons, carrying conventional warheads and are used against
specific threats such as aircraft, ships and enemy missiles.
The main components of a tactical missile consist of, the airframe and exter-
nal control surfaces, payload, guidance computer and propulsion system. Tacti-
cal missiles are normally classified by their launch platform and intended target.
Examples include, Air-to-Air such as the ASRAAM Advanced Short Range Air-
to-Air missile [12] and Air-to-Surface, such as the Storm Shadow [3] air launched
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cruise missile.
The AAAW model is of the tactical class, which having a fixed launcher sys-
tem will always be launched at the same pitch, yaw (heading) and roll for each
engagement. By considering a fixed launcher, the performance of the integrated
fire control systems discussed in later chapters is then dependent only on the mis-
sile sizing and associated aerodynamic capability and the quality of the weapon
trajectory optimisation methods.
2.2 Basic Aerodynamics and Fundamental Con-
cepts
A dynamic model describes the motion of the missile within one or more degrees
of freedom. Each degree of freedom describes either the translational or rotational
motion of the airframe. The number of degrees of freedom used depends on the
specific application of the model. The greater the number of degrees of freedom
which are used to describe the motion, the more computationally intensive the
model will be. This will be due to the increased number of equations required
to be solved to model the airframe dynamics. The choice of model is therefore
determined based on the user’s requirements.
The dynamics of a missile airframe are normally modelled assuming rigid body
dynamics [13] which for general spatial motion results in three translational and
three rotational degrees of freedom. This is known as a Six Degrees of Freedom
(6DoF) model.
In a 6DoF model the translational motion is described as translation in (X, Y, Z)
with the rotational motion defined in terms of three angles (pitch θ, heading ψ
and roll φ). However if only the longitudinal motion of the weapon was of inter-
est e.g. in an assumed planar engagement, then the dynamics could be modelled
using a 3DoF model [14], considering only the translation of the airframe in the
X and Z axis and the weapon pitch.
Different combinations of translational and rotational motion can be used to
define a variety of dynamic models. An overview of the most common dynamic
models used in missile simulation today can be found in [15].
In this thesis the weapon is required to intercept a target which moves within
the XY plane. The simulated engagements are therefore non planar, requiring
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both longitudinal and lateral guidance commands to be generated. The weapon
is a roll, stabilised missile, requiring roll stabilisation commands to be generated
by the guidance computer. Therefore a full 6DoF model is required to model
the motion of the missile airframe using three translational and three rotational
degrees of freedom.
A 6DoF model requires the rate of change of both the translational and rota-
tional degrees of freedom to be determined. The associated variables for the
translational and rotational movement are the translational velocities and accel-
erations and the Euler angle rates.
The translational velocities (vx, vy, vz) and accelerations (ax, ay, az) are relatively
simple to determine, they are the first and second time derivatives of the airframe
position in 3DoF. The Euler angle rates (ψ˙, θ˙, φ˙) (defined in Earth-orientated
axes) however are more complicated to determine. The Euler rates are func-
tions of the angular velocities (P,Q,R) (defined in body orientated axes) and
the weapon attitudes. The Euler rates are calculated using the following equa-
tions [16] :
φ˙ = P +Q sinφ tan θ +R cosϕ tan θ. (2.1)
θ˙ = Q cosφ−R sinφ. (2.2)
ψ˙ = Q
sinψ
cos θ
+R
cosψ
cos θ
(2.3)
The dynamics of the missile are dependent on the aerodynamic forces and mo-
ments which act on the airframe during flight. The aerodynamic forces as well as
the moments are produced by the variations in pressure and velocity due to the
flow of air around the missile. The propulsive force (i.e thrust) is generated from
the propulsion system on the missile.
In a 6DoF model, the aerodynamic forces are summed to produce the resul-
tant aerodynamic force. The resultant aerodynamic force is resolved into parallel
and perpendicular components to the direction of the free stream velocity, where
the free stream velocity is defined as the velocity of the airflow (whose direction
is parallel and opposite to the forward direction of flight) far ahead of the mis-
sile such that the air is not affected by the motion of the missile in the opposite
direction [11]. The parallel and perpendicular components of the resultant force
define three forces known as the Drag, Lift and Side Forces.
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The Drag force is produced by the pressure and skin forces which act on the
surface of the missile. It acts parallel to the free stream velocity [11].
The Lift force is produced by the pressure forces acting on the surface of the
missile. It acts perpendicular to the velocity vector of the missile and to the free
stream [11].
The Side Force is the component of the resultant aerodynamic force which
acts perpendicular to the lift and drag forces [11].
Three moments consisting of the Pitching, Yawing and Rolling moments are
also defined which are created by varying the aerodynamic load distribution on
the airframe using a control scheme.
2.3 Axes Systems
There are three important axes systems which are used within missile flight sim-
ulation consisting of the Earth, Body and Wind axis systems.
The Earth axes is a right handed system [11] which is used to determine the
true position of the missile at every time step during the simulation. The X and
Y axes lie in the horizontal plane (Xe, Ye), with the Z axis pointing vertically
down in the direction of gravity (Ze). The Earth axes system [17] is shown in
Figure 2.1.
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Figure 164.- Earth-axis system.
Body-Axis System
In the body-axis system the rectangular Cartesian axis system is oriented such
that the X-axis points out of the nose of the aircraft and is coincident with the longi-
tudinal axis of the aircraft. The Y-axis is directed out of the right wing of the air-
craft and the Z-axis is perpendicular to both the X and Y axes and is directed
downward. The origin of the entire system is taken to be the center of gravity of the
aircraft. At this point it is useful to define the important angular displacement terms
roll, pitch, and yaw.
Roll: the airplane rotates about its longitudinal axis (that is, X-axis). A
positive roll is defined as the Y-axis turning toward the Z-axis, that is,
the right wing drops.
Pitch: the airplane rotates about the Y-axis. A positive pitch is defined as
the Z-axis turning toward the X-axis, that is, the nose of the airplane
rises.
Yaw: the airplane rotates about the Z-axis. A positive yaw is defined as the
X-axis turning towards the Y-axis, that is, the nose moves to the right
(clockwise when viewed from above).
194
Figure 2.1: Earth Axes
The missile Body axes is a right handed system which is used for calculating the
aerodynamic forces and moments, with an origin defined by the missile centre
of gravity. The X axis coincides with the longitudinal axis of the missile (Xb).
The positive Y axis is positive to the right and lies perpendicular to the X axis
(Yb). The Z axis is positive downwards (Zb) nd is perpendicular to theXY plane.
Three rotations are also defined within this axes system, which are known as
the Roll φ, Pitch θ and Yaw ψ.
1. Roll is a rotation about the Xb axis.
2. Pitch is rotation about the Yb axis.
3. Yaw is a rotation about the Zb axis.
The Body axes system [17] is shown for a generic aircraft in Figure 2.2.
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APPENDIX C - Continued
The body-axis system and the concepts of roll, pitch, and yaw are illustrated in
figure 165.
YB
X B Roll
Yaw
Z B
Figure 165.- Body-axis system.
Wind-Axis System
In the general wind-axis system, the origin of the rectangular Cartesian system
is at the center of gravity of the aircraft. The X-axis points into the direction of the
oncoming free-stream velocity vector. The Z-axis lies in the plane of symmetry of
the airplane and is perpendicular to the X-axis and is directed generally downward.
The Y-axis is perpendicular to both the X and Z axes (fig. 166(a)). In many prob-
lems of interest airplane motion is in the geometric plane of symmetry (no yawing
motion) so that the X-axis also lies in the plane of symmetry. This means that the
Y-axis points out of the right wing. The Z-axis again is in the plane of symmetry.
The system then is termed the simplified wind-axis system and is illustrated in fig-
ure 166(b)).
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Figure 2.2: Body Axes
The Wind axes is right handed system which is used for the calculation of aero-
dynamic coefficients. The X axis in the system is positive in the direction of the
free stream Xw. The Y axis is perpendicular to the X axis and positive to the
right of the X axis Yw and the Z axis is positive downwards perpendicular to the
XY plane Zw. The missile/aircraft centre of gravity lies at the origin of the axes
system. The Wind axes is shown in Figure 2.3 [17].
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(b) Simplified wind-axis system. X and Z axes in plane of symmetry.
Figure 166.- Wind-axis system.
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Figure 2.3: Wind Axes
During the missile simulation, variables such as the position and velocity in the
Earth axes will be transformed into the Body axes position and velocity and vice
versa. This is accomplished by multiplying the defined missile position vector in
the Earth axes by rotation matrices in heading, pitch and roll about the body X
axis, Y axis and Z axis respectively. Rotations in heading (ψ), pitch (θ) and roll
(φ) are calculated as follows [13] : X ′Y ′
Z ′
 =
 cosψ sinψ 0− sinψ cosψ 0
0 0 1
  XY
Z
 (2.4)
 X ′Y ′
Z ′
 =
cos θ 0 − sin θ0 1 0
sin θ 0 cos θ
  XY
Z
 (2.5)
 X ′Y ′
Z ′
 =
1 0 00 cosφ sinφ
0 − sinφ cosφ
  XY
Z
 (2.6)
The Earth coordinate system to Body coordinate system transformation matrix
T be is then expressed as the multiplication of the following matrices [15]:
(
TBe
)
=
1 0 00 cosφ sinφ
0 − sinφ cosφ
 cos θ 0 sin θ0 1 0
sin θ 0 cos θ
  cosψ sinψ 0− sinψ cosψ 0
0 0 1

(2.7)
The axes systems used in the weapon model assumes that the earth is flat and
static. While both of these assumptions are approximate, they only become a
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problem if distances are long, i.e if the trajectory of an ICBM was to be deter-
mined the curvature of the earth and its rotation would have to be considered.
The Advanced Anti Armour Weapon model used in this thesis has a range of less
than 11000m therefore these approximations are acceptable.
2.4 Aerodynamic Force and Moment Equations
The forces and moments which act on the missile airframe, are calculated using
the equations of motion for a rigid body. The use of a rigid airframe model is an
approximation. An actual missile would flex slightly during flight. However the
error induced in the calculated values for the forces and moments will only be
very small as missiles are designed to withstand high lateral G-forces [13]. The
use of a rigid body simplifies the calculation of the forces and moments consider-
ably.
The Drag (Fx), Side (Fy) and Lift (Fz) forces are defined mathematically as [18]
:
Fx = −qS(CD cosα cos β + CY cosα sin β − CLsinα)−mg sin θ + T. (2.8)
Fy = −qS(CD sin β − CY cos β) +mg cos θ sinϕ. (2.9)
Fz = −qS(CD sinα cos β + CY sin β + CL cosα) +mg cosϕ. (2.10)
where :
q = Dynamic Pressure (Pa)
S = Reference Area (m2)
T = Thrust (N)
m = Mass of the weapon (kg)
g = Gravity constant of 9.81 (m/s2)
α = Angle of attack (rads)
β = Angle of side slip (rads)
CD = Aerodynamic drag coefficient defined in the wind axis (dimensionless)
CY = Aerodynamic side force coefficient defined in the wind axis (dimensionless)
CL = Aerodynamic lift coefficient defined in the wind axis (dimensionless)
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The Pitching (M ), Yawing (N ) and Rolling (L) moments are defined as [18] :
M = qSbCm. (2.11)
N = qSbCn. (2.12)
L = qSbCl. (2.13)
where :
b = Reference length (m)
Cm = Aerodynamic pitching moment coefficent (dimensionless)
CY = Aerodynamic yawing moment coefficient (dimensionless)
CL = Aerodynamic rolling coefficient (dimensionless)
The mathematical representation of the forces and moments has introduced a
number of important quantities which must be properly defined and calculated
such as, the definition of the reference area and length, the calculation of the dy-
namic pressure and angles of attack and side slip. The remainder of this section
will provide a brief description of each of the quantities defined in the force and
moment equations beginning with the reference area and reference length.
The reference area (S) for a missile is defined as the body cross-sectional area
and the reference length (b) is defined as the mean missile diameter [19]. Con-
ventionally for an aircraft model, the reference area is defined as a wing plan form
area and the reference length is defined as the wingspan for the calculation of the
lifting and yawing moments and the mean aerodynamic chord for the calculation
of the pitching moment.
The dynamic pressure (q) is calculated from the total airspeed (Va) and the
atmospheric air density (ρ) in kg/m3 at a height (h in metres) as follows [16] :
q =
1
2
ρV 2a (2.14)
The atmospheric air density is defined as [16] :
ρ = 1.225(1− 2.18× 10−5h)4.2586. (2.15)
The total airspeed is calculated as :
Va =
√
(u− ug)2 + (v − vg)2 + (w − wg)2 (2.16)
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where (u, v, w) are the components of the missile velocity vector and (ug, vg, wg)
are the components of the local wind velocity vector.
In order for aerodynamic lift to be generated by the missile, it must achieve
an angle of attack [15]. The angle of attack α is defined as :
α = arctan
(
w − wg
u− ug
)
(2.17)
The angle of sideslip β can be thought off as the directional angle of attack
and is calculated from the body X axis and the wind corrected velocity vector as
follows :
β = arcsin
(
v − vg
Va
)
(2.18)
The angles of attack and sideslip appear in the force equations because the aero-
dynamic coefficients for Drag, Lift and Side force are often determined in the
wind axes, however the force equations are solved within the body axes. The
angles of attack and sideslip are used to correctly express the force coefficients in
terms of the body axes instead of the wind axes
The Aerodynamic coefficients are used to calculate the aerodynamic forces
and moments which act on the missile in flight [15]. They can be calculated from
wind tunnel measurements or using analytical methods. The most common an-
alytical method is to calculate stability derivatives which predict how the forces
and moments which act on the airframe change as stability parameters such as
the angle of attack are varied.
2.4.1 Calculation of Aerodynamic Coefficients
Each aerodynamic coefficient is defined by a set of stability derivatives which can
be defined using a first order Taylor series expansion about a trim flight condition.
A trim flight condition is a flight condition whereby the forces and moments on the
missile sum to zero. The stability derivatives are then determined by considering
all of the possible relationships which may exist between the force and moment
coefficients and the parameters which affect the stability of the airframe, such as
the angles of attack and sideslip. Before defining the aerodynamic coefficients,
the calculation of a first order Taylor expansion [20] for a multivariate function
is reviewed below :
1. Consider a real valued function in two variables f(x, y) which is expanded
about the points (a, b) respectively.
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2. The Taylor series expansion of the first order would then be defined as :
f(x, y) = f(a, b) +
[
(x− a)∂f
∂x
+ (y − b)∂f
∂y
]
(2.19)
3. If a = 0 and b = 0, then the expansion becomes :
f(x, y) = f(0, 0) +
[
(x)
∂f
∂x
+ (y)
∂f
∂y
]
(2.20)
4. This can be more compactly defined as :
f(x, y) = f0 + fxx+ fyy (2.21)
The equations for each aerodynamic coefficient can then be defined as :
CD = CD0 + CDαα + CDββ + CDδpδp + CDδq δq + CDδr δr + CDδxδx + ...
CDα2α
2 + CDβ2β
2 + CD
δ2p
δp2 + CDδ2q
δq2 + CDδ2r
δr2 + CDδ2x
δx2 + ...
S
2Va
[CDα˙α˙ + CDβ˙ β˙ + CDpP + CDqQ+ CDrR] (2.22)
CY = CY0 + CYαα + CYββ + CYδpδp + CYδq δq + CYδr δr + CYδxδx + ...
CYα2α
2 + CYβ2β
2 + CY
δ2p
δp2 + CYδ2q
δq2 + CYδ2r
δr2 + CYδ2x
δx2 + ...
S
2Va
[CYα˙α˙ + CYβ˙ β˙ + CYpP + CYqQ+ CYrR] (2.23)
CL = CL0 + CLαα + CLββ + CLδpδp + CLδq δq + CLδr δr + CLδxδx + ...
CLα2α
2 + CLβ2β
2 + CL
δ2p
δp2 + CLδ2q
δq2 + CLδ2r
δr2 + CLδ2x
δx2 + ...
S
2Va
[CLα˙α˙ + CLβ˙ β˙ + CLpP + CLqQ+ CLrR] (2.24)
Cm = Cm0 + Cmαα + Cmββ + Cmδpδp + Cmδq δq + Cmδr δr + Cmδxδx + ...
Cmα2α
2 + Cmβ2β
2 + Cm
δ2p
δp2 + Cmδ2q
δq2 + Cmδ2r
δr2 + Cmδ2x
δx2 + ...
S
2Va
[Cmα˙α˙ + Cmβ˙ β˙ + CmpP + CmqQ+ CmrR] (2.25)
Cn = Cn0 + Cnαα + Cnββ + Cnδpδp + Cnδq δq + Cnδr δr + Cnδxδx + ...
Cnα2α
2 + Cnβ2β
2 + Cn
δ2p
δp2 + Cnδ2q
δq2 + Cnδ2r
δr2 + Cmδ2x
δx2 + ...
S
2Va
[Cnα˙α˙ + Cnβ˙ β˙ + CnpP + CnqQ+ CnrR] (2.26)
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Cl = Cl0 + Clαα + Clββ + Clδpδp + Clδq δq + Clδr δr + Clδxδx + ...
Clα2α
2 + Clβ2β
2 + Cl
δ2p
δp2 + Clδ2q
δq2 + Clδ2r
δr2 + Clδ2x
δx2 + ...
S
2Va
[Clα˙α˙ + Clβ˙ β˙ + ClpP + ClqQ+ ClrR] (2.27)
The rotational derivatives such as CDα˙ are multiplied by
S
2Va
as these derivatives
are taken with respect to this quantity where S is the reference area and Va is
the total airspeed of the missile [21]. The value of each stability derivative listed
in equations 2.22-2.27 is provided in Table 1 of Appendix A. Stability derivatives
with a value of 0 indicate that there is no significant relationship between the sta-
bility parameter and the respective coefficient. Stability derivatives with a non
zero value are listed as the actual coefficient. This means that either a constant
is known for that stability derivative or an expression is provided in [19] which
can reliably predict the value of the derivative under various trim conditions.
The actual values of the non zero stability derivatives are sensitive and have
therefore been omitted from the thesis.
It should be noted that there are a number textbooks for which expressions
for non zero stability derivatives can be obtained (see references [11] and [15]),
however [19] should be consulted in the first instance. This is because the text
provides a number of reliable expressions for the calculation of several stability
derivatives for the moment (Cl, Cm, Cn) and side force (CY ) coefficient expres-
sions as well as an in-depth calculation of the drag coefficient. The reliability of
these expressions has been verified by comparing predicated values from this text
to known parameters for a classified weapon model.
The expressions for the aerodynamic coefficients have introduced two important
aspects of missile design and simulation. These consist of conventional weapon
control indicated by the δ terms in the stability derivatives and the calculation
of the drag coefficient. The δ terms in the stability derivatives represent control
deflections for a weapon which uses a conventional aerodynamic control scheme,
Section 2.4.1.1 provides a brief explanation of how the AAAW model is controlled
in simulated flight using a fin control scheme. The calculation of the drag coef-
ficient is briefly discussed in Section 2.4.2, this may be of interest to the reader
in order to understand the parameters which the affect the drag on a missile
airframe during flight.
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2.4.1.1 Conventional Weapon Control
Conventional aerodynamic control of a tactical missile is often very different to
that of an aircraft. Changes in the roll, pitch and yaw of an aircraft is achieved by
using elevators, ailerons and rudders. However the attitudes of a tactical missile
(which uses conventional aerodynamic control) are normally manipulated using
external control surfaces of which there are three main types, consisting of ca-
nards, wings and fins.
Canards are small surfaces located at the front of the body, wings are larger
surfaces located within the middle of the body and fins are small surfaces located
at the rear of the body. Other control methods exist, such as, thrust vectoring
and reaction jet control which manipulate the direction of the thrust produced
by the rocket engine to achieve attitude changes. The choice of control scheme
is dependent on a number of factors which are beyond the scope of this thesis,
however an in-depth discussion of each control scheme is provided in [19] for the
interested reader.
The simulated AAAW in this thesis utilises a conventional fin control scheme.
A fin control scheme allows the guidance computer on the weapon to produce
four control deflections, which consist of, a required change in pitch (δq), heading
(δr), roll (δp) and drag (δx). Drag control is used in some Laser Guided Bombs
to increase the amount of drag on the bomb to reduce the speed of descent. Drag
control is not utilised in the guidance and control scheme of the AAAW model.
There are two possible fin configurations for conventional aerodynamic control
consisting of (+) and (×) configuration. This particular weapon model uses a
(+) configuration, as this is relatively simple to implement compared to (×).
Figure 2.4 indicates how this fin configuration produces the required attitude
changes. The fins are numbered in order to aid in discussing how the aerody-
namic control [19] is achieved.
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Figure 2.4: + configuration
In the simple case of (+) roll orientated weapon using four control surfaces (as
in this model) [19], a pitching moment is created by deflecting fins 2 and 4 which
results in a normal force in the direction of the required pitch. A yawing moment
is created by deflecting fins 1 and 3 in alternative directions, inducing a side force
into the desired yaw direction. A rolling moment is created by deflecting all 4
fins in either a clockwise or counter clockwise direction.
2.4.2 Coefficient of Drag Calculation
The coefficient of drag is the summation of the drag due to the body (CD0body)
control surfaces (CD0controlsurfaces) and stabilising surfaces (CD0stable). Control and
stabilising surfaces consist of wings, fins and canards. A missile can have either
1-3 sets of surfaces, for instance the Starburst missile system [19] has only canards
and a tail. This section will explore the calculation of the drag due to the body
and then due to the external control and stabilising surfaces.
2.4.2.1 Body Drag
The body drag consists of three parts, the drag due to the shock wave on the
nose, the drag due to the body base and the drag due to the body skin friction.
The drag due to the shockwave on the nose is determined based on its geometry,
namely the nose length (ln), nose diameter (dn), missile reference area (Sref ) and
the nose tip cross-sectional area (Shemi). The drag is also a function of the Mach
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number (M ) which is calculated as [15] :
M =
Va
a
(2.28)
where Va is the missile airspeed and a is the speed of sound (which is 343.2 m/s at
sea level and standard atmospheric pressure [15]). The drag due to the shockwave
on the nose CD0nose can then be defined as [19] :
CD0nose =
3.6[
(
ln
d
)(M − 1) + 3
] (Sref − SHemi)
Sref
+
3.6[
0.5
M − 1 + 3
] SHemi
Sref
(2.29)
It is worth mentioning that the drag due to the shockwave on the nose only be-
comes significant if the missile is travelling at supersonic speeds, it is relatively
small for subsonic speeds.
The drag due to the body base depends on whether the missile is coasting or
is powered and if the missile is at subsonic or supersonic speeds when the aero-
dynamic drag due to the body base is computed.
If the missile is travelling at supersonic speeds and is coasting then the drag
due to the body base (CDBase,Coast) will be [19] :
(CDBase,Coast) = 0.25/M (2.30)
If the missile is travelling at subsonic speeds and coasting then (CDBase,Coast)
becomes [19] :
(CDBase,Coast) = 0.12 + 0.13M
2 (2.31)
However if the missile is powered then the base drag is reduced by a factor of
(1−Ae/SRef ) (where Ae is the effective nozzle area ). The drag due to the body
base (CDBase,Powered) then becomes [19]:
(CDBase,Powered) = (1− Ae/SRef )(0.25/M) (2.32)
If the missile is travelling at subsonic speeds and is powered then the base drag
becomes [19] :
(CDBase,Powered) = (1− Ae/SRef )(0.12 + 0.13M2) (2.33)
When the missile rocket engine is on, the base of the missile is at a high pressure
therefore the base drag is low. Once the rocket engine cuts out the pressure drops
resulting in low a pressure area being formed behind the missile. Hence this is
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why the base drag is reduced at both subsonic and supersonic speeds during pow-
ered flight.
At subsonic speeds the pressure waves created by the missile passing through
the air will be smooth and gradual. The air begins to move out of the way of
the missile before the missile reaches it. Therefore at subsonic speeds, the more
significant contribution to the body drag in respect of the skin friction and nose
shockwave will be the skin friction.
The drag due to the skin friction is a function of the body length (l), dynamic
pressure (q) and Mach number (M ) and is defined as [19] :
CD0Body,Friction = 0.053(l/d)[M/(ql)]
0.2 (2.34)
As the missile accelerates to the speed of sound, shockwaves appear on the upper
and lower surfaces. Once the missile reaches the speed of sound (Mach 1), the
shockwaves will arrive at the trailing edge of the airframe. A bow shockwave will
also form at the nose. As the missile then accelerates past the speed of sound, the
shockwaves on the nose and trailing edge will become more oblique. The drag due
to the shockwave on the nose will then become the most significant contribution
to the missile body drag at higher than Mach 1 speeds.
2.4.2.2 Drag Due to Control Surfaces and Stabilising Surfaces
There are two components to the drag produced by the aerodynamic surfaces,
these are the drag due to the shockwave and the drag due to the skin friction.
The drag due to the shockwave for an external aerodynamic surface is a function
of the Mach Number (M), the specific heat ratio (γ), the leading edge sweep
and thickness angles (δLE,∆LE), the thickness of the mean aerodynamic chord
(tmac), the span (b) and the number of the specific aerodynamic surfaces being
considered (nw).
Taking the wing as example, the drag due to the shockwave on the wing (if
M cos ∆LE > 1) is defined as [19]:
CD0wing,wave = nw
2
[(γ(M cos ∆LE)2)]
{{
[(γ + 1)(Mcos(∆LE)
2]
2
} γ
γ + 1
{
(γ + 1)
[2γ(M cos ∆LE)2 − (γ − 1)]
} 1
γ − 1 − 1
}
sin2γLEcos∆LEtmacb
Sref
(2.35)
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If M∆LE < 1 then the drag due to the shockwave CD0Wing,Wave is 0.
The drag due to the wing friction CD0Wing,Friction is a function of the number
of aerodynamic dynamic surfaces being considered (nw), the length of the mean
aerodynamic chord (Cmac), the dynamic pressure (q) and the wing platform and
reference areas (SW , SRef ). It is defined as follows [19] :
CD0Wing,Friction = nw[0.0133/(qCmac)
0.2](2SW/SRef ) (2.36)
Therefore the total drag due to the wings is equal to:
CD0Wing=CD0Wing,Wave + CD0Wing,Friction
The weapon model in this thesis is fin controlled and uses fixed canards for
airframe stabilisation. Therefore the total drag CD0 due to the body and the
aerodynamic surfaces is defined as [19] :
CD0 = CD0body + CD0canard + CD0fins (2.37)
The calculation of the aerodynamic drag coefficient concludes the discussion of the
concepts and equations associated with the 6DoF dynamic model. The following
sections will discuss the propulsion, warhead, guidance and control considerations.
2.5 Warheads
There are a variety of warheads available which can be used in complex weapons,
with the most common warheads being blast effect, fragmentation, shaped charge
and explosive pellet [22]. In this model it is assumed that the weapon is fitted
with a fragmentation warhead. This is a warhead, which on detonation, sends
out pellets at high velocity from a central blast point in a circular band [11].
This type of warhead is representative of missiles such as Hellfire II which can
be outfitted with this type of munition. The size of the warheads employed in
this type of weapon is unknown and would be classified anyway. However the
effect of a fragmentation grenade such as the M67 can be found in open source
literature [23]. This grenade has a blast radius of 15m. A missile would most
likely be capable of carrying a larger warhead so for this model a conservative
blast radius of 15m is used. A simulated engagement is then classed as successful
if the final range of the missile to target is within 15m.
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2.6 Propulsion
There are a variety of propulsion technologies which can be utilised in the design
of a tactical missile. The main technologies are Turbofan/TurboJet, Ramjet and
Solid Fuel Rockets [15]. Turbofan/Turbojet engines are the oldest form of air
breathing jet engine and are most commonly used for subsonic cruise missiles.
For missiles which travel at supersonic speeds of between Mach 2.5 and Mach 5,
ramjet technology becomes preferable. However ramjets work by using the en-
gine’s forward motion to compress incoming air. Therefore they cannot produce
thrust at zero airspeed. In order to utilise a ramjet system, the missile must first
be boosted to the ramjet take over speed using a rocket engine. The weapon
model in this thesis is assumed to use a solid fuel rocket engine, to reflect the
fact, that for the purposes of small to medium tactical missiles, solid fuel rocket
motors are most often used. This is due to their simplicity, reliability and ability
to produce thrust across the entire Mach range [19]. It is also very simple to
produce a varying thrust profile.
Solid fuel rocket engines, like all rocket engines, work on the same Newtonian
principle that “to every action, their is an equal and opposite reaction”. The
propellent in solid rockets consists of fuel and oxidiser. The fuel and oxidiser
mix and burn at high pressure within the propellent storage casing, creating a
fluid exhaust in the form of a hot gas. The gas is passed through a supersonic
propelling nozzle which uses the heat energy of the gas to accelerate the exhaust
to a very high speed. The reaction to this produces thrust pushing the engine in
the opposite direction.
Some weapons will have a varying thrust profile such as constant thrust or boost
sustain thrust. In a solid fuel rocket engine, this is simple to achieve. The gas
produced from the combustion chamber is a function of the burn area of the
propellent. A large burn area results in more gas and hence greater thrust and
vice versa, the change in burn area over time (burn rate), produces the required
time varying thrust profile. To change the burn area, a cavity of different shapes
such as a wagon wheel or star can be drilled through the centre of the propellent
creating various thrust profiles.
Solid fuel rocket motors with propellent cross section shapes are radial burn-
ing engines, which means that the propellent is burnt from inside of the relevant
shape outwards [24]. A progressive burn is achieved using a tubular shape, in
this case the surface area of the propellent increases with burn time. The greater
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the surface area of the burnt propellent, the greater the thrust produced.
Star and rod-and-tube cross section shapes are designed to produce the same
burning surface area over the duration of the burn time, resulting in a constant
thrust. A multi-fin shape is designed to produce a boost-sustain profile, which is
achieved from the initial burn surface area increasing rapidly over a given burn
time. The burn area will then stabilise and remain constant for the remainder of
the propellent burn time.
In terms of modelling the rocket engine for the weapon model, the important
concept is the specific impulse. The specific impulse Isp of a rocket engine is
a measure of how energetic the propellent or propellent combination is for that
particular engine [24]. It is defined as the thrust (T ) per unit mass flow (m˙g) of
propellant (at the Earth’s surface) as follows :
Isp =
T
m˙g
(2.38)
It is given in units of seconds, with typical values for solid fuel rockets being of
the order 250s [19]. The AAAW model has a boost-coast profile, which is simply
implemented as the rearrangement of the above equation :
T = Ispm˙g (2.39)
The boost phase has a duration of 3s and boosts the missile to speeds of over
Mach 2.
2.7 Guidance and Control
A missile guidance system can be divided into three distinct phases, known as
the boost, midcourse and terminal phases [11]. In the boost phase, the missile
accelerates from its launch platform. During the midcourse phase, the guidance
system will make minor modifications to the trajectory of the missile in order to
keep the target within the intercept capability of the weapon. In the terminal
guidance phase, the weapon will lock on to the target and will perform rapid
manoeuvres to intercept the target.
There are four main types of guidance systems employed in modern tactical mis-
siles [15]. These consist of Command, Beam-Riding, Semi-active Homing and
Active Homing guidance. The choice of guidance system on the missile will de-
pend on a variety of factors such as the intended targets the missile is designed
to engage and the cost of the weapon and launch platform.
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2.7.1 Command Guidance
Commanded missiles are guided by commands transmitted from the ground via a
command link [25]. The missile and target are tracked by a measurement system
such as radar [15]. A guidance computer then calculates the required accelerations
and associated control commands required to steer the missile onto a collision
course with the target. This type of guidance is referred to as command-to-line-
of-sight, the midcourse part of the trajectory will normally be optimised to avoid
excessive accelerations in the terminal phase of the engagement [26]. It should
be noted that commanded missiles do not have their own seekers they can only
execute orders, therefore their accuracy depends on the precision of the tracking
system.
2.7.2 Beam Rider
A beam rider system consists of a missile with an on-board seeker, and a launch
platform which has a radar or laser source [11]. The radar or laser source detects
and tracks the target and launches the missile to engage. The seeker onboard
the missile determines whether the missile lies within the centre of the beam. If
the missile does not lie within the centre of the beam then its on-board guidance
computer will apply controls to realign the missile with the target. As all the
required information is extracted directly from the radar, there is no requirement
for a command link which results in this type of system being relatively simple
to implement. However the missile will often be forced to follow a trajectory that
will require strong accelerations in the terminal phase, even if the target itself
has not performed evasive manoeuvres [26].
2.7.3 Semi-active Homing
Homing guidance is the most common and modern form of missile guidance in
use today. There are three primary forms of homing guidance consisting of semi-
active, active and passive guidance [11]. In a semi-active system the target will
be illuminated by a radar on the launch platform. The missile is launched and a
passive seeker on the missile detects and tracks the signal scattered off the target.
Unlike beam riding systems, the missile does not have to remain within the radar
beam. Because of this, proportional navigation is often exploited (Proportional
Navigation is discussed in detail in Section 2.8.1 of this Chapter). The disadvan-
tage of using a semi-active homing system is that the target has to be constantly
illuminated for the duration of the engagement. This is especially dangerous for
an aircraft launching an air-to-air missile as the aircraft must keep approaching
the target at which point the enemy may also launch a missile.
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2.7.4 Active and Passive Homing
To overcome the constant illumination issue found in semi-active homing missiles,
active seekers have been developed. Active homing missiles have a seeker which is
both a transmitter and detector of radiation, with the most common form being
radar [11]. An active homing missile will often have a two phase guidance system.
In the first part of the engagement i.e the midcourse phase, the missile will be
guided to the target using either command or inertial guidance. Once the target
is within range of the seeker, the seeker will lock onto the target and proceed to
the terminal phase of the trajectory often using a proportional navigation guid-
ance law [26].
There are two disadvantages to this type of system. The first is that active
homing missiles are considerably more expensive than other types of weapon.
The second is that because the missile seeker is a transmitter as well as receiver,
the target will often be able to detect that the missile is locked onto it, therefore
covert operation will not be possible.
A passive homing missile works much the same way as an active homing mis-
sile, however the seeker is only a detector of radiated energy from the target.
For example an infrared homing missile is a system which locks onto the heat
generated by a target such as in the anti air role, where the missile locks onto the
heat produced by the aircraft’s engines.
2.8 AAAW - Guidance System
The weapon model in this thesis is classed as an active homing system, utilising
a proportional control scheme and a radar seeker to detect and track targets.
The guidance system is activated once the weapon has left the launcher. The
missile will first climb to a predefined ride height (boost phase), at which point
the midcourse guidance phase will begin. The weapon will now be unpowered
and will therefore coast for the remainder of the flight. At a weapon range from
launch of 3000m the radar seeker will be turned on. The seeker will now be in
target detection mode which means it will scan for a potential target.
The guidance computer in the midcourse phase is required to generate airframe
accelerations which will roll stabilise the weapon, maintain the desired ride height
and a specified heading. The accelerations are then produced by deflecting the
appropriate controls surfaces. The weapon will scan for a target up to a maxi-
mum weapon range from launch of 10000m.
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On the successful detection of a target the seeker will enter the tracking mode
and the weapon will begin the terminal guidance phase. The accelerations ap-
plied during this guidance stage will cause the weapon to lose altitude. The
commanded accelerations will also manoeuvre the weapon to maintain the target
within the seeker scan area during this final guidance phase. This is because
the seeker is used to determine the position and velocity of the target which are
required in order to calculate the appropriate accelerations. The accelerations for
the terminal guidance stage are calculated using a Proportional Navigation (PN)
law.
2.8.1 PN Guidance Law
Proportional navigation (PN) is the most widely used guidance law in use today
[27]. The basic principle of PN guidance is to generate a missile acceleration
“which will nullify the line-of-sight (LOS) rate between the target and intercepter
[27] ”, where the line of sight ~RLOS is defined as vector between the position of
the intercepter (~Ri) and the position of the target (~RT ).
~RLOS = ~RT − ~Ri (2.40)
The guidance law [28] can then be expressed as :
~ac =
N
R2
((~RLOS × ~VC)× ~Vi)− ~g (2.41)
where ~ac is the required airframe acceleration,~VC and ~Vi are the closing velocity
and intercepter velocity respectively, N is the navigation constant and R is the
range from the weapon to the target. The gravity bias term ~g insures that the
“intercepter is not pulled under the target in the terminal phase of the engage-
ment” [28].
2.9 Fire and Forget AAAW Operation
The AAAW model used in this research was originally designed to be representa-
tive of a Fire and Forget Anti-Tank weapon for an unrelated project. The weapon
can either be launched on or off-boresight. An on-boresight launch is simple,
the weapon will maintain the same yaw angle as the launcher once separation has
been achieved. An off-boresight launch consists of the weapon executing a turn
right or left after separation which will place the missile on a new heading. The
new heading is referred to as the off-boresight angle Ob and is calculated as :
Ob = ψ + ∆ψ (2.42)
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where ψ is the missile launcher yaw angle and ∆ψ is the required missile yaw
change. The missile launcher heading and off-boresight angle are set at the be-
ginning of the flight simulation. In this research, the missile launcher heading is
always set at 0◦ to represent a fixed launcher situation. This means that the ini-
tial yaw of the missile before a potential off-boresight command is initialised as 0◦.
If an off-boresight launch is simulated then the off-boresight command is executed
by the weapon control system once the simulation clock reaches 1s. This time
delay simulates the weapon clearing the launcher. The respective off-boresight
angle is then achieved using a yaw control, which requires the deflection of two
fins as previously shown in Figure 2.4.
In order to achieve a required fin deflection, gas is expended from a small tank
on the missile which in turn moves the fin. The weapon has a limited amount of
gas. Therefore the fins can only be deflected a limited number of times during
the course of the missile flight. However the fins are responsible for the control
of the weapon during all three guidance phases. Because of this, the weapon is
restricted to a maximum launch off-boresight angle of 40◦ to ensure that the fins
can deflected a sufficient number of times in order to facilitate weapon control
during the midcourse and terminal guidance phases. The 40◦ limit was imposed
in the original design specification. The AAAW can be launched with an off-
boresight angle in the range of ±40◦.
As the weapon in this case is simulated as a Fire and Forget system, no further
off-boresight commands can be transmitted to the weapon once the simulation
has begun. The weapon seeker is aligned to the centre of the missile airframe.
The choice of an on-boresight or off-boresight launch will then dictate where the
seeker will scan for a potential target.
2.9.1 Scan Area Prediction
In the weapon model the seeker, is simulated as a radar spot on the ground which
is scanned back and forth continuously. The seeker scan will scan a limited area
(within the xy plane) in front of the weapon as it flies. Only targets which have
been successfully detected within the scan area at a given scan time can therefore
be engaged and potentially intercepted by the AAAW. The x and y bounds of
the seeker scan area are a function of the ride height (Rh), missile heading (ψ),
the seeker depression angle (θd) and the positive and negative seeker sweep angle
limits (±α). Each of these parameters is depicted in the diagram shown in Figure
2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Scan Pattern Calculation
The coordinate limits of the scan area can then be calculated using equations
2.43 and 2.44 respectively.
x = x1 = x2 = Rh tan(90− θd) (2.43)
y± = (
√
x2 +R2h) tan(±α) (2.44)
In order to account for the heading of the missile, the x and y seeker limits are
assembled as a vector and rotated using the following matrix :[
cosψ −sinψ
sinψ cosψ
]
The scan pattern width dictated by the x and y limits can be tuned by varying
the seeker sweep angle limits (±α) and the ride height of the weapon. The typi-
cal scan pattern width is value of between 120-180m. Over the flight period the
weapon seeker will end up scanning a large continuous area. This is demonstrated
in Figure 2.6 for an off-boresight command of 0◦.
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Figure 2.6: Scan Pattern Calculation
In Figure 2.6 (a), the weapon range from launch is 3000m and therefore the seeker
has been activated. In Figure 2.6 (b), the weapon has been in flight for 15s and,
as can be seen from the plot, a large area has now been scanned by the seeker. In
Figure 2.6 (c), the weapon has been in flight for 36.2s and is now 10000m from
the launch point. The seeker has therefore been deactivated. It can be seen, from
the Figure that applying an off-boresight angle will therefore change where the
seeker will scan for a target for the duration of the weapon fly out.
The weapon model is implemented as a series of mathematical functions which
are programmed using the Matlab language. Each function such as the 6DoF
model or guidance algorithm is defined within an individual Matlab file. The tra-
jectory of the weapon is then determined from the integration of the equations of
motion (equations 2.8-2.13) using a fixed time step of 0.005s. The time step has
been fixed at 0.005s to be representative of the operating frequency of a modern
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weapon INS guidance system such as the Novatel UIMU-LN200 [29]. This system
has an operating frequency of 200Hz which is equivalent to an integration period
of 0.005s. The calculation of a weapon trajectory and associated scan area takes
approximately 3s based on the PC specification outlined in Appendix B.
2.9.2 On or Off-Boresight Launch Selection Criteria
The AAAW model was originally designed to be initialised at the point that a
target had been detected from a separate sensor system. The target range, speed
and heading of the threat where therefore known. In order to launch the weapon,
an appropriate off-boresight angle (if required) is determined by considering a
predicted target trajectory and the weapon reachable set.
2.9.2.1 Target Trajectory Prediction
As the weapon model was developed to be representative of in service Anti-
Armour Weapons, it was therefore designed to engage the type of targets that this
class of weapon would be deployed against operationally. Anti-Armour weapons
are used to engage targets which normally travel relatively slowly and in straight
lines and/or constrained to terrain features such as roads [30]. Examples of this
type of target are vehicles such as Main Battle Tanks, Air Defence Units and
Armoured Personnel Carries.
The weapon has a maximum flight time of approximately 40s, so will therefore
engage the target in a short space of time.
The predicated target trajectory is calculated by assuming that the target will
maintain the detected heading and speed for a duration of 40s, in essence the
target will travel in a straight line. As the manoeuvrability of targets such as a
Main Battle Tank is poor compared to the weapon, then even if the target does
manoeuvre it will not significantly deviate from the predicted trajectory over such
a small time period.
Once the predicted trajectory has been determined the appropriate off-boresight
angle (if required) can be calculated by using the reachable set.
2.9.2.2 Reachable Set Calculation
Each off-boresight angle will result in the seeker scanning a given area over the
flight time of the weapon. The weapon model can be set to fly at an off-boresight
angle of ±40◦ (as the weapon heading is initialised as 0◦). By calculating the
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seeker scan area for each off-boresight angle value and joining the respective scan
areas together results in the reachable set of the weapon. The reachable set
represents the maximum detection boundaries of the seeker and is shown Figure
2.7.
Figure 2.7: Reachable Set with a Missile Launcher Heading of 0◦
In order for the weapon to intercept a target, the target must have one or more
points along its trajectory whereby it can be detected by the seeker within the
boundaries of the reachable set.
2.9.2.3 Combination of Reachable Set and Predicted Target Trajec-
tory
Some or all of the predicted trajectory will intercept the reachable set area. In
order to determine whether an off-boresight angle is required each seeker scan
area is compared with the predicated target trajectory, beginning with the scan
area associated with an off-boresight launch of −40◦.
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The off-boresight angle is incremented in steps of 1◦ until one or more valid
detection points are determined for a given scan area. A valid detection point is
simply when the target at a given time step will lie within the area being scanned
by the weapon at the same time step. This requirement is depicted in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Determination of Detectable Location within the Reachable Set
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In Figure 2.8, the initial target position has been set at the Cartesian [x(0), y(0)]
co-ordinate of [9920, 1218]. The velocity of the target is 26m/s which is repre-
sentative of the maximum road speed of a modern light tank such as the FV 107
in service with the British Army [31], the velocity components [vx(0), vy(0)] are
[−25.85,−2.717]. The predicted trajectory is then calculated using the following
expression : 
x
vx
y
vy
 (t+ dt) =

1 dt 0 9
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 dt
0 0 0 1


x
vx
y
vy
 (t) (2.45)
where t = the prediction time and dt is the prediction time step. The matrix
within this expression is a constant velocity model [32]. A target which obeys this
model will, maintain the same velocity for the 40s period hence the prediction of
a non manoeuvring target trajectory. A time step (dt) of 0.005s is used to define
the target at each point along the predicted trajectory. This time step is used
to match the integration time for the weapon model. Based on the predicted
trajectory, an off-boresight angle of 7◦ has been determined. This will result in
a target detection by the seeker at 31.5s provided that the target follows the
constant velocity prediction.
A flow diagram of the simulation of the Fire and Forget (F.F) AAAW engag-
ing a target is shown in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9: Fire and Forget AAAW flow diagram
The target state at T= 0 is the initial position and velocity at the beginning of
the simulation. The weapon state at T= 0 is the launch, position and attitudes
of the weapon. The simulation will continue until either the weapon range from
launch (R.F.L) exceeds 10km, which will coincide with the seeker being turned
off, or the target is intercepted based on the conditions described previously.
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2.9.3 Fire and Forget AAAW Demonstration
In order to demonstrate how the AAAW model engages a typical non manoeu-
vring target, a simulation was performed with the target following the predicted
trajectory determined in section 2.9.2. The results of the simulation are displayed
using various plots in Figures 2.10 and 2.11.
In Figure 2.10 (a) the trajectory of the missile during the boost (W.T.B), mid-
course (W.T.M) and terminal (W.T.T) guidance phases is shown.
In Figure 2.11 (a) the target detectability during the three guidance phases is
shown. A state of N.D means that the target is not detectable by the seeker, in
that the target does not lie in the area being scanned by the seeker at that point
in time. A state of D means that the target is within the scan area of the weapon
and is detectable. The seeker mode during the three guidance phases is depicted
in Figure 2.11 (b). The seeker is either off (S/O), in detection mode (S/D) or in
tracking mode (S/T).
The weapon altitude, speed, heading and range is shown for the boost (Bo),
midcourse (Mi) and Terminal (Te) guidance phases.
The time that the weapon spends in each guidance phase is also depicted in
Figure 2.10 (c).
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Figure 2.10: AAAW successful direct attack strike, (plot set 1)
As can be seen from Figure 2.10 (a) and (c) the weapon spends the majority of
the simulated flight in the midcourse guidance stage. The target behaviour over
the flight time of the weapon is depicted in Figure 2.10 (b) and (d). The target
maintains a constant heading from the initial target location (T.S) which can be
described as the target obeying a constant velocity model (C.V). The target is
detected within the area being scanned by the seeker at 27.5s (S.A.D) due to the
missile position at that point in time (W.P.D). The trajectory of the weapon and
the predicted scan area for an off-boresight command of 7◦ is also shown in this
plot which are labeled as P.S.A and W.T respectively.
36
Figure 2.11: AAAW successful direct attack strike (plot set 2)
The seeker is in the detection mode during the midcourse guidance phases. As
can be seen from Figure 2.11 (b) the seeker entering the tracking mode and the
weapon beginning the terminal guidance phase happens simultaneously. The
weapon altitude and yaw plots depicted in subplots (c) and (e) respectively indi-
cate an underdamped control law.
The suggestion of an underdamped control law is apparent from the time taken
for the altitude to settle to the desired ride height and the slightly erratic weapon
yaw angle during the application of the off-boresight command. In a real world
system the guidance system would be tuned to ensure the controls where prop-
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erly damped. However the guidance system was never developed to be a perfect
control system and it is an internal property of the (legacy) system being studied.
The underdamped control does not pose an issue in this research for a num-
ber of reasons. The first reason is that the weapon is a considerable distance
from the target at launch it will only engage the target in the later part of the
trajectory so the effect of the time taken for the ride height to settle is inconse-
quential as the ride height is stable from approximately 11s onwards. The effect
of the yaw instability is only a potential issue when an off-boresight command
is executed, however the yaw angle stabilises within less than 2s from an off-
boresight command being enacted. Furthermore the observed instability in the
terminal guidance phase is to be expected as the weapon will execute a number
of rapid manoeuvres during this guidance phase.
The weapon simulation ends at the point that the altitude reaches zero. The
engagement is classified as successful if the final range of the weapon to the target
is less than the blast radius of the warhead (15m). Even with an underdamped
control law the weapon range to the target at the point that this simulations
ended is 2.73m which is well within the blast radius of the fragmentation war-
head.
The underdamped control law will also effect the seeker scan area as dictated
by equations 2.43-2.44. However the oscillations that will be observed in any
calculated scan pattern (see Figure 2.7) will be accounted for when determin-
ing the off-boresight command required for a target interception. Therefore the
performance of the weapon due to the underdamped control law is unaffected.
2.10 Chapter Review
This chapter has discussed the various concepts and theories surrounding the
components of a modern missile system. The specific parameters of an Advanced
Anti-Armour Weapon to be used in this research have been discussed. The anal-
ysis of the trajectory of the weapon in a typical non manoeuvring target engage-
ment indicated that the weapon has an underdamped control law which results
in oscillations in the calculated scan area.
The oscillations are accounted for when determining the off-boresight angle re-
quired for the interception for a non manoeuvring target and therefore do not
impact the performance of the weapon against non manoeuvring targets. The
38
oscillations will also be accounted for in any system which shapes the trajectory
and scan area in response to a manoeuvring target. Therefore the underdamped
control law will not impact upon the performance of the weapon to intercept
manoeuvring targets in any integrated fire control system proposed in this thesis.
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Chapter 3
The Small Boat Threat
Though AAAWs such as the Brimstone and Hellfire missiles were primarily de-
veloped to engage targets with relatively poor manoeuvrability, research is now
being conducted to determine whether these systems can be deployed against
more challenging targets. A new role foreseen for these systems is in the defence
of high value maritime military assets, such as aircraft carriers, against the small
boat threat [33]. The small boat threat encompasses four main scenarios which
consist of using a boat to [34] :
1. Act as a waterborne improvised explosive device.
2. Smuggle weapons including WMDs into a country’s port, the ship itself
could be used as a platform for denotation for some smaller nuclear weapons.
3. Conduct piracy operations such as those often reported off the coast of
places such as Somalia.
4. Conduct stand off attacks i.e. Man Portable Air Defence System attacks
However in terms of the threat against high value maritime assets, two highly
problematic behaviours in particular have been identified based on research car-
ried out at the Naval Postgraduate School in the USA [35]. The behaviours
consist of either attacking the asset (ship) or harassing it in an effort to distract
the ship for an attack by some other craft or vehicle. In both behaviours the
assumption is made that the target will use its maximum dynamic capability at
all times in order to accomplish the goals of each behaviour.
If the boat attacks, then it will follow a trajectory which will bring it towards the
ship in order to mount to some form of assault. In an attack scenario the boat
will seek to reach its target in the shortest time possible. This will be to minimise
the time that the ship has to form a defensive response in order to intercept the
boat and prevent the attack.
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If the intent of the boat is to distract the ship, then it will initially travel suffi-
ciently close to the ship to gain attention. However it is then likely to perform
several manoeuvres in order to make the task of tracking it as difficult as possible.
The actual definition of a small boat varies slightly for different countries. For
instance, the United States Department of Homeland Security describes a small
boat as any vessel used for commercial or recreational purposes less than 300
gross tons [7].
What the small boat threat represents in essence is a small, fast and agile target.
This is a type of target which this Fire and Forget AAAW model (and AAAWs
in general) was not originally designed to engage.
3.1 Small Boat Target Model
The first step in the research is to develop a target model which is a realistic
representation of a boat suitable for a small boat attack. The performance of the
current Fire and Forget AAAW model can then be evaluated against this type of
target.
3.1.1 Boat Specification
The target model in this thesis is representative of fast attack craft in service
today, such as the Royal Marines MK3 Rigid Raider [36], as this type of craft is
a possible candidate for a small boat attack. This is because they are fast, highly
manoeuvrable and potentially difficult to track due to their small size. As such,
the dynamic capability of the target consists of [36] :
1. A maximum speed of 50 knots which is equivalent to 26m/s.
2. A turning radius of 150m. At the maximum speed, this allows turns of
approximately 0.5g to be executed which is equivalent to a turn rate of
10◦/s
The target model is used to calculate a realistic trajectory for the small boat to
follow over a maximum simulation period of 40s i.e. the maximum flight time of
the weapon. At each point in time for a given trajectory, the target is constrained
to follow one of three behaviours which consist of :
1. The boat is traveling at its maximum speed of 50 knots at a constant
heading.
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2. The boat is turning right at a turn rate of 10◦/s.
3. The boat is turning left at a turn rate of 10◦/s
By constraining the target to using its maximum speed and turn capability, the
performance of the AAAW and any future systems is then evaluated based on a
realistic small boat threat.
3.1.2 Random Target Trajectory Generation
As the boat is capable of performing both direct and manoeuvring attacks, the
behaviour of the boat for a given target trajectory is therefore determined at
random using the following process.
1. The AAAW can only intercept a target which lies within its reachable set.
The boundaries of the reachable set as determined by off-boresight angles
of +40◦ and −40◦ coincide with a target range of 10000m and a polar angle
of ±35◦. Real world sensor systems such as radar describe the position of
a target in terms of a range and bearing. The polar angle limits and the
equivalent bearings are shown in Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1: Off-boresight and equivalent Polar and Bearing angles
42
The range of the target is set at the maximum detection and engagement
range of the weapon of 10000m. An initial polar angle (θ) is then randomly
generated using the following expression :
θ = −35 + 70A (3.1)
where A ∼ U(0, 1). The polar coordinates are then converted into their
Cartesian equivalent which results in an initial target position which lies
within the reachable set of the weapon.
2. A target heading ψ is then determined as :
ψ = 0 + 360A (3.2)
The maximum target speed and generated heading are then used to deter-
mine the velocity components (vx, vy). The cartesian position and velocity
components are assembled as a target state vector X(0) = [x, vx, y, vy]
3. A target behaviour (b) is then determined using the following expression
which produces an integer value of either 1, 2 or 3 :
b = 1 + 2A (3.3)
A value of 1 is a continuation of the current heading. A value of 2 or 3 is
turn to the right or left respectively.
4. A duration time for the behaviour (bd) of between 5s and maximum time
of 40s is then determined as :
bd = 5 + 35A (3.4)
5. The initial state vector, behaviour decision value and the behaviour dura-
tion time are then passed as inputs to a function which calculates the target
trajectory produced under those conditions for the behaviour duration bd
using the following expression :
X(T + dt) = F (b)X(T ) (3.5)
where :
T = Current trajectory calculation time
dt = Trajectory calculation time step (0.005s)
X(T ) = State vector of the target at the calculation trajectory time (T)
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F (b) = The dynamic model associated with behaviour decisions 1-3.
The dynamic models F(1), F(2), F(3) are defined as [32] :
F (1) =

1 dt 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 dt
0 0 0 1
 F (2/3) =

1
sin(ωdt)
ω
0
−1− cos(ωdt)
ω
0 cos(ωdt) 0 −sin(ωdt)
0
1− cos(ωdt)
ω
1
sin(ωdt)
ω
0 sin(ωdt) 0 cos(ωdt)

where ω is the turn rate, F(2) is a target coordinated turn to the right
(C.T.R) therefore the turn rate is set as +10◦/s. Matrix F(3) is a coordi-
nated turn to the left (C.T.L), with an associated turn rate of −10◦/s.
At the end of the behaviour duration time, the trajectory calculation time (T )
is compared with the maximum flight time of 40s. If they are equal, then the
trajectory calculation process ends. If not, steps 3-5 of the process are repeated
with the updated state vector now defined at Xb(T = bd) used as the input to
Equation 3.5.
The process continues until the target trajectory time is equal to 40s. A flow
diagram of the trajectory calculation process is provided in Figure 3.2
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Figure 3.2: Random Trajectory Calculation Flow Diagram
In order to develop an accurate performance assessment of the AAAW model
against this type of target, only trajectories whereby the target could be detected
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at a point within the reachable set should be considered. To determine whether
a valid detection location exists for given random target trajectory, the position
of the target trajectory at each point in time is compared with the reachable set
area at the same point in time. A valid detection will occur when the target lies
within the reachable set defined at the same point in time. This requirement is
shown in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: Determination of valid detection point for a randomly generated
target trajectory
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For this particular trajectory a valid target detection location was determined at
a position of [9460,628] at a scan time of T=28.7s. If the randomly generated
target trajectory does not have a valid target detection location, the trajectory is
discarded. The trajectory calculation process can be repeated for any number of
desired target trajectories. Each target trajectory is calculated within the Earth
axes system
In order to asses the overall performance of the weapon against a small boat,
80 random trajectories were generated using the target model. The trajectories
produced by the model encompass a variety of scenarios. The behaviour of the
target for each trajectory can then be characterised by calculating the area under
the curve bounded by the target line of sight ~RLoS and the actual target trajectory
as follows:
1. The target line of sight ~RLoS between the target location at T = 0s ~Rin and
the location of the target at T = 40s ~Rend is determined as :
~RLoS = ~Rend − ~Rin (3.6)
The target line of sight (LoS) represents the non manoeuvring trajectory
the target would follow to arrive at the same location at T = 40s.
2. Each location along the generated target trajectory has a Cartesian coordi-
nate (x, y) which is defined at a given point in time, ~Rt(T ). The distance,
d(T ) between the target position at time T and the line of sight is calculated
as :
d(T ) =
|~RLoS × (~Rt(T )− ~Rin)|
|~RLOS|
(3.7)
The distance at each time step is representative of the magnitude of the
deviation from a non manoeuvring trajectory, brought about by the target
behaviour up to that point in time. The calculation of distance is depicted
in Figure 3.4 to aid in the understanding of the significance of the computed
distance.
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Figure 3.4: Calculation of deviation from LoS
3. The area (A) is then the total deviation of the target from the non manoeu-
vring trajectory (LoS) for the 40s period. It is calculated as the summation
of each deviation (distance) value defined at time steps (dt) of 0.005s as
follows :
A =
T∑
T=0
d(T ) (3.8)
An area value of 0m2 coincides with a non manoeuvring target with an area value
greater than 0m2 characterising a manoeuvring target trajectory. The area due
to the target deviation from the LoS for each randomly generated trajectory is
shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: 80 Random Target Trajectories
The size of the deviation brought about by a manoeuvre is dependent on the
duration and whether it results in the target then traveling in a direction which
takes it further away or brings it closer to the LoS. The area will therefore increase
as the target spends a greater proportion of the 40s trajectory travelling in a
direction away from the LoS. The effect of different manoeuvres on the size of
the area is shown in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.
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Figure 3.6: Determination of valid detection point for a randomly generated
target trajectory
The plots shown in Figure 3.6 are generated from the data produced for trajectory
number 16 (Figure 3.5). For this trajectory the target was initialised at a position
of [9994,349]. It then executed a 11s turn right, before performing a turn to the
left which had a duration of 25s. At T = 36s, it began a turn to the right which
was terminated when the trajectory calculation clock reached T = 40s. As can
be seen from Figure 3.6 (c) the deviation of the target increases rapidly from T=
0, to T= 22s as the target is moving in a direction away from the line of sight.
The deviation then starts to reduce as the effect of the remaining target motion
is to bring the target closer to the line of sight.
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Figure 3.7: Determination of valid detection point for a randomly generated
target trajectory
The plots shown in Figure 3.7 are generated from the data produced for trajectory
number 17 (Figure 3.5). For this trajectory the target was initialised at a position
of [10000,0], it then executed a 10s turn left, before performing a 15s turn right.
At T=25s, the target began a 9s turn to the left before continuing on the resultant
heading for 6s. As can be seen from Figure 3.7 (d), though the target performs
3 turns just as in the case of Figure 3.6, the actual area due to the deviation
brought about these manoeuvres is smaller.
3.1.3 Fire and Forget AAAW Benchmark
The Fire and Forget AAAW was tested against the 80 random trajectories pro-
duced by the target model. The weapon successfully intercepted 47 targets and
failed to intercept 33 targets. The 33 failed intercepts, can be described as obey-
ing 1 of 3 failure modes, which are defined as:
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Failure Mode 1 states that the manoeuvring target has not been detectable
within the scan area at any point in time. This is due to the calculation of a
weapon trajectory and thereby scan area based on the assumption of a non ma-
noeuvring target trajectory.
Failure Mode 2 applies to both manoeuvring and non manoeuvring targets.
In this failure mode, the target has been detectable within the scan area of the
weapon at a given point in time. However the seeker has failed to recognise the
valid target and has therefore not entered the tracking mode. Due to the detec-
tion failure, the weapon does not then enter the terminal guidance phase resulting
in the target not being intercepted.
Failure Mode 3 again applies to both manoeuvring and non manoeuvring tar-
gets. In this failure mode, the target is detectable within the seeker scan area.
The seeker recognises the valid target and transitions into the tracking mode.
The weapon then begins the terminal guidance phase, however the guidance fails
to reduce the weapon range to the target to less than 15m, which is the warhead
blast radius. The target in this case escapes the effect of the warhead and is
therefore not intercepted.
Each failed intercept in the case of this Fire and Forget system is classed as
Failure Mode 1. An example of this Failure is provided in Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
The target in Figure 3.8 was initialised at a position [x, y] of [10000, 350], with
a velocity [vx, vy] of [−25.6,−3.6]. Based on this initial state a predicted non
manoeuvring target trajectory was determined. An off-boresight angle of 2◦ was
calculated to achieve a target detection by the weapon seeker. At T=0s, the
target began an 8s turn to the left. The target then maintained the new head-
ing as result of the turn for 8s. At T=16s, the target began a 23s turn to the right.
The weapon trajectory during the boost (W.T.B) and midcourse guidance phases
(W.T.M) is provided in Figure 3.8 (a) as well as the target trajectory (T.T). The
target start location is shown in Figure 3.8 (b) along with the weapon trajectory
(W.T) and the predicted scan area (P.S.A).
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Figure 3.8: Manoeuvring Target Miss by F.F AAAW (plot set 1)
The initial 8s turn to left, results in the target following a trajectory which takes
it out of the predicted scan area. The trajectory followed by the target over
the remaining 32s, does not bring the target back into the weapon scan area.
Therefore the target does not become detectable. As a result, the seeker does not
transition into the tracking mode and the weapon does not enter the terminal
guidance phase. As can be seen from Figure 3.9 (b) and (f), once the weapon
range from launch reaches 10000m, the seeker transitions into the off-mode (S/O).
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Figure 3.9: Manoeuvring Target Miss by F.F AAAW (plot set 2)
The results of the 80 simulated engagements are presented in Figure 3.10. The
area due to the target deviation in each engagement is determined based on the
observed behaviour up until the point of interception or T=40s if the weapon
failed to intercept the target.
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Figure 3.10: Fire and Forget AAAW Results
Of the 80 trajectories generated by the target model, 14 would be classed as non
manoeuvring targets, in that no manoeuvres where executed by the target for
the duration of the 40s weapon fly out. 6 trajectories generated by the model
consisted of non manoeuvring behaviour for the majority of the simulation and
then the execution of a late turn.
In these 6 trajectories it is possible to intercept the target based on the pre-
diction of a non manoeuvring target in the F.F system before the target is able
to manoeuvre. In this and future chapters, this type of trajectory will be referred
to as a possible intercept before manoeuvre (I.B.M) target.
The remaining 60 target trajectories are manoeuvring targets (M.T), whereby
the target will perform one or more manoeuvres such that the target can not be
intercepted before the first manoeuvre occurs. The performance of the weapon
against the three types of trajectories produced by the model is summarised in
Table 3.1
N.M I.B.M M.T
14/14 6/6 27/60
Table 3.1: Fire and Forget (F.F) System Results
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For each of the manoeuvring target intercepts, the weapon will have maintained
a constant heading up until the point the target is detected, which means the
seeker will have scanned only a limited area. The conditions for an intercept of
a manoeuvring target will therefore be very restrictive and can be explained by
considering trajectory 21 using Figures 3.11 and 3.12.
In the engagement depicted in Figure 3.11, the target was initialised at a position
[x, y] of [10000, 530], with a velocity [vx, vy] of [−25.8, 2.7]. Based on this initial
target state a predicted non manoeuvring trajectory was determined. An off-
boresight angle of 4◦ was calculated to achieve a target detection by the weapon
seeker.
At T=0s, the target began an 8s turn to the left, at T=8s, the target began
a 13s turn to the right. From T=21s until detection by the seeker at T=28.5s
the target maintained the new heading, obeying a constant velocity model. The
target trajectory in the xy plane is depicted in Figure 3.11 (b). The weapon
trajectory, position, scan area at the detection point and the predicted scan area
are also plotted and are labelled as W.T, W.P.D, S.A.D and P.S.A respectively.
In Figure 3.12, (a) the detectability of the target is plotted against time. If
the target follows the predicted trajectory, then it should be detected within part
of the total predicted scan area at some point in time. If the target manoeuvres,
it will then potentially follow a trajectory which takes it out of the predicted scan
area making it undetectable by the seeker. Even if the target then manoeuvres
further and arrives back in the predicted scan area, it may not lie within the
predicted scan area at the correct point in time and will still be undetectable.
56
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000
0
200
400
600
800
X /m
Y 
/m
(a) − Engagement Shown in XY Plane
 
 
W.T.B
W.T.M
W.T.T
T.T
7000 7500 8000 8500 9000 9500 10000
400
500
600
700
800
900
X /m
Y 
/m
(b) − Target Trajectory XY Plane
 
 
T.S
C.T.L
C.T.R
C.V
P.S.A
W.P.D (t=28.5s)
S.A.D (t=28.5s)
W.T
0 10 20 30 40
Bo
Mi
Te
W
ea
po
n 
Gu
ida
nc
e 
Ph
as
e
Simulation Time /s
(c) − Weapon Guidance Phase Vs Time
0 10 20 30 40
C.V
C.T.R
C.T.L
Simulation Time /s
Ta
rg
et
 B
eh
av
iou
r 
(d) − Target Behaviour Vs Time
Figure 3.11: Successful Manoeuvring Target Intercept by F.F AAAW (plot set 1)
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Figure 3.12: Successful Manoeuvring Target Intercept by F.F AAAW (plot set 2)
In this trajectory the target has manoeuvred in and out of the predicted scan
area. During both the left and right turns the target is undetectable by the
weapon seeker. However the target becomes detectable by the seeker at T=28.5s
as it lies within the area being scanned by the seeker at that instant in time.
3.2 Data Link AAAW
For each of the failed intercepts, the target had performed one or more manoeu-
vres. Each of the 33 failed engagements were classed as Failure Mode 1. The
performance of the AAAW against manoeuvring targets can therefore be consid-
ered limited at best.
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Current UK defence programs such as the Selective Precision Effects at Range
(S.P.E.A.R) package are exploring the use of data links with Advanced Anti-
Armour Weapons such as the Brimstone Missile system [9]. In essence a data link
allows a weapon to be retargeted in flight either by sending new target data or
off-boresight commands. If a target was tracked after the weapon was launched
then feasibly a weapon could be retargeted in response to detected target be-
haviours. This will enhance the performance of the weapon against manoeuvring
targets. The information transmitted using the data link will depend on the spe-
cific guidance system used on the weapon.
In the case of this weapon model, a data link will allow off-boresight commands to
be transmitted to the weapon in flight. The application of an off-boresight com-
mand will change the weapon heading and therefore the area scanned over the
simulated flight period. Two or more off-boresight angle commands will therefore
create a shaped weapon trajectory and scan area.
In section 2.9, the off-boresight angle, Ob was defined as follows :
Ob = ψL + ∆ψ (3.9)
where ψL was the initial launcher yaw angle and ∆ψ was the yaw angle which
was limited to an absolute maximum value of 40◦. A data linked AAAW can
receive a number of off-boresight commands during the flight. Each off-boresight
angle transmitted to the weapon after launch can then be defined as :
Ob = ψw + ∆ψ (3.10)
where ψw is the current missile heading (yaw angle) and ∆ψ is the required
missile heading change. The limitation of a maximum absolute heading change
of 40◦ still applies. Therefore, for a weapon which is able to receive a number
of off-boresight commands, the absolute sum of the changes required for each
off-boresight command must not exceed 40◦. This can be stated mathematically
considering n off-boresight commands Ob with each command requiring a heading
change ∆ψb as follows :
b=n∑
b=1
|∆ψb| ≤ 40◦ (3.11)
Each off-boresight command sent to the weapon which is not equal to the pre-
vious command will reduce the size of the heading change which can be applied
for future off-boresight commands. This can be demonstrated considering the
trajectory and subsequent plots presented in Figure 3.13.
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The trajectory of the weapon was shaped at four points in time. At T=0s an
off-boresight command of 5◦ was supplied to the weapon while in the launcher.
At T=10s, T=15s and T=25s, off-boresight commands of 15◦, 0◦ and 10◦ were
sent to the weapon (simulating the transmission over a data link).
The four off-boresight commands required heading ψb changes of 5
◦, 10◦, −15◦
and 10◦ which are shown in Figure 3.13 (b). The absolute sum of these heading
changes is 40◦.
In Figure 3.13 (d) the heading change capability spent is labelled as H.C.S and
the maximum heading angle which can be applied for remaining off-boresight
commands is labeled as H.C.R.
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Figure 3.13: Example of a Shaped AAAW Trajectory
After 25s the absolute maximum cumulative heading change of 40◦ has been
reached which means that the weapon cannot receive any further off-boresight
commands after this point in time
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3.3 Proposal for an Integrated Fire Control Sys-
tem
The ability to retarget the weapon in flight has the potential to increase the per-
formance of the weapon against manoeuvring targets. As demonstrated in Figure
3.13, the weapon can only be retargeted a limited amount, which is specified by
the maximum cumulative absolute heading change of 40◦.
In order to maximise the ability of the weapon to intercept a manoeuvring target,
the limited retargeting capability must be utilised efficiently over the simulation
period. In that, it should be possible to retarget the weapon sufficiently at any
point in time, in response to a detected target manoeuvre. This thesis proposes
that this requirement can be achieved from the calculation of an optimal shaped
weapon trajectory in each engagement. This trajectory can be calculated using
an integrated fire control which considers four questions :
1. What is the current behaviour of the target?
2. What is the possible future behaviour of the target?
3. What is the maximum allowable yaw change ?
4. What is the optimal trajectory based on the answers to questions 1-3?
An integrated fire control system consists of three fundamental aspects, target
tracking, target behaviour prediction and weapon trajectory optimisation. The
Fire and Forget approach only considers one possible target trajectory i.e. a non
manoeuvring target, but the target could follow a variety of trajectories during
the weapon fly out. If the target is tracked after the weapon launch, its behaviour
can then be monitored.
The behaviour can then be used to update the current single prediction or calcu-
late a number of potential future target trajectories. By using a more advanced
behaviour prediction, the future optimal weapon trajectory can then be updated
in response.
A general flow diagram of an integrated fire control system is provided in Figure
3.14.
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Figure 3.14: Flow Diagram of an Integrated Fire Control System
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3.4 Chapter Review
This chapter has evaluated the performance of the existing Fire and Forget
AAAW model against a fast agile surface vessel which is able to manoeuvre at
several points in time during the weapon fly out. The performance of the weapon
against non manoeuvring targets was excellent. The AAAW successfully inter-
cepted all 14 of the non manoeuvring targets generated by the target model. This
was to be expected given the original design specification of the AAAW which
is based on non manoeuvring targets. The AAAW was also able to intercept 6
targets which would have performed a manoeuvre later in the simulation, had
the intercept not occurred.
The weapon successfully intercepted 33 of the 60 manoeuvring targets gener-
ated by the model.
The chapter highlighted that current UK research programs are exploring the
use of data links with this type of weapon. The data link allows the weapon
to receive off-boresight commands in flight in order to shape the trajectory of
the weapon. This has the potential to significantly improve the performance of
the weapon against manoeuvring targets. Here, performance is measured by the
number of manoeuvring targets, the weapon is able to intercept over a number
of simulated engagements. The greater the number of intercepts, the greater the
performance of the weapon.
The level to which the performance can be increased, is limited by the trajectory
shaping capability. This limitation is due to the original design specification of
the AAAW, such as the number of times the fins can be deflected and a maximum
cumulative off-boresight angle of 40◦.
It was postulated that in order to achieve the maximum performance increase,
the limited trajectory shaping (retargeting) capability would have to be efficiently
utilised over the course of the weapon fly out. This could be achieved using an
integrated fire control system.
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Chapter 4
Integrated Tracking and
Trajectory Prediction
The ability to shape the trajectory and scan area of the weapon will not im-
prove the performance of the AAAW against a manoeuvring target if the only
predicted target behaviour considered is that of a non manoeuvring target. There-
fore, in order to utilise this capability effectively and improve the performance of
the weapon, a wide range of possible target trajectories must be considered. A
method can then be established to calculate the optimal weapon trajectory based
on a given set of performance criteria, considering the widest range of possible
target trajectories.
If the target is tracked after the initial detection, the information obtained re-
garding its behaviour, such as whether it has manoeuvred, can be used to update
the possible future trajectories. The optimal weapon trajectory can be revised
considering the updated predicted target trajectories. By doing this the perfor-
mance of the weapon against manoeuvring targets should improve. In that the
number of manoeuvring targets intercepted by the AAAW should increase.
The combination of the information obtained from the tracking system with a
realistic target model can be referred to as an integrated tracking and trajectory
prediction system. This system underpins the three integrated fire control sys-
tems described in Chapters 5 and 6. This chapter consists of three parts, the first
part presents a model which can be used to determine the possible trajectories
that the target may follow over a 40s weapon flight period. The second part of
the chapter discusses the development of a tracking system which is capable of
successfully tracking a small manoeuvrable boat. The final part of this chapter
discuses how the tracking and prediction model are integrated in order to improve
the quality of the target trajectory prediction over the weapon fly out.
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4.1 Target Trajectory Prediction
It is standard practice to define an exclusion zone around naval military as-
sets [37]. Unauthorised ships which then enter the zone can and will be fired
upon [38]. In this thesis, the exclusion zone will be considered as the reachable
set of the AAAW, the intent of a target entering the reachable set will be un-
known. The target may or may not have electronic capability which allows it
to determine if it is being tracked by the high value asset that the AAAW is
protecting. There is no military doctrine available for the target, which means
that the trajectory cannot be predicted based on a set of known rules. As such,
the future trajectory of the target is also unknown. However, provided that the
target always follows a trajectory which allows it to be detected within a scan
area determined by a prediction of a non manoeuvring target, then this lack
of information would not pose a significant problem. However, this constraint
severely limits the performance of the AAAW to intercept manoeuvring targets.
It is possible to predict the potential trajectories that the target could follow
over a potential 40s engagement by considering the target as obeying one of three
behaviours at each point in time which consist of the target :
1. Travelling at its maximum speed (obeying a constant velocity model)
2. Performing a turn to the right at its maximum turn rate (obeying a coor-
dinated turn model).
3. Performing a turn to the left at its maximum turn rate (obeying a coordi-
nated turn model)
The constraints on the target behaviour are based on the assumptions outlined in
the research carried out by the Navel Research Institute in relation to the small
boat threat [35]. The target can transition between behaviours over the flight
time of the weapon. The integrated fire control systems will seek to shape the
trajectory of the weapon based on the predicted target trajectories. In order for
a shaped weapon trajectory to be effective, the approximate minimum time that
the target would spend in each behaviour to allow it to escape the seeker scan
area determined for a non manoeuvring target, for part of, or all of the weapon
fly out must be calculated.
This time can be calculated approximately considering a target position at a
detection of [10000,0]. The scan area of the weapon over a 40s flight will then be
evenly distributed either side of the target position as shown in Figure 4.1 (a).
In this scenario, there is no advantage to the target turning left or right.
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The time taken for the target to achieve a lateral distance of greater than half
of the seeker width based on a turn followed by constant velocity motion is then
a reasonable approximation to this behaviour duration. This is because target
turns of a shorter duration will produce trajectories which are closer to the non
manoeuvring target trajectory. These targets would be less problematic, reducing
the effectiveness of the prediction.
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Figure 4.1: Calculation of Behaviour Time for Target Trajectory Prediction
From Figure 4.1 subplot (b) it is apparent that the most appropriate behaviour
duration time is 5s. This is because a turn of less than 5s increases the time
taken for the target to escape the seeker scan area and a turn duration of longer
than 5s does not reduce this escape time. A turn/manoeuvre duration of 5s is
therefore a reasonable approximation to use to predict the various trajectories.
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Each target behaviour can be represented as a state which is assigned an integer
value in the range of 1-3 as follows:
1. A state value of 1, is a 5s continuation of the previous target heading at
maximum velocity.
2. A state value of 2, is a 5s turn to the right at a turn rate of 10◦/s
3. A state value of 3, is a 5s turn to the left at a turn rate of 10◦/s
A continuation of the previous target heading at maximum velocity is calculated
using a constant velocity model (FCV ). A turn to the right (FCTR) or left (FCTL)
is calculated using a co-ordinated turn model [32]. The transition matrix required
for each of these dynamic models have been defined mathematically in Section
3.1.2
Each possible target trajectory is then simply a combination of 8, 5s state transi-
tions which occur from an initial target state at a range of 10000m. For instance,
a 5s turn to the right from launch by the target followed by 35s of continuing
along the new heading would be defined in state transitions as 21111111.
The model predicts a total of 6561 (38) possible trajectories that the target could
follow during the weapon fly out, including a non manoeuvring trajectory. The
model is designed to be initialised from a target state observed from an ini-
tial radar detection. In order to show the complexity of the initial prediction
trajectory distribution, the distribution of potential target trajectories has been
calculated from an initial state of [10000,-26,0,0]’ and is shown in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Predicted Trajectories
Due to the large number of possible trajectories calculated by the model, it can
be difficult to understand the time aspect of the trajectory distribution consid-
ering only this figure. Therefore Figure 4.3 is also provided which displays three
trajectories predicted by the model. The trajectories are colour coded to show
the 8 states which form each predicted trajectory and the time period associated
with that particular state.
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Figure 4.3: Selected Predicted Target Trajectories
The scan area associated with a given shaped trajectory would only be able to
overlap part of the predicted trajectory distribution. In order to be able to opti-
mise the weapon trajectory in the integrated fire control systems, the probability
of the target following each of these approximate predicted trajectories during
each 5s interval must be calculated.
4.2 Calculation of Associated Trajectory Prob-
abilities
A target following one of the predicted trajectories will be within 1 of 3 states at
each point in time. As each state has a duration of 5s, the target will therefore
perform 8 state transition states (or steps) for a 40s target trajectory prediction.
A state transition also includes transitions whereby the target remains in the
current state.
As the military doctrine of the target is unknown, the most suitable approxi-
mation for the target behaviour is therefore a random process. In addition, it
is assumed that the future state transitions of the target are independent of the
past sequence of state transitions (Markov assumption [32]).
Based on this set of approximations, the probability of the target following any
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one predicted trajectory during each 5s time period, can be calculated by mod-
elling the behaviour of the target as a Markov Chain as follows:
1. Let S = {S1, S2, S3} be the possible target states and ~Pn = [p1, p2, p3]′ be
the vector of probabilities of each state at step n. The probability pi is then
the probability that the target is in state Si at step n.
2. The conditional probability pij that the target will be in state Sj at step
n+ 1, provided it was in state Si at step n is then defined as :
pij = P (Xn+1 = Sj|Xn = Si) (4.1)
where Xn+1 and Xn denote the future and present state respectively.
3. The associated transition matrix P which contains all the conditional prob-
abilities for the chain is then defined as:
P =
p11 p12 p13p21 p22 p23
p31 p32 p33
 (4.2)
4.2.1 State Probability and Transition Matrix Calculation
In order to determine the state probabilities, the minimum time that the weapon
seeker will be on and therefore in the detection mode before turning off must
first be considered. The seeker will be on and in the detection mode while the
weapon’s range from launch is less than 10km.
The time taken for the weapon to achieve this range to turn off is primarily
dependent on whether the weapon executes one or more off-boresight commands
during the flight. Each off-boresight command will increase the weapon deceler-
ation rate with greater yaw changes increasing the deceleration rate further. As
the weapon speed then decreases, the time taken to achieve a range from launch
of 10000m will therefore increase. The effect on the time taken for the weapon
to achieve the turn off-range by the application of an off-boresight command is
demonstrated in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Speed Curve comparison of off-boresight angles of 0◦ and −40◦
The speed and range graphs displayed in Figure 4.4 (a) and (b) are calculated
with an launch off-boresight angle of 0◦ and −40◦ respectively. If the weapon
is launched with an off-boresight angle of 0◦ it will reach the turn of range at
T=36.8s. If the weapon is launched with an off-boresight angle of −40◦ it will
reach the turn of range at T = 39.8s. In Figure 4.5, the seeker turn off time as a
function of the launch off-boresight angle is shown.
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Figure 4.5: Seeker turn off time as a function of the launch off-boresight angle
Increasing the absolute value of the launch off-boresight angle increases the seeker
turn off-time. The same effect can be achieved by sending off-boresight commands
to the weapon once it is in flight. As can be seen from Figure 4.5, the time at
which the seeker turns off varies from approximately T=36.2 to T=39s. It can
therefore be confidently assumed that the seeker should be on for 35s of flight,
regardless of the manoeuvres performed by the weapon. This minimum seeker
time is equivalent to 7 state transitions for each predicted target trajectory. At
T = 35s, there will be 37 possible target locations with an associated discrete
probability distribution. Assuming that the seeker does not detect the target
untill T=35s, then the state probability values can be tuned based on what the
probability distribution would be at T=35s.
There is an equal probability that the target will turn right or left (P2, P3), there-
fore the three state probabilities can be determined using the following equation
:
[P2/P3] =
1− P1
2
(4.3)
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Decreasing the probability of state 1 P1 will increase the probabilities of P2 and
P3. As the probabilities of P2 and P3 increase the total probability distribution
at 35s will spread out. The state probabilities are calculated by considering the
ideal case whereby the initial target location at T=0s is at the centre of the
scan area associated with a predicted non manoeuvring target. The scan area
will therefore overlap the middle of the predicted target distribution at T=35s as
shown in Figure 4.6 (a).
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Figure 4.6: Predicted target locations at 35s
If P1 = 0.9, P2/P3 = 0.05. then the scan area associated with a non manoeuvring
target prediction results in a total probability of intercept of 0.46. However this
probability of intercept is due to the high peak associated with a non manoeu-
vring prediction which is shown in subplot (c). The probabilities of the remaining
target positions are negligible in comparison due to the shape of the probability
distribution.
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Any shaped trajectory and scan area generated by an integrated system will
therefore be heavily biased towards the non manoeuvring trajectory and the lim-
ited number of other predicted target positions, which can be detected by focusing
the seeker scan area over the non manoeuvring probability peak. An integrated
solution will therefore not achieve a significant improvement in the performance
of the AAAW to intercept a manoeuvring target. If the probability of state 1
is reduced, the significance of the bias towards a non manoeuvring target is de-
creased which can be demonstrated using Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: Total probability of intercept considering only the scan area associated
with a direct attack
As shown in the Figure, the bias towards the non manoeuvring trajectory reaches
a minimum level at a P1 of 0.4. If the probability of state 1 is reduced further,
then a bias towards manoeuvring targets starts to appear. This will have the
opposite effect of biasing the trajectory solution towards a manoeuvring target
trajectory, reducing the performance of an integrated system against a non ma-
noeuvring target. As the possibility of a non-manoeuvring attack still exists
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then any integrated system should be capable of intercepting this type of attack
and other target behaviours. Therefore the probability of each state was set as
~Pn = [0.4, 0.3, 0.3]
′ with the associated transition matrix P calculated as:
P =
0.4 0.3 0.30.4 0.3 0.3
0.4 0.3 0.3
 (4.4)
4.3 Sensor Selection - Pulsed Radar
The first part in the development of a simulated tracking system is the selection
of an appropriate sensor input. The sensor will provide a series of noisy measure-
ments for the target which are then processed by the tracking system.
There are a variety of sensor systems employed across, land, sea and air do-
mains. These range from electro-optical systems, which sense radiation in the
ultra-violet, visible and infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, to sys-
tems like pulsed and continuous wave radar.
For target detection at sea, the target will most likely be detected at a low graz-
ing angle (angle between the horizontal and a radar ray path). Electro-optical
systems detect a lot of background clutter from the sea at low grazing angles.
The background clutter in electro-optical systems consists of, saturation (sensor
output does not change with increased radiance) and false alarms (detection of
a non present target), which are due to the reflected solar radiation. [39]. As
electro-optical systems are passive, it is very difficult to separate foreground ob-
jects from background clutter on the horizon easily.
Radar systems perform considerably better at low grazing angles. The back-
ground clutter due to the large return echoes observed from the sea is also much
easier to separate from the target. This is because, the target will normally be
moving, therefore Doppler processing can be used to separate out the echoes and
detect the target. [40]
A pulsed radar system was chosen to be modelled in order to produce the noisy
measurements. This is because a radar system will perform well at low grazing
angles, with a further benefit that the range of the target is very easy to determine
using a pulsed system [41].
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4.3.1 Radar Theory
Radar uses radio waves to detect the presence and position of both friendly and
hostile objects, this is what is known as radio detection and ranging [41], i.e
(RADAR). The principle of radar is fairly simple. An antenna radiates electro-
magnetic energy in the form of radio waves which will scatter off anything which
it encounters such as land, sea and man made objects such as aircraft and ships.
A radio receiver (which can be the same antenna) detects reflected energy and
after amplification and signal processing of the received echoes, information such
as the range, bearing etc. of the target can be determined. There are a variety of
radar systems employed in both military and civil applications. The two funda-
mental radar technologies in radar system design for target detection are Pulsed
and Continuous wave.
Pulsed Radars transmit a pulse and then wait for the return signal. Though
relatively complicated to manufacture, the target range can be easily calculated
by measuring the time delay from the pulse being transmitted and the detection
of the reflected pulse [42].
Continuous wave radars transmit a continuous signal. Because of this the target
range cannot be calculated by measuring a time delay. However continuous wave
radars are capable of determining the velocity of the target accurately and their
range is only limited by the broadcast power level, making them ideal candidates
for things like early warning systems.
For the purposes of this research, the radar model is representative of a short
range pulsed radar system such as the Man-portable Surveillance and Target Ac-
quisition Radar (MSTAR) which is used by the British Army for the detection
of helicopters, vehicles and infantry. A pulsed radar model was selected because
pulsed systems like MSTAR [43] have a strong track record in short range surveil-
lance.
4.3.2 Noisy Measurement Generation
Pulsed radar systems describe the position of an object in 3D space in terms of
Range (R), Bearing (θ) and Elevation (ψ). As the radar model is only operating
over a short range, a flat earth approximation is used [44]. The implication of
this approximation, is that if the radar were looking down at the sea at a given
depression angle, the grazing angle can be taken as equal to the depression angle.
For simplicity, the radar is assumed to be operating at sea level. Therefore, the
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grazing angle can be taken as 0◦. The position of the target is then described
just in terms of range and bearing.
A radar system would detect clutter produced by the backscatter of the trans-
mitted signal by elements of the sea surface. The clutter would be observed as a
large background echo, which would be far greater in size than the return echo
from the target. The level of clutter is dependent on the sea state, i.e. whether
the sea was smooth or rough and on the size of the grazing angle. As the sea
state worsens and the grazing angle increases, the amount of clutter detected in-
creases [40]. Modelling the sea state and the associated clutter is highly complex
and beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore the sea state and associated clutter
are ignored in this model.
Based on these approximations, the noisy measurements are generated by firstly
converting the Cartesian coordinates (xt,yt) of the trajectory data supplied by
the target model into a true range Rt and true bearing θt which are achieved
using the following expressions :
Rt =
√
(xt − xr)2 + (yt − yr)2 (4.5)
θt = atan
(yt − yr)
(xt − xr) (4.6)
The standard deviation of the measurement noise in range and bearing is then
calculated, with the noises in the range and bearing measurements assumed to
be normally distributed with a respective mean of the true range and true bearing.
The standard deviation of the measurement noise for the range is a function
of the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR), the speed of light (c) and the radar bandwidth
(B) and can be defined as follows [41] :
σR ' c
2B
√
2× SNR (4.7)
The standard deviation of the measurement noise for the bearing is a function of
the radar beam width (∆θ) and the signal to noise ratio and is defined as [41] :
σθ ' ∆θ
2× SNR (4.8)
Normally distributed random noise values for both the range R and bearing θ
are calculated (δR, δθ). The range Rm and bearing θm measurements are then
defined as
Rm = Rt + δR (4.9)
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θm = θt + δθ (4.10)
with the final Cartesian position measurements (xm, ym) then calculated as :
xm = xr +Rmcos(θm) (4.11)
ym = yr +Rmsin(θm) (4.12)
Equations 4.7 and 4.8 have introduced a number of the important radar concepts
used to create the model such as the signal to noise ratio (SNR) and bandwidth
(B). Parameters such as these are optimised in the design of a radar system or the
creation of a mathematical model. As such they require an in-depth explanation
which is provided in the following section of this chapter.
4.4 Radar Model Design
The mathematical model of the radar system is based on the radar equation [41].
All calculations, in the model are performed by considering a radar with a single
antenna to transmit and receive. Sections 4.4.1-4.4.2 present the derivation of
this equation and further radar concepts. Section 4.4.3 presents the specification
of the final radar model and the associated noise standard deviations for the range
and bearing measurements.
4.4.1 Radar Equation Derivation
The first part of the derivation is to calculate the power density per unit area or
power flux (PFl) at the target from the radar installation. It is assumed that the
radar antenna has a peak power output Pt and that the power is concentrated
towards the target.
The power flux at the target is a function of the peak output power Pt, the
area of the sphere (at the end of the antenna) through which the power must
pass and the gain factor (Gt) associated with the geometry of the transmitting
antenna design. The power flux at the target (Pft) can therefore be defined as :
Pft =
PtGt
4piR2
(4.13)
The gain factor of the transmitter antenna is a function of the wavelength of the
transmitted radio waves (λ) and the effective area of the transmitter (Ae). It is
defined as :
Gt =
4piAe
λ2
(4.14)
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The wavelength is a function of the operating frequency (f) and the speed of
light (c) and is calculated as
λ =
c
f
(4.15)
The next step is to consider the power re-radiated by the target. Transmitted
radio waves will be reflected off any object encountered. Each object, including
the target and surrounding clutter, will intercept some of the incident power and
re-radiate it back towards the radar. The amount of incident power intercepted
and reflected by an object is what is known as the radar cross section ( σ) of that
particular object. Therefore the power re-radiated (Prr) towards the radar due
to the radar cross section of the target is calculated as
Prr =
PtGtσ
4piR2
(4.16)
The reflected power intercepted by the antenna is a function of the effective area
of the antenna and the spread of the power over a sphere of area 4piR2 on its
return path, as well as some losses in the system (L). The power intercepted at
the antenna PIA becomes :
PIA =
PtGtGrσλ
2L
4pi3R4
(4.17)
The final step is to consider the background noise (N). For all practical radars the
noise will be dominated by internal noise produced by thermally excited electrons.
The noise is a function of the Boltzmann constant (k), the system temperature
T0 and the radar bandwidth (B) and is calculated as [40]:
N = kT0B (4.18)
The final radar equation then becomes :
SNR =
PtGtGrσλ
2L
4pi3R4N
(4.19)
The radar equation is often used to find one unknown [41], for the purposes of
this research it was used to calculate a required transmitter power for a given
set of design parameters. For further information on the derivation of the radar
equation, see references [45] and [42].
4.4.2 Operating Frequencies, Pulse Width, Bandwidth
Before proceeding to discuss the specification of the radar model and the calcula-
tion of the required transmitter power. It is first worth exploring in greater detail
the significance of the selection of the radar operating frequency, pulse width and
bandwidth.
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4.4.2.1 Operating Frequency
The operating frequency of the radar is an important design consideration in
any radar system as it directly influences the angular resolution (beamwidth)
of the radar beam, the dimensions of the transmitter and the efficiency of the
propagation of the radio waves through the medium [41]. The angular resolution
(∆θ) of a radar beam is defined as :
∆θ =
λ
d
(4.20)
where λ is the wavelength and d is the diameter of the antenna.
A higher operating frequency results in a smaller beamwidth and therefore a
better angular resolution. However at lower frequencies the propagation of the
radio waves through the medium is more efficient but larger antennas are re-
quired. Short range surveillance radars such as the British MSTAR system [43]
operate in the I and J bands (8-20 GHZ).
4.4.2.2 Pulse width and Bandwidth
The selection of the pulse width is an important factor in the design of a pulsed
radar system. It dictates the range resolution (∆R), bandwidth and the sampling
frequency for a given range to be surveyed. The range resolution dictates how far
apart two targets must be in order to be recognised as two separate targets. It is
a function of the pulse width (τ) and the speed of light (c) and is defined as :
∆R =
cτ
2
(4.21)
As can be seen a shorter pulse width gives an improved range resolution. How-
ever, to survey the same area as a longer pulse width requires a faster sampling
frequency resulting in increased computational load on the digital signal process-
ing component of the radar system. A shorter pulse width results in a higher
bandwidth (as bandwidth is defined as) :
B =
1
τ
(4.22)
The higher the bandwidth for a given SNR, the smaller the standard deviation
of the measurement noise in terms of the range measurement. However a higher
bandwidth also increases the noise in the system, reducing the SNR.
It is easy to see the difficult balance that must be achieved by a radar engineer
when optimising the operating frequency, pulse width and bandwidth.
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4.4.3 Calculation of Transmitter Power
The first step in the calculation of the transmitter power is to set a reasonable
radar detection range. This can be accomplished by considering a real world
scenario, in that the integrated fire control system for the AAAW would be part
of a much larger multilayered defensive system [46].
The radar model described in this chapter would be known as a fire control radar,
as it is responsible for supplying target measurements to a weapon fire-control
system. A ship would most likely utilise a variety of systems for long range threat
detection such as continuous wave radar [41]. On the detection of a target, the
fire control system for the AAAW would be activated. However sufficient time
would have to be allowed in order to steer the fire control radar onto the target.
The specific timing details for this type of multilayered defence system are not
available within open source literature, therefore a reasonable time and associated
detection range has to be approximated.
The target has a maximum speed of 26m/s and the AAAW has a maximum
seeker target detection range of 10000m. Based on these parameters the detec-
tion range of the radar was set at 10500m. This would allow allow a minimum
time of just under 20s to steer the radar onto the target, which should be a rea-
sonable allocation of time.
As the pulsed radar is therefore operating over a short range, a J-Band oper-
ating frequency of 20Ghz is selected which results in a respective wavelength of
0.015m. In order to achieve good range resolution a short pulse width of 1µs was
selected. This results in a bandwidth of 1MHz and an associated noise level of
144dBW.
The next step is to consider the radar cross section of the target. In a real
would scenario, the radar cross section of the boat (target) would vary based on
a number of parameters. It is a highly complicated issue which is beyond the
scope of this research. However approximate constant values for various target
types are provided in [41]. A small boat has an approximate radar cross section
of 1m2 or 0dB [41].
For a target with a cross section of 0dB, the SNR for reliable detection was
set at 30dB [41]. The final variable in the model to be determined is the antenna
diameter which was selected to be 2m [41]. The transmitter power can then be
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calculated from a rearrangement of the radar equation as follows :
Pt =
SNR4pi3R4N
GtGrσλ2
(4.23)
After substituting the values defined from the specification provided earlier, a
peak power of 70W was obtained. The standard deviation of the measurement
noise in respect of the range (σr) and bearing (σθ) at the maximum detection
range was calculated as 3.037m and 1.2149× 10−4 rads respectively.
Changing the parameters of the radar model specification will change the noise
values obtained. However these values have been verified against open source
parameters for in service radars such as MSTAR [43] and the Ranger R4. The
radar model therefore represents a realistic model suitable for this research. In
an operational radar such as these systems, the transmitter power would most
likely be reduced using techniques such as pulse integration, which integrates a
number of lower power pulses to produce the equivalent transmitter power.
4.5 Stochastic Estimation
Measurements generated by any sensor will be noisy. The factors which control
the level of noise in a radar system have been discussed in detail in the preceding
Section. Once noisy measurements are available, whether modelled in the case of
this research, or within a real world system, the next issue to address is how to
estimate the state of the target at each point in time. A general approach known
as stochastic methods can be used for the purposes of estimation. Stochastic
methods estimate an unknown target state assuming that the measurement noise
is either statistical in nature or can be modelled as such [47]. They often make
use of state-space models.
An overview of the principle of state space models as well as important statistical
concepts are discussed in the following sections.
4.5.1 State-space models
State-space models are a convenient mathematical notation for estimation and
control problems. State-space models can be used to describe many processes
in the world from biological systems to processes in economics and physics [48].
By deriving a mathematical system model to represent the process, the tools of
mathematics can be used to obtain information about the process and potentially
control it.
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There are two types of system model, linear and non-linear. Most real pro-
cesses are non-linear. However the mathematics required to describe a non-linear
process are often highly complex. Therefore many non linear processes are often
approximated as a linear system as the mathematics required to define a linear
process are often simpler than that of non linear processes [48].
The state of a system is expressed as a state vector, with the variables within the
state vector describing the dynamic state of the system at a particular instant in
time. A state space model contains two equations consisting of the system and
measurement equations. The system equation is a mathematical model which
predicts the evolution of the system subject to a defined dynamic model and
external influences such as system inputs. The system equation will normally be
an incomplete characterisation of the system. Therefore, a process noise is also
used to account for modelling inaccuracies.
The measurement equation describes how the variables in the state vector are
related to the noisy observed measurements, where each measurement will be the
true system state with some added unknown noise which is often due to inac-
curacies in the sensor. Estimating the future state of a system using only noisy
measurements will often be ineffective for most tracking problems. In order to
produce a more reliable prediction of the future state of the system, predictive
filters can be used.
Predictive filters estimate the optimal state of a system by using a mathematical
model of the dynamics of the systems to propagate the state and the associated
uncertainties [49]. The propagated state is then combined with the best informa-
tion available from the measurements. There are numerous filter types available
with each one being appropriate for a certain type of uncertainty representation
and dynamic model.
The predictive filter used in this thesis is a Kalman filter which represents uncer-
tainties as Gaussian random variables (justification of a Kalman filter is provided
in Section 4.6). In order to understand how the filter works, the fundamental sta-
tistical concepts related to the Kalman filter are firstly reviewed, with the general
mathematical representation of a state space model then provided.
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4.5.2 Statistical Concepts
There are four main statistical concepts which must be understood in order to
fully understand how the Kalman filter works. These consist of the mean, stan-
dard deviation and variance of a scalar random variable as well as the covariance
of two scalar random variables which are defined as follows :
The expected value (E) [32] of a scalar random variable (x) which is more com-
monly known as the mean x¯ is defined as
x¯ = E[x] =
∫ ∞
−∞
xp(x)dx (4.24)
The second central moment [32] or variance (σ2) is then defined as
σ2x = E[(x− x¯2)] =
∫ ∞
−∞
(x− x¯2)p(x)dx (4.25)
with the square root of the variance yielding the standard deviation (σx)
σx =
√
σ2x (4.26)
In a multivariate case i.e two scalar random variables (x1, x2) with respective
means of (x¯1, x¯2) a covariance matrix is obtained [32] as
cov(x1, x2) = E[(x− x¯1)(x− x¯2)] (4.27)
The Kalman filter describes uncertainties using Gaussian random variables. This
means that the random variables has a probability density function p(x) defined
as :
p(x) =
1√
2piσx
exp
−
(x− x¯)2
2σ2x (4.28)
The Gaussian distribution is one of the most historically popular probability dis-
tributions used in modelling random systems. It is a special distribution because
it appears many random processes which occur in nature appear to be Normally
distributed or very close to it. Under some moderate conditions it can even be
proved that a sum of random variables with any distribution will tend towards a
normal distribution. This property is stated formally by the central limit theo-
rem [50].
4.5.3 State-space model mathematical representation
The concept of state space can be explained by considering a moving object. The
variables which represent the dynamical motion of the system i.e. position and
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velocity are defined by a sequence of states which can be collated into a state
vector x(k). The state vector can then be used to define the dynamical state of
the system at each time step (k). The evolution of the system state over time
is then predicted by the system equation. The system equations defined in this
thesis are direct discrete-time models as such they have the following general
form [32] :
x(k + 1) = F (k)x(k) +G(k)u(k) + Γ(k)v(k) (4.29)
where F (k) is state transition matrix and v(k) is a white process noise which
enters through a noise gain Γ [32]. The process noise accounts for inaccuracies in
the system model. It has an associated covariance matrix Q(k). u(k) represents
a set of assumed known controls with an associated input gain G(k) [51].
The measurement equation describes the relationship between the predicted
state vector x(k) obtained from the system equation and the observed measure-
ment z(k). The observed measurement will be the true state of the system with
the addition of a unknown noise w(k) which is defined mathematically as :
z(k) = H(k)x(k) + w(k) (4.30)
where H(k) is measurement matrix used to selected the measured states from the
state vector.
The system and measurement equations which define the state-space model form
the basis of virtually all linear predictive filters.
The Kalman filter was chosen as the fundamental component of the tracking
algorithm in this thesis because linear target dynamics are assumed and the mea-
surement noise produced by the radar model is white and Gaussian distributed.
The Kalman filter under these conditions will provide the optimal state esti-
mate [48]. In cases where the process model is not strictly linear, and can not
be successfully approximated as such, other filters exist such as the Extended
Kalman Filter [52], Unscented Kalman Filter [53] and the Particle filter [54].
4.6 Kalman Filter
The Kalman filter is a predictive filter which was introduced by Rudolf Kalman
in 1960 [55]. It is an algorithm that has been employed in various applications
from process control to stock price prediction [56].
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The filter estimates the instantaneous state of a linear dynamical system us-
ing measurements corrupted by Gaussian white noise which are linearly related
to the system state [57]. It is a recursive filter which minimises the mean square
estimation error without direct observation of the system state.
There are several good explanations of the Kalman filter available such as those
found in [55,58,59]
The notation for the filter algorithm provided in the following section is the
same as used in reference [32] which can be consulted for further information on
the implementation of the Kalman Filter.
4.6.1 Kalman Filter Algorithm
1. The first step in the algorithm is to initialise the estimated state xˆ(0|0) and
associated estimated state covariance P (0|0). The initial estimated state
can be obtained using some preliminary measurements.
2. The predicted state xˆ(k + 1|k) is obtained from a given system model as :
xˆ(k + 1|k) = F (k)xˆ(k|k) +G(k)u(k) (4.31)
where F (k) is a state transition matrix which predicts how the system
should evolve from state to state and G(k) is an input gain associated with
a set of known controls u(k).
3. The predicted measurement zˆ(k+1|k) is then calculated from the predicated
state as :
zˆ(k + 1|k) = H(k + 1)xˆ(k + 1|k) (4.32)
where H(k + 1) is a measurement matrix which will select the predicted
states which will be measured at k + 1.
4. The updated estimated state covariance matrix P (k+1|k) is then calculated
as :
P (k + 1|k) = F (k)P (k|k)F (k)′ +Q(k) (4.33)
where Q(k) is the process noise covariance matrix which represents the
inaccuracies in the assumptions made when characterising the dynamics of
the target for the system model.
5. The measurement prediction covariance S(k + 1) is then determined from
the predicted state covariance P (k+1|k), the measurement matrix H(k+1)
and the actual measurement covariance matrix R(k+1). The measurement
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covariance matrix is determined from the properties of the noise associated
with the measurement sensor. The measurement prediction covariance is
calculated as :
S(k + 1) = H(k + 1)P (k + 1|k)H(k + 1)′ +R(k + 1) (4.34)
6. The Kalman Gain W (k+1) is then determined, with the associated matrix
constructed in such a way as to minimise the covariance of the expected
errors in the predicted state as follows :
W (k + 1) = P (k + 1|k)H(k + 1)′S(k + 1)−1 (4.35)
7. A new measurement is obtained z(k+ 1) from the sensor and the predicted
state is updated from the innovation ν(k+ 1) and the filter gain W (k+ 1).
The updated state estimate xˆ(k + 1)(k + 1) is calculated as :
xˆ(k + 1|k + 1) = xˆ(k + 1|k) +W (k + 1)ν(k + 1) (4.36)
where :
ν(k + 1) = z(k + 1)− zˆ(k + 1|k) (4.37)
8. The final step in the filtering process is to update the estimated state co-
variance matrix as :
P (k + 1|k + 1) = [I −W (k + 1)H(k + 1)]P (k + 1|k) (4.38)
where I is the identity matrix.
The filter is computationally simple consisting of only three main steps; mea-
surement, innovation and prediction [51]. A simple tracking problem utilising
a Kalman filter is provided in the following section in order to give a clearer
understanding of the principle of operation of the filter algorithm.
4.6.2 Kalman Filter Simple Example
A target begins with an initial stateX(0) = [x, vx, y, vy] of [10000,−25.8, 1220, 2.7]′.
It moves at constant velocity for 35s. At T=35s, the target begins a 5s turn to
the right. Appropriate noisy measurements of the target position are produced
using the pulsed radar model. A simple Kalman filter utilising a constant velocity
model [32] is used to track the target for a 40s time period. The state transition
matrix, F (k) can be derived from the following equations of motion :
x(k + 1) = x(k) + vx(k)t (4.39)
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vx(k + 1) = vx(k) (4.40)
which yields the transition matrix :
F (k) =

1 dt 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 dt
0 0 0 1
 (4.41)
The measurement matrix H(k) is calculated to select the target states which are
measured (i.e. the cartesian position in [x, y]) and is defined as :
H(k) =
[
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
]
(4.42)
with the covariance matrices of the estimation error P (0|0) and measurement
error R(0|0) [32] initially defined as :
P (0|0) =

1 1
dt
0 0
1
dt
2
dt2
0 0
0 0 1 1
dt
0 0 1
dt
2
dt2
 · (σ
2) (4.43)
R(0|0) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
· (σ2) (4.44)
The system transition matrix assumes that the target is moving at constant ve-
locity during each finite time step (dt). However, for most real world applications
the target motion may suffer from some small fluctuations (accelerations). The
process noise covariance matrix Q(k) represents the inaccuracy in assuming con-
stant target motion.
Q(k) =

1
4
dt4 1
2
dt3 0 0
1
2
dt3 dt2 0 0
0 0 1
4
dt4 1
2
dt3
0 0 1
2
dt3 dt2
 · σ
2
v (4.45)
The σv term within the process noise covariance matrix represents the standard
deviation of the perturbations i.e. the typical acceleration of the target between
time steps. The typical accelerations will often be unknown, therefore the value
of σv becomes a design parameter which is tuned to produce the best tracker
performance. An increase in the value of this design parameter results in an
increase within the expected errors in the prediction step of the filter [51]. It
should be noted that the covariance matrix in this form will only work for fixed
time steps.
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In this particular example a small value of 0.1m/s2 was chosen as it is assumed
that the target velocity will vary only a very small amount.
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Figure 4.8: Kalman Filter Example
During the non manoeuvring motion of the trajectory, the Kalman filter performs
well, shown by the small error in the estimated position depicted in Figure 4.8
However once the target begins the turn, the error rapidly increases. This is due to
the mismatch between the assumed target dynamics in the filter (i.e. the constant
velocity model) and the actual target dynamics of a turn at T=35s onwards. The
poor performance of a single Kalman filter in respect of a manoeuvring target is a
common issue. Several algorithms have been developed to improve the ability of
the Kalman filter to track a manoeuvring target. These algorithms are discussed
in detail in the next Section of this Chapter.
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4.7 Manoeuvring Target Tracking (MTT)
There are two significant issues which all target tracking algorithms must seek
to overcome; the measurement origin uncertainty and the target motion uncer-
tainty [60]. The measurement origin uncertainty arises because a measurement
produced by any sensor system may have originated from another source instead
of the object of interest (target). For instance if the sensor system is a radar, then
measurements could originate from background clutter and false alarms. Numer-
ous techniques have been developed to understand and overcome this uncertainty.
The reader is directed to [61] and [62] for further information.
The target motion uncertainty arises due to the fact that the target may un-
dergo a known/unknown manoeuvre starting and ending at unknown points in
time. When the target manoeuvres, a mismatch will exist between the assumed
modelled dynamics i.e. the transition matrix used in the state equation in the
Kalman filter and the actual target dynamics [63]. For instance, if the Kalman
filter uses a constant velocity model with a low process noise and the target per-
forms a co-ordinated turn, then a large mismatch will exist between the estimated
state of the target and the actual state of the target.
In order to improve the performance of the Kalman filter to track a manoeu-
vring target, there are two fundamental approaches available. These consist of
Adaptive Estimation and the Multiple Model Approach.
4.7.1 Overview of Adaptive Estimation
Adaptive Estimation makes use of both estimation and decision in order to track
a manoeuvring target [64]. It is discussed in varying degrees of detail in refer-
ences [65–70].
The mismatch between the assumed target dynamics and the actual target dy-
namics will result in a poor track being produced by the filter. Adaptive estima-
tion techniques attempt to compensate for the mismatch by adapting the state
estimate in some way from decisions made about the behaviour of the target.
Normally the start and end time of a particular manoeuvre are used in order to
make the decision to adapt the state estimate. A variety of techniques exist in
this area with the three most common being, Adjustable Level of Process Noise,
Input Estimation and Variable State Dimension. These are the techniques which
are discussed in this chapter assuming a Kalman filter is being used to track the
target.
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4.7.2 Adjustable Level of Process Noise
The covariance of the process noise (Q) is used to represent the inaccuracies as-
sociated with the assumptions made about the behaviour of the target in the
prediction step of the filter [51].
A target manoeuvre will result in a large innovation, as there will be a significant
mismatch between the true and estimated target dynamics. The adjustable level
of process noise approach assumes that the effect of the large innovation on the
state estimate can be compensated for by scaling the process noise level covari-
ance by a predefined factor, or by switching to a higher process noise covariance
matrix. Once the manoeuvre terminates the process noise covariance matrix is
either scaled down or the filter switches to a lower predefined process noise co-
variance matrix.
The upward and downward adjustments of the process noise covariance level
are performed from the detections of the onset and termination of the manoeuvre.
There are a variety of manoeuvre detections techniques which can be used to
detect the manoeuvre onset and termination [65], [71], the most common choice
is a simple chi-square test [72].
There is a significant amount of literature utilising this technique in a variety
of applications [65], [66] [73]. The reason for the choice of the test indicated in
the reviewed literature is the simplicity in its implementation. The test is also
reliable provided that the individual terms of the test can be assumed to be in-
dependent and Gaussian in nature [64] (which is normally acceptable based on
the Central Limit Theorem).
The test can be applied in this research to determine whether there is statis-
tical evidence to suggest that the results of the successful manoeuvring intercepts
achieved by a data linked AAAW in a given integrated fire control system are
due to chance alone.
4.7.3 Input Estimation
Input Estimation assumes that a manoeuvring target can be described as a linear
system which is being driven by an unknown input, over a particular time window
[32]. This can be stated mathematically as :
x(k + 1) = F (k)x(k) +G(k)u(k) + Γ(k)v(k) (4.46)
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where u(k) represents an unknown input with an associated gain G(k), v(k) is a
process noise with associated gain Γ(k) and a covariance matrix Q(k). The esti-
mate produced by the filter will initially be reliable up until the target manoeuvre.
During the manoeuvre, the filter will be mismatched to the actual target be-
haviour. The error in the estimate will increase significantly. Input estimation
seeks to correct the state estimate by estimating the unknown input during the
manoeuvre time window.
There have been numerous papers on tracking published which make use of the
input estimation technique such as [74–76]. The algorithm can be briefly sum-
marised as :
1. A filter with an input u(k) of 0 is used to estimate the state during the
manoeuvre based on an original assumed system model such as a constant
velocity model.
2. The target manoeuvre will result in a large innovation for the mismatched
filter, which can then be considered as “a linear measurement of the input
with additive zero-mean white noise with covariance equal to the filter’s
innovation covariance [32]” .
3. Assuming that the manoeuvre started at the beginning of an assumed slid-
ing time window and that it can be represented as a constant unknown
input, then the input itself can be estimated using the method of Least
Squares.
4. The size of the estimated input (e.g. acceleration) is then compared against
the standard deviation of the measurement to determine whether the size
of the input is statistically significant. If the size of the input is significant
then the state estimate produced by the mismatched filter is corrected with
the effect of the estimated input from the start of the assumed time that
the manoeuvre began.
The reader is directed to either, [64] or [32] for a more in depth explanation of
the algorithm.
4.7.4 Variable State Dimension (VSD)
The Variable State Dimension approach is the the last of the three adaptive
estimation techniques to be discussed in this thesis. The VSD considers the ma-
noeuvre as an inherent part of the target dynamics.
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While the target is not manoeuvring, the filter operates using a quiescent state
model. A manoeuvre detection results in the filter switching to an augmented
state model which consists of further state components. The target is then tracked
with the augmented model until another decision is made to revert back to the
quiescent model. A summary of the algorithm is provided below :
1. The filter is initialised with a quiescent state model, the filter uses this state
model during the non manoeuvring part of the target motion.
2. A target manoeuvre is detected when a fading memory average of the nor-
malised innovations exceeds a predefined threshold.
3. The detection of a manoeuvre results in the estimator switching to an aug-
mented model which incorporates additional state components.
4. The filter switches back to the quiescent model when a manoeuvre is de-
clared terminated. This is when the extra estimated state components of
the augmented model become statistically insignificant.
4.7.5 Review of Techniques
Though each algorithm described in this chapter can be used to track a manoeu-
vring target, each one has a number of drawbacks which limits the effectiveness
of the algorithm for a MTT problem. The adjustable level of process noise ap-
proach is very simple to implement, however the calculated equivalent noise is
highly non stationary which makes it unsuitable for most MTT problems. As-
suming the input is constant in the case of the input estimation algorithm, limits
again this algorithm’s applicability to most MTT problems. The variable state
dimension approach is the best of the three algorithms. It is the most flexible
but relies more heavily on good manoeuvre detection [64] for MTT problems,
than the other techniques. Due to the greater dependency of VSD on good ma-
noeuvre detection, relatively few examples of this approach where found utilising
this approach for tracking a manoeuvring target [77, 78] compared to the other
algorithms. A more widely used approach in terms of tracking a manoeuvring
target is Multiple Model Methods which is the subject of the next section of this
chapter.
4.8 Multiple Model (MM) Methods
In general the most effective way of describing manoeuvring and non-manoeuvring
target motion is to use different motion models. For instance the motion of a civil-
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ian aircraft in the horizontal plane can be described by a nearly constant velocity
model for when the aircraft is maintaining its current heading with turns char-
acterised by a coordinated turn model [79].
One of the most common approaches to target tracking in the presence of mo-
tion uncertainty is the Multiple Model (MM) method. This is evidenced by the
wide range of literature available on manoeuvring target tracking utilising this
technique [80–93]. The first approach to this algorithm was the static multiple
model estimator. It uses a number of models, each matched to a filter to repre-
sent possible system behaviours (e.g. manoeuvres). These various behaviours are
commonly referred to as system modes. The early results of the static multiple
model estimator provided good results for systems with a time invariant unknown
or uncertain system mode. However the static approach has been proven inef-
fective for handling a manoeuvring target tracking problem in which the system
undergoes frequent transition between system modes [60,70].
It was not until 1988 when the highly cost-effective Interacting Multiple Model
(IMM) [94] estimator was developed that the multiple model approach became
an effective method for tracking a manoeuvring target.
One of the most significant properties of the IMM which makes it such an ef-
fective approach for manoeuvring target tracking is its ability to get around the
difficulty of the target model uncertainty [95].
In approaches prior to this and especially in decision-based methods, only the
estimate produced from one filter at any point in time was considered. The ac-
curacy of the tracker is then heavily dependent on correct behaviour detection.
The IMM estimator uses multiple models and generates a state estimate by com-
bining the state estimates produced from each filter within a given bank of models.
By weighting these estimates, improved tracker performance against manoeuvring
targets is established without the strong reliance on correct target model detec-
tion. Due to this property, the IMM was identified as the most suitable algorithm
to use with the tracking system developed for the current project.
4.8.1 IMM Algorithm Overview
Based on known or assumed parameters governing the nature of the expected
motion of the target, a number of models are defined. The IMM then assumes
that, at each point in time, the target will follow one of the predefined models.
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Each model is matched to a filter, which run in parallel. The state estimate
produced after each cycle of the algorithm (i.e. at the end of each time step) is
a weighted sum of the individual filter estimates [32].
1. The first step in one cycle of an IMM estimator which consists of n filters
running in parallel with associated mode probabilities µi (where i, j = 1 : n)
is to compute the mixing probabilities µi|j as follows :
µi|j(k − 1|k − 1) = 1
c¯j
pi|jµi(k − 1) (4.47)
where c¯j =
n∑
i=1
pi|jµi(k−1) and pi|j is the Markov chain transition probability
between modes.
2. A mixed state estimate xˆ0j and covariance are then calculated which are
used as the input for each filter along with the measurement z(k) in order
to yield the respective estimated states xˆj(k|k) and estimated covariances
P j(k|k). The calculation of the mixed state estimate and covariance for
each filter is performed as follows :
xˆ0j(k) =
n∑
i=1
xˆi(k − 1|k − 1)µi|j(k − 1|k − 1) (4.48)
P 0j(k− 1|k− 1) =
n∑
i=1
µi|j(k− 1k− 1){P i(k− 1|k− 1) + [xˆi(k− 1|k− 1)−
xˆ0j(k − 1|k − 1)] · [xi(k − 1|k − 1)− xˆ0j(k − 1|k − 1)]′} (4.49)
3. After the n filters have been applied the mode probabilities are then updated
as follows :
µj(k) =
1
c
∆j(k)c¯j (4.50)
where c is a normalisation constant defined as c =
n∑
j=1
∆j(k)c¯j and ∆j is
a likelihood function defined as ∆j(k) = N [z(k); zˆj[k|k − 1; xˆ0j(k − 1|k −
1)], Sj[k;P 0j(k − 1|k − 1)]]
4. The final step at the end of the filter cycle is to compute the combined state
estimate xˆ(k|k) and associated covariance P (k|k) which are calculated as :
xˆ(k|k) =
n∑
j=1
xˆ(k|k)µj(k) (4.51)
P (k|k) =
n∑
j=1
µj(k){P j(k|k) + [xˆj(k|k)− xˆ(k|k)][xˆj(k|k)− xˆ(k|k)]′} (4.52)
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As can be seen from the stated equations, the IMM is computationally simple.
A major advantage of this approach is that the algorithm is modular in nature
meaning that, filters can be modified, added, removed or replaced without a com-
plete redesign of the algorithm [96]. It is therefore possible to optimise the models
required to track a particular type of target.
Further explanation of the IMM algorithm can be found in reference [97].
4.8.2 IMM Design Considerations
As with any system, in order to obtain the best results, there are a series of design
considerations which need to be taken into account [98], such as :
1. The required level of accuracy in estimating the position and velocity of the
target.
2. The speed at which target manoeuvres are detected and terminated.
3. The complexity of the IMM implementation.
The performance of the IMM is generally dependent on two main design param-
eters; the model selection and the Markov chain transition probabilities.
4.8.2.1 Model Selection
When selecting the models to be used in the IMM algorithm, both the complex-
ity and quality of the models need to be considered. If the IMM algorithm uses
Kalman filters then some of the most widely models [32,99] are constant velocity,
constant acceleration and co-ordinated turn.
An extensive literature review showed that dynamical models are commonly de-
fined in discrete-time. This is based on the assumption that with most sensor
systems, measurements are often only available at a certain sample rate. The
models defined in this thesis are all in discrete time. The reader is referred
to [32,99] for other types of model.
The general definition of a discrete time equation for the non manoeuvring mod-
els is a function of the current state x(k), the state transition matrix F (k), a
process noise v(k) and the gain vector Γ and is calculated as :
x(k + 1) = F (k)x(k) + Γv(k) (4.53)
A constant velocity model has a state vector in two dimensions of x(k) =
[x, vx, y, vy]
′, where x, y are the position of the target in the x axis and y axis
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respectively and vx, vy are the associated velocity components of the target. The
state transition matrix F (k) and gain vector Γ are defined as :
F (k) =

1 dt 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 dt
0 0 0 1
 Γ =

1
2
dt2
t
1
2
dt2
t

The process noise v(k) in this case is a zero mean white acceleration sequence,
with the covariance of the process noise is computed as [32]:
Q(k) =

1
4
dt4 1
2
dt3 0 0
1
2
dt3 dt2 0 0
0 0 1
4
dt4 1
2
dt3
0 0 1
2
dt3 dt2
 · σ
2
v (4.54)
Though the target is assumed to be travelling at constant velocity, its motion will
be subject to small perturbations [51]. For example, the motion of an aircraft
is subject to effects such as turbulence and drag. In order to account for these
effects, a small value of σv is selected, where σv represents the standard deviation
of the perturbations, i.e. the typical fluctuations in velocity between time steps.
A constant acceleration model has a state vector in two dimensions of x(k) =
[x, vx, ax, y, vy, ay]
′ where x and y are the position of the target in the x and y
axes, vx and vy are the associated velocities and ax and ay are the acceleration
components of the target. The state transition matrix F (k) and gain vector Γ
are defined as [32]:
F (k) =

1 dt 1
2
dt2 0 0 0
0 1 dt 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 dt 1
2
dt2
0 0 0 0 1 t
0 0 0 0 0 1

Γ =

1
2
dt2
dt
1
1
2
dt2
dt
1

The process noise v(k) in this case is a zero mean white sequence, the acceleration
is a discrete-time Wiener process. The covariance of the process noise is computed
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to be [32]:
Q(k) = E[Γv(k)v(k)Γ′] =

1
4
dt4 1
3
dt3 1
2
dt2 0 0 0
1
2
dt3 dt2 dt 0 0 0
1
2
dt2 dt 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
4
dt4 1
3
dt3 1
2
dt2
0 0 0 1
2
dt3 dt2 dt
0 0 0 1
2
dt2 dt 1

σ2v (4.55)
In this case, it is assumed that the target is travelling with a constant acceler-
ation. However, the accelerations will be subject to small fluctuations. A small
value of σv is selected to account for this.
A coordinated turn model with a known turn rate has a state vector
in two dimensions of x(k) = [x, vx, y, vy]
′ where x and y are the position of the
target in the x and y axes and vx and vy are the associated velocity components
of the target. The state transition matrix F (k) and vector Γ are defined as [100]
:
F (k) =

1
sin(ωdt)
ω
0
−1− cos(ωdt)
ω
0 cos(ωdt) 0 −sin(ωdt)
0
1− cos(ωdt)
ω
1
sin(ωdt)
ω
0 sin(ωdt) 0 cos(ωdt)

Γ =

1
2
dt2
t
1
2
dt2
t

The covariance of the process noise is computed as [32] :
Q(k) =

1
4
dt4 1
2
dt3 0 0
1
2
dt3 dt2 0 0
0 0 1
4
dt4 1
2
dt3
0 0 1
2
dt3 dt2
 · σ
2
v
In this case it is assumed the target is performing a coordinated turn, however
the turn will often not be perfectly co-ordinated. A small value of σv is selected
to account for the modelling error.
If the turn rate is unknown then the state vector and state transition matrix
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can be augmented to estimate the turn rate. This is accomplished by the use of
an extended Kalman filter, the reader is directed to [99] for further information.
The choice and number of models used is an important consideration in the design
of the algorithm. It could be assumed that increasing the number of models will
lead to greater accuracy in the estimate produced as more of the potential maneu-
vers the target could perform are covered. However it should be noted that the
more models that are used, the higher the computational load and the stronger
the competition between modes, with no guarantee of increased accuracy [98].
4.8.2.2 Markov Chain Transition Probabilities
The Markov transition probabilities represent an assumed probability that the
system model will switch (transition) from one model to another. The values are
calculated to approximately match the expected time the system spends in each
mode [99]. The transition probabilities are often tuned by performing a number
of Monte Carlo simulations.
The selection of the probabilities results in a trade-off between the peak esti-
mation errors at the onset of a target manoeuvre and the maximum reduction of
the estimation errors during uniform motion [70]. If the desired result is that the
filter detects and transitions between modes quickly (i.e. a highly adaptive filter)
then high transition probabilities should be selected. However, this will result in
low smoothing and higher errors when tracking uniform target motion. This is
because the IMM is more likely to transition in and out of the manoeuvring mode
during the uniform target motion as the behaviour of the IMM will be much more
volatile.
4.8.3 IMM Implementation
The IMM for this research has a state vector defined in two dimensions which
tracks position and velocity.
The state vector is mathematically defined as x(k) = [x, vx, y, vy] with an as-
sociated measurement matrix H(k) defined by equation 4.42.
Three Kalman filters are used within the IMM algorithm which have the fol-
lowing specifications :
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1. Filter 1 uses a constant velocity state transition matrix (FCV ) defined as :
FCV =

1 dt 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 dt
0 0 0 1

2. Filter 2 uses a coordinated turn right state transition matrix (FCTR) defined
as :
FCTR =

1
sin(ωdt)
ω
0
−1− cos(ωdt)
ω
0 cos(ωdt) 0 −sin(ωdt)
0
1− cos(ωdt)
ω
1
sin(ωdt)
ω
0 sin(ωdt) 0 cos(ωdt)

3. Filter 3 has a co-ordinated turn left state transition matrix (FCTL) defined
as :
FCTL =

1
sin(−ωdt)
−ω 0
−1− cos(−ωdt)
−ω
0 cos(−ωdt) 0 −sin(−ωdt)
0
1− cos(−ωdt)
−ω 1
sin(−ωdt)
−ω
0 sin(−ωdt) 0 cos(−ωdt)

where dt = radar sampling period, and ω = turn rate of 10◦/s (≈ 0.5g).
The three filters have a matrix representing the covariance of the process noise,
Q(k) with an associated process noise of σv = 0.1 m/s
2. This reflects the as-
sumption that the modelling error is relatively small where :
Q(k) =

1
4
dt4 1
2
dt3 0 0
1
2
dt3 dt2 0 0
0 0 1
4
dt4 1
2
dt3
0 0 1
2
dt3 dt2
 · σ
2
v
The preceding discussion on state estimation assumed that the measurements in
x and y where uncorrelated. Due to this assumption, the initial covariance in
the error in the state estimate P (0|0) and in the measurement R(0|0) could be
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initially defined easily as :
P (0|0) =

1 1
dt
0 0
1
dt
2
dt2
0 0
0 0 1 1
dt
0 0 1
dt
2
dt2
 · (σ
2) R(0|0) =
1 0
0 1
 · (σ2)
where σ = the standard deviation of the measurement error. However the error
in measurements of the position in x and y, produced by a radar system /model
as in this research are correlated as they are the cartesian equivalent of the radar
range and bearing. The covariance matrices for the error in the state estimate and
measurement for correlated measurement errors are initialised using equations
4.58-4.60 [101,102], provided that :
Rσ2θ
σr
< 0.4 (4.57)
Equations 4.58-4.60 are functions of the range (R), bearing (θ) and the standard
deviation of the range (σR) and bearing errors (σθ) and are defined as :
σ2x = σ
2
R cos
2 θ +R2σ2θ sin
2 θ (4.58)
σ2y = σ
2
R sin
2 θ +R2σ2θ cos
2 θ (4.59)
σxy = (σ
2
R −R2σ2θ) sin θ cos θ (4.60)
As the radar model used to generate noisy measurements meets this requirement,
the covariance of the state estimate error P (0|0) and measurement error R(0|0)
can then be initially defined using the following matrices [101] :
P (0|0) =

σ2x −
σ2x
dt
σxy −σxy
dt
−σ
2
x
dt
2σ2x
dt2
−σxy
dt
2σxy
dt2
σxy −σxy
dt
σ2y −
σ2y
dt
−σxy
dt
2σxy
dt2
−σ
2
y
dt
2σ2y
dt2

R(0|0) =

σ2x σxy
σxy σ
2
y

where dt= the radar sample period = 0.1s.
The filters are initialised using the first two measurements produced by the radar
model, with mode probabilities set at 0.4 for the constant velocity filter (mode
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1) and 0.3 for the right and left co-ordinated turn models (modes 2 and 3). To
ensure the IMM transitions quickly between modes, the Markov chain transition
matrix [pi|j] is set at :
pi|j =
 0.99 0.005 0.0050.005 0.99 0.005
0.005 0.005 0.99

These values where obtained using a Monte Carlo tuning method. A range of
0.8 and 0.99 was used for the largest probability in the chain transition matrix,
with the remaining probabilities calculated using equation 4.3. 100 runs were
performed for each possible matrix combination with the matrix provided in this
thesis yielding the best overall performance in terms of the state transition time.
Normally, the IMM would produce the state estimate and mode probabilities
for the length of the tracking time after initialisation without interference. How-
ever, in this particular algorithm, the mode probabilities are reset at each 5s time
interval. This is to reflect the assumption within the target trajectory prediction
model that the future behaviour is independent of past events.
Shown in Figure 4.9 is a typical target trajectory with the estimated trajec-
tory overlaid. The target begins with an initial target position of (10000, 350).
It performs a left coordinated turn lasting 8s and then continues on its current
bearing. At T=16s it begins a coordinated turn to the right lasting 24s. Ground
truth data has been calculated for the trajectory and is provided in Figure 4.10
with the mode probabilities presented in Figure 4.11.
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Figure 4.9: Typical Target Trajectory
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Figure 4.10: Ground Truth Data for a Typical IMM Run
As can be seen in Figure 4.10, for this particular trajectory and associated mea-
surements, the IMM produced an accurate target track even with the high Markov
103
transition probabilities.
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Figure 4.11: Associated Mode Probabilities
The purpose of the tracking algorithm and specifically the IMM is to detect the
target behaviour in order to be able to update the distribution of possible target
trajectories. Though ground truth data has been presented, the focus of the re-
liability of the IMM is on its ability to correctly detect the target behaviour at
each point in time for any given set of data.
4.8.4 Reliability Testing
The reliability was quantified using the results of 100 random target trajectories
and associated radar measurements. The mode probability data provided in
Figure 4.11 can be used to help explain the reliability analysis.
1. The random target model records both the target state in each trajectory
and start and end time of each behaviour. For this particular case (i.e.
Figure 4.9) the following information is attached to the true trajectory
data :
State 3 1 2
Start Time 0 8 16
End Time 8 16 40
Table 4.1: True State Data for a Typical Random Target Trajectory
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2. For each trajectory produced by the random trajectory generator, noisy
measurement data was generated using the pulsed radar model.
3. The IMM algorithm was then run with a mode detection threshold of 0.85
set. If a mode probability either reached or peaked above this threshold the
mode was recorded and the time at which it occurred. For this particular
trajectory the following detections where made :
Detection Time 1.8 6.2 11.5 18 21.2 25.7 31.2 35.9
State 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2
Table 4.2: IMM Mode Detection Data for a Typical Random Target Trajectory
4. The final step is to consider what the estimated behaviour could be for the 3
possible behaviour states. From the results of the simulations the following
confusion matrix is obtained :
Actual/Estimated C.V C.T.R C.T.L
C.V (State 1) 505 8 1
C.T.R (State 2) 0 187 1
C.T.L(State 3) 0 4 94
Table 4.3: IMM Confusion Matrix for 100 Random Target Trajectories
The low number of incorrect behaviour detections indicate that the IMM algo-
rithm is very reliable if a manoeuvre detection threshold of 0.85 is used. However
by considering a variable threshold and using a Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve the most appropriate threshold can be determined.
4.8.5 ROC Curve Analysis
The ROC curve was first used during the second world war for the analysis of
radar signals before it was eventually employed in signal detection theory [103].
The ROC curve requires two quantities to be calculated, Sensitivity and Speci-
ficity.
The Sensitivity is the proportion of the true positives (mode 2 or mode 3 de-
tected) given that the target is manoeuvring.
The Specificity is the proportion of the true negatives (mode 1 is detected) given
that the target is not manoeuvring.
Sensitivity =
Number of True Positives
Number of true positives + Number of false negatives
(4.61)
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Specificity =
Number of True Negatives
Number of true negatives+Number of false positives
(4.62)
The ROC curve is a then a plot of the true positive rate (Sensitivity) as a function
of the false positive rate (1-Specificity) at different detection thresholds. An ideal
tracker (classifier) will have a true positive rate of 1 and a false positive rate of
0 at some threshold. The ROC curve shown in Figure 4.12 is calculated using a
mode threshold range of of 0.3− 0.9.
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Figure 4.12: ROC Curve Based on 100 runs
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The ROC curve indicated that a mode threshold of 0.9 gives almost perfect classi-
fier performance based on 100 random runs. Due to this result, a mode threshold
of 0.9 is utilised in the final IMM implementation. The average mode transition
time for the implemented IMM algorithm was calculated to be 1.4s. The ROC
curve analysis and confusion matrix indicated that the IMM was reliable and
suitable for integration with the target trajectory prediction model.
4.9 Tracking and Prediction - Integrated Sys-
tem
In each integrated fire control, the initial distribution of possible target trajecto-
ries will be calculated and the associated probabilities based on the first pulsed
radar measurements. There will initially be 6561 predicted trajectories that the
target could follow over the 40s period. However the possible target trajectories
will be eliminated as information about the behaviour of the actual target (i.e.
the small boat) is obtained using the IMM estimator. The elimination of the
predicted trajectories is performed considering two possible situations over each
5s state transition period.
1. If during a state transition period, mode 2 or 3 rise above the threshold
value of 0.9 then the assumption is made that the turn has a duration of
5s and that the turn began at the start of the state transition period. An
example would be that mode 2 (turn to the right) peaks above the thresh-
old at T=3s. The assumption is then made that the turn began at T=0s
and will end at T=5s. Trajectories predicted by the initial model at T=0s,
which do not feature this behaviour are then eliminated.
A flag is then set within the relevant code which prevents further trajectory
limitations from either mode 2 or mode 3 peaking again above the threshold
during the same time period. The flag is reset at the beginning of the next
state transition period, i.e. between T=5s and T=10s.
2. If mode 2 or mode 3 do not peak above the threshold during a state tran-
sition period, then the assumption is made that the target continued along
its original heading at its maximum speed for that time period. Trajectories
which feature a turn either right or left during that particular state tran-
sition period are eliminated. An example of this would be between T=15s
and T=20s neither mode 2 or mode 3 peak above 0.9. At T=20s predicted
trajectories whereby the target turns right or left during this period are
then eliminated.
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After each predicted trajectory elimination, the probabilities are recalculated.
The probabilities of the remaining predicted target trajectories will increase as
the prediction model predicts a smaller and smaller time period into the future.
A flow diagram of the integrated tracking and prediction system which reduces
the predicted trajectories has time progresses is shown in Figure 4.13. Rs in the
diagram denotes the radar sample period and T1 and T2 define the current state
transition time window. As the average mode settling time in the IMM is 1.4s
no eliminations are made in the first 1.4s of the state transition time period.
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Figure 4.13: Flow diagram for the integrated tracking and prediction system
The trajectory elimination process depicted in this figure will continue to propa-
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gate within the integrated fire control systems until the simulation clock reaches
T=40s or the weapon successfully detects the target.
An example of the predicted trajectory elimination process is provided in Figure
4.14
Figure 4.14: Example of Elimination of Predicted Trajectories by the Integrated
Tracking and Prediction System
A random trajectory generated by the target model in Chapter 3 is shown in
green in Figure 4.14 (a)-(d). The initial distribution of predicted trajectories is
provided in Figure 4.14 (a), with the mode probabilities of the IMM provided
in Figure 4.14 (e). At T=2s, T=6.5s and T=12.9s, manoeuvres were detected
by the IMM as indicated by the plot of the coordinated turn right (C.T.R) and
left mode probabilities (C.T.L). The appropriate trajectories were eliminated at
these manoeuvre detection times. As information is obtained about the target
behaviour, the predicted target distribution becomes a better predictor of the
actual target behaviour. This improved prediction can be observed in the Figure.
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4.10 Chapter Review
This chapter has covered several important aspects of research which are impor-
tant in the design of the different systems described later in this thesis. Firstly
a method for calculating the various trajectories the target could follow over a
40s engagement was discussed. By using a Markov chain, the probability of the
following any one trajectory at each point in time was calculated.
The components of a tracking system which uses a radar for the sensor input
was then discussed. The literature reviewed indicated that a Kalman filter based
IMM estimator would be a suitable algorithm which could be used to track a
potentially manoeuvring target.
The chapter concluded by discussing the integration of the tracking algorithm and
target trajectory model. By integrating the two systems, the target trajectory
prediction will become a more accurate predication as the engagement progresses.
Three integrated fire control systems are presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The
initial distribution of predicted target trajectories and subsequent updated dis-
tributions, calculated by the system discussed in this chapter, are used for the
determination of the optimal weapon trajectory under different criteria, within
each of the fire control systems.
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Chapter 5
Integrated System One -
Trajectory Optimisation By
Simulated Annealing and Simple
Search (S.A.S.S)
The scan area associated with a shaped weapon trajectory will only be able to
overlap part of a distribution of possible target trajectories. One or more of the
overlapped trajectories will have a detectable position. Each detectable position
will have an associated probability. Therefore the sum of the probabilities for
all detectable positions/locations is then the total probability of intercepting the
target for that particular shaped weapon trajectory.
It is postulated that for a given distribution of target trajectories, there will
be a maximum probability of intercept which can be achieved from shaping the
weapon trajectory. A weapon trajectory which achieves this maximum intercept
probability can be considered optimal.
The optimal trajectory should maximise the ability of the weapon to respond
to any target manoeuvres detected by the IMM. As more information is obtained
about the target behaviour, possible target trajectories are then eliminated from
the distribution. The optimal trajectory will then be revised as more information
is obtained and the distribution of the possible target trajectories reduces in size.
The weapon should fly a heading which reduces the range of the weapon to the
target. The target should then, at a given point in time, lie within the seeker
scan area. If a successful detection is made, the terminal guidance phase will be
triggered and the weapon will attempt to intercept the target.
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5.1 Determination of Detectable Target Loca-
tions
In order to calculate the intercept probability for a given weapon trajectory,
the locations within the distribution of predicted trajectories overlapped by the
associated scan area must be determined. Two possible methods were developed
to achieve this. The first method considers the problem in 3 dimensions (3D) and
the second considers the problem in 2 dimensions (2D).
5.1.1 Detectable Target Location Determination in 3D
The seeker scan area can be split up into a series of planes where each plane
is the area produced by the xy coordinates of the seeker scan pattern defined
at two points in time (t1, t2). The planes are calculated sequentially and are
determined on a one second time interval. The xy co-ordinates for each predicted
target trajectory are sampled at one second intervals. A 3D intercept can then
be calculated by considering a plane from the seeker scan pattern and a line
produced by two points from a given predicted trajectory, as follows :
1. The (x, y, t) co-ordinates for the seeker scan patterns defined at (t1, t2) can
be used to calculate the equation of the plane which can be represented as
Ax+By + Ct+D = 0 (5.1)
2. For a given predicted target trajectory for the same time interval, two points
(m1,m2) can be extracted which are used to calculate the equation of a line
as follows:
m = m1 + u(m2 −m1) (5.2)
where m1 = [x1, y1, t1]
′, m2 = [x2, y2, t2]′
3. The equation of the line defined by (m1,m2) is then substituted into the
equation of the plane and the intercept (u) calculated as :
A(x1 +u(x2−x1)) +B(y1 +u(y2− y1)) +C(z1 +u(t2− t1)) +D = 0 (5.3)
A further step verifies that the intercept (xy) coordinates are enclosed by the
bounds of the seeker scan area. If they are enclosed by the seeker area a de-
tectable target location has been found.
A diagram showing this process is displayed in Figure 5.1.
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The plane is the seeker scan pattern defined between 28 and 29s for a given
weapon trajectory. Two intercepts have been calculated which indicate two pos-
sible predicated target trajectories which have a detectable location.
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Figure 5.1: Detectable predicted target locations determined using the 3 dimen-
sional method
This method can be very time consuming. If there is a large number of possi-
ble target locations enclosed by the seeker scan area, it can take up to 60s to
determine which of the target locations are detectable for one shaped trajectory.
An optimisation algorithm will have to consider a large distribution of possible
weapon trajectories therefore a computationally faster solution was required.
5.1.2 Detectable Target Location Determination in 2D
The 2D method consists of separating the seeker scan pattern area into a series of
individual areas between two consecutive time steps, i.e. the area between 1-2s,
then 2-3s, 3-4s etc. The predicted target trajectories which are then enclosed by
this seeker area can then be divided up into the xy coordinates associated with
each set of time steps. If the predicted target data defined between each set of
consecutive time steps is enclosed by the seeker scan defined by the same time
steps then detectable target locations have been found.
The ability of this method to correctly determine the same trajectories which
have a detectable location (as calculated using the 3D method) has been verified
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by performing a number of trials using different weapon trajectories and various
predicted target trajectory distributions. In each case the same trajectories with
detectable locations were identified using this method. An example of this veri-
fication is provided in Figure 5.2
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Figure 5.2: Detectable predicted target locations determined using the 2 dimen-
sional method
As can be seen in the figure, the same two trajectories with a detectable location
have been identified using this method.
The 2D method is considerably faster with the time taken to determine the de-
tectable locations depending on the number of possible target locations which
lie within the seeker area. The calculation of the detectable locations can take
on average between 0.08s for a small number of possible locations up to 1s for
a greater number of possible target locations. Therefore this method is used to
determine the detectable target locations for each shaped weapon trajectory.
The possibility exists that the same predicted target trajectory could have more
than one location whereby the target could be detected by the weapon seeker at
different instants of time. More than one probability value for that particular
trajectory would then be included in to the calculation of the total probability
of intercept. This would overweight that particular weapon trajectory in an op-
timisation process which would reduce the performance of that algorithm.
To ensure the correct intercept probability for each generated weapon trajectory
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is established the following checks are made:
1. Each trajectory has an associated label, if two or more points of the same
trajectory lie within a particular interval i.e. they have the same label only
one point will be counted.
2. The labels of each potential intercept are also compared to each other to
ensure that only one potential intercept is determined for a given predicted
trajectory.
For example, if the potential detectable locations had labels of 1111, 11112 then
only the data of 11112 would be counted. The label of 1111 states that the target
continues on its current heading for 4 state transitions. The label of 11112 states
that the target continues on its current heading for 4 state transitions and then
performs a coordinated turn to the right. The first label specifies a part of a
predicted trajectory which is the same trajectory as label 2. Label 2 is a later
point in time. This is the target that the weapon would actually engage, as the
later target position associated with this point in time is closer to the weapon
launch point. Therefore label 1 is discounted from the calculation of the intercept
probability.
If a very agile missile was used, which could miss the target defined at label
2 and hit the target defined at label 1, then the case would have to be reconsid-
ered. However the missile is assumed not to be sufficiently agile to achieve this
and therefore the discounting of label 1 stands.
5.2 Optimal Trajectory Calculation Formulated
as an Optimisation Problem
The intercept probability obtained for a given weapon trajectory will depend on
the off-boresight command combination and the time steps that those commands
are transmitted to the weapon. In order to determine the optimal trajectory, a
variety of possible shaped weapon trajectories must be considered. Each proposed
trajectory should be generated under the same set of constraints which consist
of:
1. The number of off-boresight commands which are used to shape the trajec-
tory.
2. The time steps at which the off-boresight commands are transmitted to the
weapon.
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Each proposed weapon trajectory will result in an intercept probability of between
0 and 1. The total set of calculated intercept probabilities will form a discrete
probability distribution which will have a global maximum indicating the opti-
mal weapon trajectory. The trajectory optimisation process will be required to
determine an optimal trajectory for the weapon to follow, which is dependent on
the application of n off-boresight commands.
Each off-boresight command is comprised of the weapon heading ψ and a re-
quired heading change ∆ψ and is defined as:
Ob = ψ + ∆ψ (5.4)
The sum of the absolute heading (yaw) changes associated with n off-boresight
angles for a given shaped trajectory must not exceed 40◦ therefore the optimisa-
tion problem can be defined mathematically as:
argmax
Ob....Obn
P (Ob1 .....Obn)
subject to
n∑
i=1
|∆ψi| ≤ 40
(5.5)
The maximisation of equation 5.5 can be achieved using a variety of computa-
tional optimisation algorithms e.g. [104–106]. To discuss every suitable algorithm
would take up a thesis of several hundred pages. The following section provides
an overview of the main optimisation algorithms which are suitable for this par-
ticular problem.
5.3 Computational Optimisation Literature Re-
view
The algorithms detailed in this chapter can be classed as either Derivative-Based,
Derivative-Free or Metaheuristic [107]. There are a number of texts available
which discuss computational optimisation techniques. The reader is directed to
references [107–109] for more in depth explanations than those provided herein.
5.3.1 Derivative-Based
Derivative-Based algorithms (also known as gradient-based algorithms) are very
efficient local search algorithms for convex functions which are used in many ap-
plications [110,111]. They use the information of derivatives to determine either
the minimum or maximum of the function. In order to be used successfully the
objective function (i.e. the function to be optimised) must be sufficiently smooth
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such that the first (and more often than not the second) derivatives can be cal-
culated.
Newton’s Method is one of the most popular gradient-based algorithms. The
method utilises both the first and second derivatives of a function and an initial
starting point to determine the location of the optimal solution. The optimal
solution will be either the maximum or minimum value of the function depend-
ing on the optimisation problem. The iterative procedure for this method can be
derived as follows [112] :
1. For a given multivariate objective function f(x), a starting point (xt) is
selected (xt will be a vector of n variables).
2. A quadratic approximation for the objective function f(x) is constructed
using a second order Taylor series which matches the first and second deriva-
tives of the objective function at that given point, which is defined mathe-
matically as :
f(x) = f(xt) +∇f(xt)∆x+ ∆x
THf(xt)∆x
2
(5.6)
where ∆x = (x−xt), ∇f(xt) is the gradient of the objective function which
is determined for n variables of a multivariate function as :
∇f(xt) =

∂f
∂x1
(x)
...
∂f
∂xn
(x)
 (5.7)
and H is the Hessian matrix of the objective function which is calculated
as :
H = ∇2f(x) =

∂2f
∂x21
(x) · · · ∂2f
∂x1∂xn
(x)
... · · · ...
∂2f
∂xn∂x1
(x) · · · ∂2f
∂x2n
(x)
 (5.8)
3. The right hand side of equation 5.6 is in quadratic form (q(x) = x
T
2
H(x) +
bTx+ c), assuming that the Hessian matrix (H) is positive definite then the
next step is to find a vector which minimises the right hand side. This is
accomplished using the following expression :
x = xt −H(xt)−1∇f(xt) (5.9)
4. Equation 5.9 forms the basic iterative procedure for Newton’s Method, how-
ever, a step size term α is normally added to the formula which controls the
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rate of convergence. Therefore the final equation for Newton’s Method
is defined as :
xt+1 = xt − αH−1(xt)∇f(xt)) (5.10)
where (xt+1) is the current estimated position of the optimal solution.
The step size in equation 5.10 is carefully chosen, as a small value will result in
slow convergence towards the local optimum whereas a high value will produce a
fast convergence but may cause the algorithm to overshoot the optimum point.
The iterative process is performed until the stopping criterion  is reached. The
stopping criterion will be the accuracy required in the estimate of the location of
the actual optimal solution. The following expression is used to assess whether
the iterative procedure should stop :
|xt+1 − xt| <  (5.11)
It is worth noting that if the original objective function to be optimised is
quadratic, then Newton’s Method will yield the optimum solution in one step.
The process will provide the exact position of the optimal solution. If the original
objective function is not quadratic then the process will produce an approximate
position of the optimal solution of the function [112].
5.3.2 Derivative-Free
The Derivative-Based algorithms discussed in the preceding section are efficient
for continuous functions. However, they are memoryless, in the sense that they
do not use information obtained from past iterations to shape the future search.
They also often experience slow convergence near the local optimum. They have
the added issue that they can become unstable if discontinuities are present. To
improve the efficiency around discontinuous functions and the convergence rate, a
derivative-free algorithm can be used. One of the earliest and most popular types
of this algorithm is the Hookes-Jeeves pattern search [113], which also forms the
basis of many modern pattern search algorithms.
The Hookes-Jeeves algorithm utilises the history of past iterations to produce a
new search direction. The algorithm consists of two types of moves, exploratory
and pattern. The algorithm begins by defining an initial base point bt, and setting
an initial step length (α). Each variable in the function is incremented by the
step length in the positive direction first and then in the negative direction (if
necessary). The objective function is evaluated for the incremented value of each
variable. This is what is known as the exploratory move. If any move for each
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variable decreases the value of the objective function (minimisation problem), the
move is considered a success and the variable value is retained.
Once each variable has been considered the new base point bt+1 will be estab-
lished, provided bt+1 6= bt. If bt+1 = bt then the step length will be reduced and
the process repeated.
If the exploratory move has been successful then the base point will be moved
along the direction which produced the greatest decrease in the objective func-
tion. A set of exploratory moves are then performed around the updated base
point bt+1. If one or more exploratory moves reduces the value of the objective
function, then the pattern move is successful and a new base point is found bt+2.
However if the pattern move fails a new set of exploratory moves with a reduced
step length are performed about bt+1.
Iterations of this algorithm continue until a defined tolerance  is met which
is normally when the step length of each variable reaches a specified small value.
5.3.3 Metaheuristic
The Derivative Based and Derivative-Free algorithms discussed are all determinis-
tic, in that that they have no random components. These algorithms are efficient
if the function being optimised has only one optimum. However they show poor
performance in finding a global optimum in a complex function which has multi-
ple maxima and minima.
The final type of optimisation strategy to be discussed in this thesis is Meta-
heuristic algorithms which are a powerful set of algorithms that are often inspired
from nature [107]. There are a diverse range of Metaheuristic algorithms such as
ant and bee algorithms and particle swarm. This chapter discusses two prominent
techniques, Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing. These algorithms are
the most well understood and reviewed within the combinational optimisation
literature, hence there inclusion in the thesis.
5.3.3.1 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic Algorithms are an optimisation technique pioneered by J.Holland and
several collaborators during the 60’s and 70’s. The algorithms are based on the
abstraction of Darwin’s evolution of biological systems. There are three main
components or genetic operators in a genetic algorithm consisting of, crossover,
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mutation and selection of the fittest [107]. Each potential solution to the opti-
misation problem is encoded in a string called a chromosome. New solutions are
generated by applying the genetic operators, to produce the following results :
1. A crossover of two parent strings will produce offspring i.e. new solutions.
This is performed by swapping genes of the chromosomes. Crossover has a
typical probability of between 0.8-0.95 of producing a new solution.
2. A mutation is performed by flipping some digits of a string, the typical
probability of generating a new solution is somewhere in the range of 0.001-
0.05.
3. The new solutions produced by crossover and mutation are then selected
according to their fitness, which results in only the best solutions remaining
in the population. Sometimes the best solutions will be passed onto the next
generation without much change (elitism).
5.3.3.2 Simulated Annealing
Simulated Annealing (SA) was developed by Kirkpatrick et al. in 1983 [114].
The idea of SA comes from a paper published by Metroplis et al in 1953 [115],
which simulated the cooling of a material in a heat bath (commonly known as
annealing). If a solid is heated past its melting point and then allowed cool, the
structural properties of the solid will depend on the rate of cooling in that :
• A slow enough cool rate will result in large crystals being formed.
• A fast cool rate will result in crystals being formed which contain imper-
fections.
The algorithm presented by Metropolis simulated the material as a system of
particles and the associated cooling process. The cooling process is simulated by
gradually lowering the temperature until the system converges to a steady frozen
state. Kirkpatrick et al. took the idea of the Metropolis algorithm and applied
it to optimisation problems. The idea being to search for feasible solutions and
converge to an optimal solution. The algorithm itself can be explained as :
1. Generate an initial random solution and calculate the value of the objective
function.
2. Generate another random solution and calculate the value of the objective
function. If the value of the objective function is lower for the new solution
than the previous solution (minimisation problem) automatically accept
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this new solution, otherwise calculate the probability P of accepting a worst
solution as:
P = exp
(−c
t
)
(5.12)
where c = the change in the objective function and t = the current tem-
perature. A random number, Rn between (0,1) is generated. The worse
solution will then be accepted or rejected based on whether the probability
of accepting a worse solution is greater or less than the generated random
number using the following criteria:
• If P > Rn then accept the worse solution.
• If P < Rn then reject the worse solution.
The probability of accepting a worse solution is a function of the temper-
ature as well as the change in the value of the objective function. As the
temperature is lowered the probability of accepting a worse move is reduced.
This is the same as gradually moving to a frozen state in physical annealing.
The performance of the Simulated Annealing algorithm is dependent on the cool-
ing schedule which consists of four components :
• Starting Temperature - This must be hot enough to allow nearly any random
solution to be considered. If this is too low, the end solution will be same
or very close to the starting solution.
• Final Temperature - Often the final temperature is set at zero, however this
can lead to the algorithm having to run a lot longer than required.
• Temperate Decrement and Iterations at each temperature - After establish-
ing a start and end temperature a method needs to be found to lower the
temperature. This is normally dependent on the algorithm performing a
certain number of iterations at each temperature. The number of iterations
should be high enough such that the algorithm reaches equilibrium at each
temperature value. Their are many different ways of decrementing the tem-
perature. The best results from the authors experience are often obtained
using a geometric decrement t = αt where α < 1
This section of the thesis has given a broad overview of computational optimi-
sation and some of the main algorithms in use today. It is apparent from the
techniques reviewed in this section, that when using any optimisation technique,
the problem to be solved must be clearly identified and a thorough design specifi-
cation produced in order to determine the most appropriate optimisation method
to use.
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5.4 Selection of Simulated Annealing Algorithm
In 1975, Kenneth Alan De Jong produced a PhD thesis which analysed the per-
formance of a class of genetic adaptive systems [116]. Within the thesis, De
Jong proposed five functions which could be used to benchmark the performance
of the genetic algorithms. The benchmark functions consisted of the Sphere,
Rosenbrock, Step, Quartic and Foxholes functions. The difficulty in optimising
each function varied from easy in the case of the Sphere function to very difficult
in the case of the Foxholes function. The Sphere function is very easy to optimise,
because it is smooth, unimodal and has a definite optima and minima. However,
the Foxholes function has many local optima which means that optimisation al-
gorithms can become stuck at the first optima that they find.
In 2002, J.G. Digalakis et al. proposed a further 8 algorithms which could be
used for the purposes of benchmarking optimisation algorithms each with a spe-
cific difficulty. The focus of this paper was once again on the performance of
Genetic Algorithms. However, the same functions can be used to test perfor-
mance of other types of optimisation algorithm [117].
It would appear from these references and associated works [107, 108, 114] that
the choice of optimisation algorithm in any problem should be determined based
on the difficulties envisaged from the complexity of the function which is to be
optimised. If the function has similar characteristics to the Sphere optimisation
problem then a simple algorithm such as Newton’s method will be sufficient to
either maximise or minimise the function.
If the function has many local optima such as the Foxholes function, then Meta-
heuristic algorithms such as Simulated Annealing and Genetic Algorithms are the
most appropriate algorithm to use, as identified by the previous literature review.
For this particular optimisation problem, the complexity of the intercept prob-
ability distribution must be considered in order to determine what type of op-
timisation algorithm is required i.e. does the distribution have a single global
maxima or are their a large number of local maxima as in the Foxholes function?
The trajectory of the weapon may be potentially shaped by the integrated fire
control system at several points in time. However it is very difficult to visualise
the intercept probability distribution in more than 3 dimensions. The complexity
of the intercept probability distribution will therefore be evaluated considering
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two possible trajectory shaping approaches. In the first approach, a single off-
boresight angle will be applied at various points in time. In the second approach,
two off-boresight angles will be transmitted to the weapon at fixed points in time.
In both cases, the distribution of possible target trajectories and associated prob-
abilities is calculated from an initial target state [x, vx, y, vy]
′ of [10000,-26,0,0]’.
The intercept probability distributions for each approach are displayed in Figures
5.3 and 5.4 respectively.
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Figure 5.3: Intercept Probability Distribution for a Single Off-boresight Angle
Applied at Times T=0s....T=25s
In Figure 5.3 an off-boresight command ±10◦ was initially programmed into the
weapon at T=0s, the process was repeated increasing the off-boresight angle by
1◦ for each off-boresight angle in this range. The process was then repeated by
transmitting the off-boresight command to the weapon at T=1s, T=2s....T=25s.
In Figure 5.4, two off-boresight commands are used to shape the trajectory of
the weapon. The first command is programmed into the weapon at T=0s, which
is when the weapon is still on the launcher. The second command is transmitted
to the weapon at T=10s. The off-boresight commands are an integer value in the
range of ±10◦.
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Figure 5.4: Intercept Probability Distribution for Two Off-boresight Angles Ap-
plied at T=0s and T=10s
In both figures, the intercept probability distribution has a large number of local
maxima. As the number of off-boresight commands increases the complexity and
the number of local maxima in the intercept probability distribution will most
likely also increase. This is because their will be greater variation in the possible
shaped weapon trajectories that can be generated.
The greater variation would allow a larger number of trajectories within the
predicted target distribution to be overlapped by the weapon scan area. This
increases the likelihood of being able to detect the target along more possible tra-
jectories, resulting in an increased number of local maxima within the intercept
probability distribution.
It is therefore evident that a Metaheuristic optimisation algorithm is required
as both Derivative and Derivative-free optimisation algorithms will become stuck
in local maxima of the intercept probability distribution. The literature review
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identified two potential Metaheuristic algorithms which could be used for this
particular optimisation problem, Simulated Annealing (SA) and Genetic Algo-
rithms (GA).
Simulated Annealing was selected for the following reasons :
1. If the algorithm is correctly tuned i.e. sensible values are used for the start
and end temperature and an appropriate cooling schedule determined the
global optimum should be obtained.
2. The time taken for a genetic algorithm to find an optimal solution is gen-
erally longer than using a simulated annealing process [118].
5.5 Simulated Annealing Cooling Schedule Tun-
ing
In order to calculate the optimal weapon trajectory, the simulated annealing
algorithm will evaluate the intercept probability associated with a set of ran-
domly generated weapon trajectories. If the optimisation algorithm is to work
effectively, it must be correctly tuned. This requires a suitable cooling schedule
to be developed. In an ideal situation, the algorithm would be tuned based on
actual weapon trajectory data and the complete predicted trajectory distribution.
The calculation of a weapon trajectory and associated seeker scan area takes
approximately 3s. The time taken for the determination of the target inter-
cept probability for a weapon trajectory varies on average between 0.08s and
1s. Therefore the maximum time taken to complete both processes for a single
weapon trajectory could be 4s.
It is apparent that attempting to tune the simulated annealing algorithm based
on actual data would take an extremely long time. The process can be expedited
by tuning the algorithm based on a function of the same characteristics.
The weapon seeker should be on and able to detect a valid target up to T=35s.
If the assumption is then made that the weapon will detect the target at T=35s,
then the probability distribution associated with the predicted target trajectories
can be approximated to be representative of the intercept probability distribution
that would be observed based on actual weapon trajectory data. The complex-
ity of this distribution is then a reasonable approximation on which to tune the
algorithm. The simulated annealing algorithm can then tuned by considering
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the problem of finding the global maximum of the distribution. Each probability
value in the distribution can be assigned a number which results in 2187 possible
solutions. The simulated annealing process is then performed by generating ran-
dom numbers in the range of 1-2187.
The first stage of the tuning process is then to develop a benchmark simulated
annealing algorithm which will achieve a 100% success rate i.e. identify the global
optimum each time the optimisation algorithm was run. The parameters of the
benchmark algorithm where set as follows :
1. Start Temperature = 1, End Temperature = 0.01 (unitless in simulated
annealing, Kelvin in physical annealing)
2. Number of runs at each temperature = 100
3. Temperate Decrement T = 0.99T
A start temperature of 1 was selected to ensure initially that nearly any ran-
dom solution could be considered by the algorithm, thereby preventing it from
becoming stuck in a local optimum or producing a solution close to the initial
guess. The maximum probability of intercept which can physically be obtained
by the seeker area overlap is 1. Therefore, this also represents the maximum log-
ical starting temperature which could be used. A final temperature of 0.01 was
selected because at a suitably low temperature the probability of the simulated
annealing process accepting a worse solution is almost the same as the tempera-
ture being equal to 0. It is not normally required to allow the algorithm to run
to a temperature of 0 [114].
A geometric temperate decrement with a high value of α = 0.99 was selected
as this would reduce the temperature of the algorithm very slowly. From the
literature reviewed earlier in this chapter, it is apparent, that as long as the al-
gorithm temperature is cooled very slowly and the algorithm reaches equilibrium
at each temperature level, then it should always find the optimal value.
The number of runs was selected as 100 as this is a high number of runs for
a very slow cooling schedule thereby allowing the algorithm to reach equilibrium
at each temperature level. The algorithm was run 100 times and each time, the
maximum value of the probability distribution was found. As a 100% success
rate was obtained first time from this algorithm no further work was required on
this benchmark algorithm.
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Though the algorithm had a 100% success rate, each simulation required 45900
iterations. If this algorithm where used in practice it would take 51 hours for one
optimisation process to run which is calculated as:
Run Time =
45900× 4
60× 60 (5.13)
The trajectory optimisation algorithms developed in this thesis are not required
to run in real time. The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate the general
concept of an integrated fire control system which uses a trajectory optimisation
process and the associated benefits in terms of an increase weapon performance
against manoeuvring targets.
In order for sufficient data to be collected to analyse the performance of the
integrated fire control systems, a shorter run time for the simulated annealing
optimisation algorithm is required.
The optimisation process can be expedited by changing the parameters of the
cooling schedule such as reducing the number of iterations performed at each
temperature level. Though this will speed up the optimisation process, the con-
sequence will be a reduction in the reliability of the algorithm.
The optimisation algorithm is to be integrated with the tracking and predic-
tion system discussed in Chapter 4. The IMM component of that system is not
100% reliable therefore it is unrealistic to use an optimisation process which is
extremely computationally heavy which achieves 100% reliability when the rest
of the system will not be at this level of performance. Therefore the simulated
annealing algorithm was tuned such that it gave an acceptable success rate (in
this case a reliability of greater than 90%) but was significantly computationally
faster . The tuned algorithm completes in 5 hours as appose to 51 hours for the
untuned benchmark algorithm.
5.5.1 Start and End Temperature
The first step in the tuning process is to consider the effect of the starting tem-
perature on the reliability of the algorithm. A temperature range of 1-0.05 was
chosen, this is due to the fact that the variation in the maxima of the probability
distribution is 1 therefore 1-0.05 represents a sensible temperature range.
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A step size between trial values of 0.05 was selected. By using a small step size,
an accurate assessment can be made of the effect of the starting temperature.
The algorithm was run 100 times at each starting temperature with the end tem-
perature at 10 % of the start temperature, 100 runs is both a reasonable amount
of data to collect and is also computationally efficient. The results of this tuning
process are shown in the next figure :
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Figure 5.5: Effect of starting temperature on Simulated Annealing Performance
As can be seen from the figure, a starting temperature as low as 0.05 could be
used and 100% reliability still be achieved. However, a starting temperature of
0.1 was actually selected. A starting temperature of 0.1 ensures that the simu-
lated annealing algorithm should always be able to escape local optima at least
in the initial stages of the algorithm. In any case, a temperature higher than this
offers no greater reliability.
5.5.2 Number of Runs
The next stage of tuning is to consider the effect on the reliability of the algorithm
of the number of runs performed at each temperature. With a starting temper-
ature of 0.1 and an end temperature of 0.01. The same cooling schedule as in
the benchmark example was also used. The range of the number of runs at each
temperature was set between 5 and 100. The upper limit of 100 was chosen as
the benchmark algorithm was 100 % reliable with this number of runs. The lower
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limit of 5 was selected as this in theory would calculate an optimum quickly but
would result in poor performance in terms of reliability, as the algorithm would
not have sufficient amount of iterations at each temperature to reach equilibrium.
As in the previous tuning process the algorithm was run 100 times, the results of
this experiment are shown in Figure 5.6.
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Figure 5.6: Effect of Number of Runs at each Temperature on Simulated Anneal-
ing Performance
Based on the results of this tuning process a value of 30 iterations at each tem-
perature was selected. This is due to the fact that the algorithm with this level
of runs has a reliability of over 95%, with a significant reduction in the com-
putation time to find the maximum. A value of 35 runs upwards improves the
overall performance of the algorithm in terms of correctly identifying the global
maximum by 1-7 %. However the computation load is also increased due to the
greater number of iterations performed at each temperature level.
5.5.3 Temperature Decrement
The final step in the algorithm tuning is consider the cooling constant. As in
the benchmark a geometric temperate decrement T=αT was used, where α rep-
resents the cooling constant. A lower cooling constant will result in a faster
algorithm however it will be less reliable. From the authors experience, a cooling
constant of between 0.8-0.99 produced acceptable reliability for other simulated
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annealing algorithms. This range was chosen to tune this particular algorithm.
100 simulations where performed for each cooling constant value. The results are
shown in Figure 5.7. A starting temperature of 0.1 was used with a respective
end temperature of 0.01, 30 runs where performed at each temperature level.
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Figure 5.7: Effect of Cooling Constant on Simulated Annealing Performance
The higher the cooling constant, the greater the number of iterations performed
in each run of the algorithm, increasing the computational requirements. A cool-
ing constant of 0.98 resulted in the algorithm calculating the global maxima in 93
cases. Therefore this cooling constant value was selected for the final simulated
annealing implementation.
The selection of the cooling constant marked the end of the tuning process and
resulted in the following final specification for the actual algorithm to be used
consisting of :
1. Start temperate of 0.1
2. End temperate of 0.01
3. 30 iterations at each temperature level
4. Cooling constant α of 0.98
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A simulated annealing algorithm with this specification requires 3420 iterations to
complete the optimisation process. This means that based on current computa-
tional limits, the process will complete within approximately 5 hours; a significant
reduction in computation time from the benchmark algorithm proposed earlier
in this chapter. If the trajectory calculation time is neglected, the simulated an-
nealing algorithm can calculate the optimal trajectory within a few µs.
If an integrated system was deployed operationally which utilised this simulated
annealing process, sufficient computing power would be made available to calcu-
late the required trajectories for the optimisation process in real time.
The simulated annealing algorithm has been tuned considering a 2 dimensional
problem. However the calculation of an optimal trajectory will be a higher di-
mensional problem. Therefore the performance of this algorithm was evaluated
further by considering the problem of determining the maximum intercept prob-
ability of the complicated surface shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.8: Simulated Annealing - Example Path Taken in a 3 Dimension Opti-
misation Process
The optimisation process was performed 100 times. On each occasion, the maxi-
mum probability of intercept found by the algorithm was recorded.
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An exhaustive search was performed separately to determine what the actual
maximum intercept probability was i.e. the global maximum. On each occasion,
the global maximum was achieved. The path taken by the simulated annealing
progress for one of the runs is shown in Figure 5.8.
The results of this simulation indicate that the simulated annealing algorithm
should be reliable if applied to a higher dimension problems such as the calcula-
tion of the optimal weapon trajectory.
The algorithm calculated the global maximum in 93 trials of the cooling con-
stant tuning process and on 100 occasions in the 3 dimension problem. The
point estimate of the minimum reliability of the algorithm pˆ would therefore be
calculated as 0.93. However, there will be a margin of error in this reliability
estimation which can be determined from the calculation of the 95% confidence
interval as:
pˆ− E < p < pˆ+ E (5.14)
where E is the standard error which is calculated as:
E = 1.96
√
pˆqˆ
n
(5.15)
The margin of error at 95% confidence is calculated as ±5%. Therefore at 95%
confidence the reliability of the simulated annealing algorithm should be at least
88% but could be as high as 98%. The algorithm therefore displays sufficient
reliability for implementation within the integrated fire control system discussed
in this thesis.
5.6 Simple Search Optimisation
The trajectory of the weapon in this fire control system will be optimised using
both the simulated annealing algorithm discussed in the previous section and
a simple search approach. Trajectory optimisation by simple search consists of
calculating the maximum probability of intercept based on the application of a
single off-boresight command.
At any given point in time during the weapon fly out, there will be a maxi-
mum yaw change |δψmax| which can be used to off-boresight the weapon. This
allows two off-boresight limits [Ob1 , Ob2 ] to be defined as :
Ob1 = ψ + |∆ψmax| (5.16)
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Ob1 = ψ − |∆ψmax| (5.17)
The intercept probability for each off-boresight command P (Ob) can then be
calculated in 1◦ steps from Ob1 − Ob2 . The simple search algorithm will seek
to determine the off-boresight angle which results in the maximum probability
of intercept. The calculation of this off-boresight angle can be mathematically
defined as:
argmax
Ob
P (Ob)
subject to Ob ∈ (Ob1 , Ob2 ]
(5.18)
In the simulated system, this is achieved by calculating the probability of inter-
cept for each possible off-boresight command. The off-boresight command that
achieves the maximum probability of intercept is then transmitted to the weapon
at that time step. The weapon will then apply appropriate controls to achieve
the off-boresight heading.
5.7 Trajectory Optimisation Proposed Approach
In order to develop the final integrated fire control system, the number of off-
boresight commands which can/will be used to shape the weapon trajectory must
be established. The first off-boresight command is programmed into the weapon
while on the launcher at T=0s. Subsequent commands will be transmitted to the
weapon over the data link. The time steps at which the off-boresight commands
will be transmitted will depend on the information obtained about the target
from the tracking and prediction system. The appropriate number of off-boresight
commands which should be used to shape the weapon trajectory over the flight
period, can be established by considering the fire control system as operating in
two phases during a simulated engagement. These phases consist of:
1. Weapon initialisation at T=0s.
2. In-flight trajectory revision.
At T=0s, the target will have entered the exclusion zone i.e. it will lie within
the reachable set of the weapon. Any vessel which would have approached that
exclusion zone would be warned to leave. Therefore, the logical assumption will
be made that the target will have deliberately entered that zone and is seeking
to attack the ship [38]. The trajectory of the weapon should therefore be shaped
considering an attack by the target. As discussed by [35], in an attack, the target
will want to minimise the time taken to reach the ship. In the most simple case
it would favour a direct attack but it may have to manoeuvre for a number of
reasons such as to achieve a specific attack heading.
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The probabilities of the predicted target distribution which will be defined at
this time step will initially weight the probability of a non manoeuvring target
trajectory higher than the other trajectories thereby reflecting this assumption.
From Chapter 3, it is apparent that the seeker of the weapon should be on for
35s of flight, therefore the integrated fire control system should seek to shape the
trajectory of the weapon such that the target should be detected at the latest in
the 30-35s time interval.
The integrated tracking and prediction system will provide 6 updates in this
time period. If the target performs a direct attack, then these updates (which
will include an updated distribution of possible target trajectories and associ-
ated probabilities) will occur every 5s. It could be concluded that the trajectory
should be therefore be shaped based on 7 off-boresight commands, which would
initially be transmitted to the weapon at 5s intervals to coincide with the tracking
and prediction system updates. However revising the trajectory at this update
rate if the target has not manoeuvred could be inefficient in terms of the cost to
the maximum heading change which can be applied at subsequent off-boresight
commands.
Each off-boresight command which is not equal to the previous off-boresight
requires a heading change. Though the new off-boresight heading will not be
achieved instantly, the size of the maximum heading change which can be used
in subsequent commands is reduced instantly within the fire control system.
If the target has not manoeuvred then the change in the probability distribu-
tion will be only be minor, especially in the early stages of the engagement. It
is therefore unlikely that the optimal trajectory would need to be significantly
revised at 5s time intervals. The maximum heading change capability would be
better preserved in case the target does perform a manoeuvre. Therefore 4 off-
boresight commands will be initially used to shape the trajectory of the weapon
which are calculated considering that they will be transmitted to the weapon at
T=0s, T=10s, T=20s and T=30s.
It is expected that the intercept probability distribution which will be associ-
ated with these trajectory constraints will have a large number of local maxima
based on Figures 5.3 and 5.4. The simulated annealing algorithm is therefore
used at the initialisation stage to determine the optimal weapon trajectory based
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on an assumed complicated intercept probability distribution.
Once the weapon has left the launcher, the system will then enter the in-flight
trajectory revision phase. The process by which the trajectory of the weapon
is revised during this phase depends on how the target behaves over the flight
time of the weapon. If the target obeys the assumption of a direct attack, then
the trajectory will be revised at T=10s and T=20s using the simulated annealing
process. If the weapon seeker has not detected the target prior to T=30s, then
the trajectory at T=30s will be fine-tuned using a simple search algorithm. The
simple search algorithm will seek to determine the appropriate off-boresight com-
mand to be applied at T=30s, considering only a very small number of remaining
possible target trajectories.
If the target manoeuvres during the weapon fly out, then the in-flight trajec-
tory revision phase will optimise the trajectory in a variety of ways, depending
on the duration and number of the manoeuvres, using both the simulated anneal-
ing and simple search algorithms.
The initial calculation of the optimal trajectory and subsequent revision due
to different target behaviours will be discussed in detail in Sections 5.8 and 5.9
respectively. However the integration of the weapon data link and the trajectory
and prediction system is discussed first in order to aid the reader’s understanding
of the whole system in later sections.
5.7.1 Data Link and Tracking and Prediction System In-
tegration
The data link is assumed to be an on-demand service. This means that the
weapon could technically receive any number of off-boresight commands over the
fly out. The off-boresight commands could be transmitted at any given point in
time. However, as the weapon is to be deployed within an integrated fire con-
trol system, the data link capability is restricted. New off-boresight commands
will only be transmitted by the fire control system if an optimisation process has
been performed. An optimisation process will be performed based on the up-
dated target trajectory prediction. The off-boresight commands will therefore be
transmitted at the same time step that the tracking and prediction system pro-
duces updated target behaviour and an optimisation process has been performed.
The time taken for the optimisation process algorithm to run is neglected. The
assumption is made if the system was deployed operationally, sufficient comput-
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ing power would be available to complete the optimisation process in real time.
As the tracking system can only make one manoeuvre detection in a 5s period or
update considering constant velocity behaviour, the fire control system will only
be able to transmit one off-boresight command to the weapon in each 5s period.
As the IMM has an average settling time of 1.4s, off-boresight commands will
only be transmitted after the first 1.4s of each state transition period.
5.8 Fire Control System Implementation - Weapon
Initialisation
At T=0s, the distribution of predicted target trajectories will be calculated from
an initial target state with components [x, vx, y, vy]
′. Each predicted target tra-
jectory will be calculated for a maximum weapon flight duration of 40s. For the
optimisation algorithm to be effective, each random weapon trajectory used to
determine the intercept probability must have a scan area which overlaps part of
the predicted target trajectory distribution. If the target trajectory distribution
is compared with the reachable set of the weapon, it is apparent that it will only
occupy a very small part of the reachable set. An example of this comparison is
shown in Figure 5.9 with an initial target state of [10000,-26,350,0]’.
The target distribution in this case is actually bounded by an area defined from
a trajectory with an off-boresight angle of 9◦ which is applied to the weapon at
T=0s, and a trajectory with an off-boresight angle of −5◦ which is applied at the
same time step. Only trajectories where the weapon seeker area will be enclosed
by these boundaries over the distribution of predicted target trajectories will be
capable of achieving an intercept probability. The area bounded by two trajecto-
ries calculated from respective off-boresight commands applied at launch can be
defined as the feasible trajectory solution area.
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Figure 5.9: Feasible Trajectory Solution Area
The first stage of the weapon initialisation process in the fire control system is to
calculate the feasible solution area for each target trajectory distribution which
is performed as follows:
1. The reachable set of the weapon is overlaid on the distribution of predicted
target trajectories. The number of individual target locations which form
each predicted target trajectory, that are enclosed by the boundaries of the
reachable set is determined.
2. The reachable set is bounded by trajectories with respective initial off-
boresight commands of ±40◦ which are programmed into the weapon while
on the launcher.
3. The number of target locations is then re-evaluated based on a reachable
set which is bounded by weapon trajectories with off-boresight commands
of 39◦ and −40◦. If the number of target locations is the same, the process
is repeated reducing the positive off-boresight command trajectory in steps
of 1◦, i.e. producing a reachable set defined by 38◦, −40◦, 37◦, −40◦. The
process continues until the number of target locations is below the initial
value defined from a full reachable set.
4. The process is then performed considering a reachable defined by the bound-
aries of off-boresight trajectories 40◦, −39◦, the same procedure is followed
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but with with the negative off-boresight command increased in steps of 1◦,
i.e 40◦,−38◦ etc.
The final off-boresight limits which define the feasible solution area are then ±1◦
of the calculated boundaries in the respective direction. Once the feasible solution
area has been calculated, 3420 weapon trajectories are randomly generated based
on 4 off-boresight commands which are applied at T=0s, T=10s, T=20s, T=30s.
In order for the random trajectories to lie within the feasible solution area, each
off-boresight command is then generated between the limits of the feasible solu-
tion area. An example of the calculation of the random weapon trajectories is
shown in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Feasible Trajectory Solution Area
The distribution of predicted trajectories in Figure 5.9 resulted in a feasible so-
lution area defined by off-boresight commands of 9◦ and −5◦. Random weapon
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trajectories are then calculated by generating 4 off-boresight commands which
will each have a random value between −5◦ and 9◦. The off-boresight commands
will be applied at T=0s, T=10s, T=20s and T=30s. 10 example trajectories
generated under these conditions are shown in Figure 5.10 (a). In Figure 5.10 (b)
the probability of intercept obtained for each of the 10 generated trajectories is
displayed. By generating trajectories using these off-boresight constraints, each
weapon trajectory has an associated target intercept probability > 0.
Once the random weapon trajectories have been generated, the last stage of
the weapon initialisation phase is to run the simulated annealing optimisation
algorithm to determine the initial optimal weapon trajectory.
The simulated annealing algorithm will optimise the trajectory based on the tar-
get trajectory distribution up to a prediction time of 35s as this is the maximum
time by which it can confidently be assumed that the seeker will actually be on.
The assumption is made that provided a target detection is made up to 35s, a
successful interception will occur within the remaining 5s of the 40s flight time
of the weapon.
The results of a simulated annealing optimisation run for this particular dis-
tribution of target trajectories are presented in Figure 5.11
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Figure 5.11: Typical Simulated Annealing Results at Weapon Initialisation
The probability of intercept for the initial optimal weapon trajectory will be fairly
small at T=0s as indicated by Figure 5.11. This is due to a significant predic-
tion into the future of the target behaviour, resulting in a large distribution of
possible target trajectories with associated lower probability peaks. As more in-
formation is obtained about the target through manoeuvre detections, possible
target trajectories will be eliminated resulting in a smaller probability distribu-
tion with larger peaks. The simulation begins with the first off-boresight angle
programmed into the weapon at T=0s.
5.9 In-flight Trajectory Revision
The optimisation of the weapon trajectory after the weapon has left the launcher,
is dependent on how the target behaves and if manoeuvres are detected by the
IMM component of the integrated tracking and prediction system. Each off-
boresight command transmission will include a revision of the current and future
commands associated with the optimal trajectory. The times at which the tra-
jectory is revised can be described considering either:
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1. 0 manoeuvres are detected by the IMM.
2. 1 or more manoeuvres are detected by the IMM.
5.9.1 In-flight Trajectory Revision, 0 Manoeuvre Detec-
tions
The trajectory will be revised at T=10s, (which will coincide with the transmis-
sion of off-boresight command 2), T=20s, and T=30s. Simulated annealing is
used to determine the optimal trajectory at T=10s and T=20s. At T=10s and
T=20s, 2 or more off-boresight commands will be used to calculate each pro-
posed weapon trajectory. This will result in a complicated intercept probability
distribution. The simulated annealing algorithm will therefore be the appropriate
optimisation algorithm, to determine the maximum probability of intercept and
the associated optimal weapon trajectory.
At T=30s, the simple search algorithm is used to fine tune the trajectory pro-
vided a successful target detection has not already been made.
The data link activity for a non manoeuvring target trajectory is provided in
Figure 5.12. The data link at each time step will be in one of two states which
consist of, able to transmit (A.T.T) and not able to transmit (N.A.T).
The transmission times of each off-boresight command coincide with either a
trajectory revision completed using simulated annealing (R.S.A) or simple search
(R.S.S). Three trajectory revisions are shown on the data link. The initial opti-
mal trajectory, and associated first off-boresight command would be programmed
into the weapon while it is on the launcher.
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Figure 5.12: Data Link Activity for 0 Manoeuvre Detections by the IMM
The simple search algorithm is used at T=30s as only a very small number of
possible target trajectories will remain. An intercept should occur within the
next 5s therefore only one off-boresight command will be considered in the opti-
misation process. There will only be a limited number of off-boresight commands
which could be applied at this point. The intercept probability distribution will
cover only a small region of space in the xy plane which can be effectively eval-
uated using a simple search algorithm, which, in essence, will simply perform an
exhaustive search.
Both optimisation algorithms have been developed considering that the final off-
boresight command will occur either at T=30s or in the interval T=25s-30s. In
the case that 0 manoeuvres are detected by the IMM, the data link will be deac-
tivated at T=30s after the transmission of the final off-boresight command. As
can be seen in Figure 5.12, the fire control system is unable to transmit over the
data link after T=30s. This is shown as a data link state of not able to transmit
(N.A.T).
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5.9.2 In-flight Trajectory Revision, Manoeuvres Detected
The trajectory will be revised twice using simulated annealing and one or more
times using the simple search approach. The final number off-boresight com-
mands used to shape the trajectory will be either 4 or 7.
If a manoeuvre detection occurs between off-boresight commands which will be
updated using simulated annealing then, the trajectory revision using simulated
annealing will be brought forwards in time to the detection time step. For ex-
ample, consider a manoeuvre detection which occurs at T=12.5s. This detection
is between off-boresight command 2 at T=10s and off-boresight command 3 at
T=20s. The trajectory revision at these time steps would be completed using a
simulated annealing optimisation process. The simulated annealing process per-
formed at T=20s, would now be performed at T=12.5s. If no further manoeuvre
detections are made, then the simple search algorithm will be used to fine tune
the trajectory at T=30s provided no target detection is made by the seeker. This
is illustrated in Figure 5.13 which provides the data link activity for one manoeu-
vre detected at 12.5s.
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Figure 5.13: Data Link Activity for 1 Manoeuvre Detection by the IMM
If further manoeuvre detections are made after the third trajectory revision has
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been completed using the simulated annealing algorithm, the trajectory will be
revised using simple search for each subsequent detection. This algorithm is used
due to the assumptions made when optimising the trajectory using simulated
annealing.
Initially it was assumed that the target would attack the ship, which would
potentially entail a small number of short manoeuvres. However the target (the
small boat) would seek to spend the duration of the engagement not manoeu-
vring, in order to minimise the time that the ship would have in order to defeat
the attack. The trajectory was therefore optimised considering that three trajec-
tory revisions based on 4 off-boresight commands would be sufficient.
However if the manoeuvre detections exhaust the initial 3 revisions then the
trajectory must still be revised. Further off-boresight commands are now re-
quired for the trajectory revision which the simulated annealing algorithm was
not optimised to consider. Therefore the fire control system naturally defaults to
the simple search algorithm for the remainder of the weapon flight.
To illustrate how the two optimisation processes would be used if multiple target
manoeuvres are detected, the data link activity for 4 manoeuvre detections is
depicted in Figure 5.14.
In this particular example, manoeuvres were detected at T=13.4s, T=17.3s,
T=22.1s and T=27s. The optimal trajectory was revised using simulated an-
nealing and off-boresight commands 2 and 3 where subsequently transmitted to
the weapon using the data link at T=13.4s and T=17.3s. The trajectory was
then revised at T=22.1s and T=27s using the simple search algorithm. The data
link transitions into the N.A.T state at T=27s, instead of T=30s. The weapon
trajectory in this case would have been shaped using 5 off-boresight commands.
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Figure 5.14: Data Link Activity for 4 Manoeuvre Detections by the IMM
5.9.3 Trajectory Revision using Simulated Annealing and
Simple Search
On each occasion that the trajectory of the weapon is revised using the simulated
annealing algorithm, the following process is performed.
1. The distribution of possible trajectories will firstly be updated based on
either the detection of a manoeuvre or a 5s period of assumed constant
velocity behaviour. The appropriate trajectory eliminations will be made
and the associated probabilities recalculated using the Markov Chain.
2. The new off-boresight limits which the remaining trajectory distribution is
enclosed by will be calculated using the same method as outlined in Section
5.8
3. 3420 random target trajectories will be calculated for the appropriate num-
ber of off-boresight commands remaining.
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4. The simulated annealing optimisation algorithm will be performed based on
the updated trajectory distribution and the generated target trajectories.
An example of a revision of the optimal trajectory using the simulated annealing
algorithm is shown in Figures 5.15 and 5.16.
The weapon trajectory (W.T), scan area (S.A) and predicted target location
distribution (P.T.D) are shown in the figure.
Figure 5.15: Optimal Weapon Trajectories and Associated Scan Areas Calculated
by Simulated Annealing at T=0s, and T=2.4s
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Figure 5.16: Assorted Data for Trajectory Revision in Figure 5.15
In the simulation depicted in Figures 5.15 and 5.16, the target had an initial state
at T=0s of [10000,-25.6, 350, -3.6]’ which was determined from the pulsed radar
model. The optimal trajectory calculated by the simulated annealing algorithm
is depicted in Figure 5.15 (a). The probability of target intercept was determined
to be 0.2 which is indicated in Figure 5.16 (d).
The target then began a turn to the left. At T=2.4s, the IMM mode proba-
bility of the coordinated turn left model peaked above 0.9s, which triggered a
weapon trajectory update. The revised weapon trajectory calculated by the sim-
ulated annealing process at T=2.4s is shown in Figure 5.15 (b). The maximum
probability of intercept was determined to be 0.32 by the simulated annealing
process if the weapon now flew the revised trajectory.
Trajectory revision using the simple search algorithm is performed in much the
same way :
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1. The distribution of possible trajectories will firstly be updated based on
either the detection of a manoeuvre or a 5s period of assumed constant
velocity behaviour. The appropriate trajectory eliminations will be made
and the associated probabilities recalculated using the Markov Chain.
2. The new off-boresight limits which the remaining trajectory distribution is
enclosed by will be calculated using the same method as outlined in Section
5.8
3. The trajectory for each possible off-boresight command is calculated, as is
the associated probability of intercept. The off-boresight command with
the largest maximum probability of intercept will be transmitted to the
weapon at the required time.
Though the first off-boresight command will be programmed into the weapon at
launch, the command will not be executed by the weapon until separation has
occurred from the launcher. A time delay of 1s is utilised in the code to simulate
the separation. The fire control system will enter the in-flight trajectory revision
phase at the transmission time of off-boresight command 2.
5.9.4 Example Engagement
In order to understand how the various components of this integrated fire control
system function to achieve an intercept, an example engagement is depicted in
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 respectively.
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Figure 5.17: S.A.S.S - Example Engagement Plot Set 1
The target had an initial state at T=0s of [10000,-25.7, 350,-3.6]’. It then per-
formed a turn to the left until T=8s. Between T=8s and T=16s, the target
continued on the new heading achieved by the 8s turn. Between T=16s and the
point of interception at T=38.65s, the target turned to the right. 5 manoeuvre
detections were made by the IMM between T=0s and T=30s. The optimal tra-
jectory calculated at T=0s was revised using the simulated annealing process at
the manoeuvre detection points of T=2.4s (shown in Figure 5.15) and T=6.5s.
The IMM made 3 further detections at T=18.1s, T=22s and T=26.6s. The tra-
jectory of the weapon was revised using the simple search algorithm at each of
these time steps. The trajectory of the weapon and target in the XY plane are
depicted in Figure 5.17 (a).
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The mode probabilities for the IMM and the data link activity is depicted in
subplots (b) and (c). The phases of the fire control system are shown Figure 5.18
(f). The weapon initialisation, inflight trajectory revision and weapon terminal
guidance phases are abbreviated as W.I, I.F.T.R and W.T.G respectively.
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Figure 5.18: S.A.S.S Example Engagement Plot Set 2
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The heading of the weapon and the maximum yaw change which can be applied at
each time step is depicted in Figure 5.18 (a) and (b). Though each off-boresight
command is transmitted instantly to the weapon at each trajectory update point,
the desired off-boresight heading is not achieved immediately. However the max-
imum yaw change which can be applied in subsequent off-boresight commands is
reduced instantly by the fire control system as shown in Figure 5.18 (b).
As time progresses and more information has been obtained about the target,
the intercept probability increases as shown in Figure 5.18 (c). In this particular
engagement an intercept probability of 1 was achieved, however this is calculated
based on a predicted target behaviour. An intercept probability of 1 will not
guarantee that the target will be intercepted. Though it should be highly prob-
able that a successful detection will occur, provided of course that the correct
trajectories have been eliminated by the combined tracking and prediction sys-
tem.
In Figure 5.18 (d), the weapon range to the target is plotted over the dura-
tion of the engagement time period. Though very little information is known
about the target in the initial stages of the engagement, calculating a weapon
trajectory based on a prediction has resulted in the weapon flying a trajectory
which continually reduces the range to the target at each point in time. For a
successful detection to occur, the weapon must fly close enough to the target such
that it is within the seeker detection range. A typical value for which is 1500m.
Provided that the target then lies within the area being scanned by the weapon,
once this range has been achieved, a successful detection should then be made.
In this particular example the detection occurs at 31.5s. At which point the fire
control system will relinquish control of the weapon. The weapon will have then
entered the terminal guidance phase .
The target in this engagement did not comply with the initial predictions of
5s state transitions, however a successful interception has still been achieved.
5.10 Performance Evaluation
The integrated fire control system was benchmarked against the same initial 80
trajectories generated for the Fire and Forget performance evaluation in Chap-
ter 3. The results of which would then indicate whether the performance of the
AAAW was improved against manoeuvring targets if a data link and integrated
fire control system were utilised.
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The results of the simulated engagements are shown in Figure 5.19 (in subse-
quent chapters, the system will be referred to using the abbreviation of S.A.S.S,
short for Simulated Annealing and Simple Search)
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Figure 5.19: S.A.S.S results
The area due to the target deviation shown in Figure 5.19 is calculated using
equations 2.51 and 2.54 with ~Rin either taken as the final location of the target
at the point of interception or at T=40s. Out of the 80 engagements simulated,
the weapon successfully intercepted 54 targets and failed to intercept 26. Just as
in Chapter 2, missed targets by the weapon in the integrated fire control system
can be considered as either Failure Mode 1, 2 or 3. However Failure Mode 1 in
this case describes a failure of the integrated fire control system to calculate a
trajectory which would result in the target being detectable within the weapon
scan area at some instant in time.
The performance of this system against each of the three types of target tra-
jectory generated by the model is presented in Table 5.1 along with the Fire and
Forget (F.F) results obtained in Chapter 3.
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System N.M I.B.M M.T
S.A.S.S 12/14 1/6 41/60
F.F 14/14 6/6 27/60
Table 5.1: S.A.S.S and F.F Results
Each of the 26 failed intercepts are classed as Failure Mode 1. Of the 41 ma-
noeuvring targets intercepted in the S.A.S.S system, 18 of the targets where also
intercepted by the F.F system. The S.A.S.S system intercepted 23 manoeuvring
targets which the F.F system failed to intercept and failed to intercept 9 targets
which the F.F system successfully intercepted.
Though the F.F system intercepted 27 manoeuvring targets, the constraints for
a successful intercept in this system are very limited, as discussed in Chapter 3.
The constraints must be considered when comparing the results with the inte-
grated system proposed in this Chapter.
In each of the successful intercepts in the S.A.S.S system, the trajectory has
been shaped in response to target manoeuvres in order to improve the probabil-
ity of a successful detection and engagement. Therefore the results of the S.A.S.S
system indicate that this system overall offers a superior performance against
manoeuvring attacks compared to the F.F system. The performance against non
manoeuvring targets remains excellent as out of the 14 non manoeuvring target
trajectories generated, 12 targets where successfully intercepted. However the
performance of the F.F system against non manoeuvring targets was superior.
The AAAW in the case of the F.F system successfully intercepted all 14 of the
non manoeuvring targets.
5.10.1 Test for Statistical Significance - Chi Square χ2
Test
The integrated system was developed to improve the performance of the weapon
against manoeuvring targets, Though the results of the trials indicate that supe-
rior performance against manoeuvring attacks is obtained using this system, the
possibility that the observed results are due to chance alone must be considered.
In order to determine whether this is the case, a test for statistical significance
can be used. In this thesis, a Chi square test is used due to its simplicity and
its recognised reliability in a variety of applications from manoeuvre detection in
target tracking to drug trial analysis [72].
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A Chi test requires the formation of a null hypothesis and the calculation of
the χ2 value. The probability of that value can then be obtained from look up
tables or calculated in Matlab. Normally, a probability of 0.05 is then used for a
comparison. If the computed probability is less than this value, then there is little
statistical evidence to suggest that the results are due to chance. A probability
value higher than this would indicate that there is statistical evidence to suggest
that the results are due to chance alone.
The following statistical assumptions are made when using this test:
1. The sampling population is random, e.g. the patients of a clinical trial are
selected from the wider population at random.
2. The variables of the trial are independent.
The assumptions are satisfied as the trajectories are randomly generated and in
each simulated engagement the weapon can either hit or miss the target (in-
dependent variable). As only two possible outcomes exist for each simulated
engagement, the engagements can actually be classed as Bernoulli trials.
The process for completing the Chi square test is as follows :
1. The results of the F.F and S.A.S.S system are collected into an observed
table (O):
System Hits Misses Total
F.F 27 33 60
S.A.S.S 41 19 60
Totals 68 52 120
Table 5.2: Observed Data
2. The expected values are then calculated as shown in the expected table (E)
below :
System Hits Misses Total
F.F 34 26 60
S.A.S.S 34 26 60
Totals 68 52 120
Table 5.3: Expected Data
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3. The difference between the observed values and expected values is the cal-
culated, the sum of which produces the χ2 statistic.
χ2 =
4∑
n=1
(On − En)2
En
(5.19)
4. The calculation of the probability of the null hypothesis being true requires
the number of degrees of freedom (v) to also be determined which is simply
defined as :
v = (m− 1)× (n− 1) (5.20)
where m is the number of rows in the observed table and n is the number
of columns in the observed table. The number of degrees was calculated as
1.
5. The probability associated with this Chi squared value for the given number
of degrees of freedom can be looked up in a table [72]. The Chi-square
probability value for the S.A.S.S system was calculated as 0.01.
As the calculated probability is below that of statistical significance (p), the
results of the S.A.S.S trials can be considered to be a reliable representation of
the performance of the system. The result of the χ2 test therefore supports the
initial conclusion that the integrated system discussed in this chapter will improve
the performance of the AAAW to intercept manoeuvring targets. However it is
worth exploring the possible reasons why the system failed to intercept the 2 non
manoeuvring targets, 5 I.B.M targets and 19 manoeuvring target trajectories.
5.11 Failure Analysis
In order to understand why the integrated system failed to achieve an intercept,
firstly requires the behaviour of the IMM component of the system in each simu-
lated engagement to be considered. In each simulated engagement, the integrated
tracking and prediction system provided 6 updates.
The detections made by the IMM algorithm during each simulated engagement
are shown in Figure 5.20.
The detections by the IMM and the actual target behaviour are described in
the legend. The first letter of the legend label is the actual target behaviour
which consists of Constant Velocity (C), Right Turn (R) and Left Turn (L). The
second letter is the detection made by the IMM during each update.
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Figure 5.20: IMM Detections for each Simulated Engagement
The IMM component of the system produced a total of 4 incorrect detections
which occurred in 4 engagements where the target had manoeuvred. The incor-
rect detections are shown in Figure 5.21.
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Figure 5.21: IMM Miss Detections
Three of the incorrect detections have potentially contributed to a failure by the
fire control system to calculate a weapon trajectory which would result in an
engagement. However in one engagement the IMM has failed but a successful
intercept has still been achieved.
5.11.1 Non Manoeuvring Target Fails
The IMM failures did not occur in the 2 failed interceptions of non manoeuvring
targets by the integrated fire control system. The failure in the system in these
cases can therefore only be attributed to the trajectory optimisation process,
specifically the simulated annealing optimisation step. If the target has not ma-
noeuvred then the maximum probability of intercept will be achieved by a seeker
scan area which allows a location on the most probable trajectory (non manoeu-
vring target) to be detectable and along one or more possible target trajectories.
As no manoeuvre detections were made, the trajectory would therefore been
revised at T=0s, T=10s, T=20s and T=30s.
Either at T=0s, or T=10s/T=20s, the simulated annealing process will have
identified a non-optimal trajectory. This trajectory will not have resulted in the
target along the predicted non manoeuvring trajectory to be detectable at some
instant in time.
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The reliability of the Simulated Annealing algorithm was calculated to be be-
tween 88 − 98% at 95% confidence therefore it highly unlikely that these two
misses are due to three simulated annealing failures in each case. The most likely
explanation is that at one of the update points before T=30s, the simulated an-
nealing process failed once. The intercept probability distribution obtained at
later update points is then dependent on the trajectory that the weapon can
now fly based on the remaining maximum yaw change. The later trajectory op-
timisation processes whether simulated annealing or simple search will then have
optimised the trajectory based on the possible trajectories that the weapon can
now physically fly.
If the trajectory has been incorrectly shaped such that the weapon trajectory
cannot be corrected to allow a detection along the non manoeuvring trajectory,
the weapon will therefore fail to engage the target.
5.11.2 Manoeuvring Target Fails
Out of the 5 I.B.M misses, only in one engagement did the IMM produce a in-
correct behaviour detection. In 2 of the 19 manoeuvring target fails, the IMM
produced an incorrect behaviour detection. Therefore the first step in the anal-
ysis of the manoeuvring target and I.B.M fails is to consider those trajectories
whereby the IMM has not failed. The two aspects of the system which could
therefore contributed to the failed intercept would be the simulated annealing
and simple search algorithms used in the actual trajectory optimisation process.
Based on the reliability analysis of the simulated annealing algorithm, then it
is likely that a failure by this algorithm will have contributed to a target miss in
only a small proportion of these failed intercepts.
A failure by the simple search method can be discounted as the algorithm is
simple, it calculates the optimal trajectory by considering all possible trajecto-
ries through an exhaustive search and simply selects the trajectory which yields
the maximum probability of intercept.
Assuming that the trajectory optimisation process has calculated the optimal
trajectory successfully in the majority of the failed intercepts, then the first pos-
sible failure reason is that the scan area associated with the optimal weapon
trajectory, based on the detection of predicted target locations does not include
a location on the actual target trajectory at the same scan time. This scenario
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is depicted in Figure 5.22
7000 7500 8000 8500 9000 9500
−100
−80
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
80
100
X/m
Y/
m
 
 
Weapon Position
Scan Area
Predicted Detectable Locations
Target Location
Figure 5.22: S.A.S.S Failure Due to Scan Area Orientation
If this scenario occurred in each case, then though the target has not been de-
tected, the trajectory optimisation process has actually still been proven effective
for the majority of the simulated engagement. In every simulation performed
including those where the IMM produced a false behaviour detection, the tra-
jectory optimisation process successfully minimised the initial 10000m range to
the target to the seeker detection range of 1500m. In essence the difficult part
of the weapon guidance has been achieved. In these cases its simply the orienta-
tion of the seeker scan area in respect to the target which has resulted in a failure.
An incorrect behaviour detection however will of course impact the probability
of achieving a successful target detection. In the I.B.M and manoeuvring target
fails, the incorrect detection will have changed the shape of the distribution of
the predicted target trajectories as well as the associated probabilities. Each op-
timisation process performed after the incorrect detection will then optimise the
trajectory based on what is now a poor target prediction. It will be unlikely that
the trajectory calculated on this incorrect distribution will result in the scan area
covering the actual target at any instant in time.
However as demonstrated in engagement 60, an incorrect detection can still re-
sult in a successful intercept occurring. In this situation, the trajectory of the
target will have brought it back within the scan area associated with the optimal
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trajectory calculated on the IMM miss detection.
The successful interception of some late manoeuvring targets using a basic Fire
and Forget system raises the question whether there is any benefit in only shaping
the trajectory after launch if a manoeuvre is detected. Furthermore can the same
performance against manoeuvring targets be achieved, if only the most probable
trajectory of the target distribution is considered? Chapter 6 will therefore seek
to determine if the performance of the AAAW using an integrated fire control
system which focuses on addressing these two questions can be improved against
manoeuvring targets.
5.12 Chapter Review
This chapter has discussed the design, implementation and simulation of an inte-
grated fire control system which sought to calculate an optimal weapon trajectory
which would maximise the probability of successfully intercepting a potentially
manoeuvring target.
The trajectory of the weapon was optimised considering a distribution of pos-
sible target trajectories and the probability of intercept that could be obtained
from overlapping the scan area of the weapon over the distribution of possible
target trajectories.
Shaping the weapon trajectory from different off-boresight combinations, var-
ied the probability of intercept. The integrated fire control system sought to
determine the weapon trajectory which would yield the maximum probability
of intercept using 4 or more off-boresight angles which are transmitted to the
weapon at various points in time.
A performance evaluation of the system, indicated that this system improves
the performance of the original AAAW to intercept manoeuvring targets. How-
ever it appears that, under certain circumstances, late manoeuvring targets could
be intercepted before the manoeuvre can be executed.
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Chapter 6
Integrated Systems Two - Most
Probable Trajectory (M.P.T)
Within the predicted target trajectory distribution their will be one target tra-
jectory which is more probable than the remaining trajectories. Initially this
most probable trajectory will be a non-manoeuvring target as stipulated by the
probabilities used in the Markov Chain discussed earlier in this thesis. If no ma-
noeuvres are detected by the IMM, the probability of a non manoeuvring target
will naturally increase. However if manoeuvres are detected by the IMM, then
the most probable trajectory will change from a non-manoeuvring target trajec-
tory, to a manoeuvring target trajectory.
It is postulated in this chapter that, the performance of the weapon against
manoeuvring targets can be improved by shaping the trajectory of the weapon
and associated scan area only on the detection of a manoeuvre. The weapon
trajectory will be shaped considering only the most probable trajectory of the
predicted target trajectory distribution.
As in Chapter 5, the integrated system will be discussed as operating within
two phases consisting of Weapon Initialisation and In-flight Trajectory Revision.
6.1 Weapon Initialisation
At T=0s, the distribution of predicted target trajectories will be calculated from
an initial target state with components [x, vx, y, vy]
′. The most probable trajec-
tory from the distribution (which is a non-manoeuvring target trajectory) will be
isolated from the rest of the distribution.
The same procedure used to calculate the launch off-boresight in the case of the
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Fire and Forget system detailed in section 3.9.2 is applied to calculate the launch
off-boresight for the integrated system. The maximum absolute yaw change,
|∆ψmax| which could be applied in subsequent off-boresight commands is reduced
instantly. At T=1s, the weapon will achieve separation from the launcher and
the initial off-boresight command will be executed.
If no manoeuvre detections occur, the weapon in this integrated system will fol-
low the same trajectory calculated using the Fire and Forget system. The system
will not transition to the in-flight retargeting phase. Provided that the target
performs 0 manoeuvres, there are 0 false manoeuvre detections, the seeker does
not fail or the terminal guidance phase, then this system should always intercept
a non-manoeuvring and an I.B.M target.
The integrated tracking and prediction system will continue to reduce the dis-
tribution of potential trajectories, the trajectory will not be revised unless a
manoeuvre detection occurs.
6.2 In-flight Trajectory Revision
The detection of a manoeuvre will result in the calculation of an updated target
prediction just as in the case of the S.A.S.S system. The new most probable
trajectory will be isolated from the updated distribution of predicted target tra-
jectories. The future weapon trajectory is determined by considering the range of
possible off-boresight commands which can then be transmitted to the weapon.
An initial off-boresight angle Ob is calculated as :
Ob = ψ − |∆ψmax| (6.1)
The associated trajectory and seeker scan area are calculated based on the appli-
cation of this off-boresight command transmitted to the weapon at this update
time. The scan area and updated most probable trajectory are compared to deter-
mine if a location along the most probable trajectory is detectable by the weapon.
If a detectable location exists, this off-boresight command will be transmitted
to the weapon. The maximum absolute yaw change which could be applied in
future off-boresight commands would therefore be 0◦.
If no intercept exists the off-boresight command is incremented by 1◦ as:
Ob = Ob + 1 (6.2)
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The check for a detectable location is performed again. This process is repeated
until either a detectable location is found or the maximum yaw change is ex-
ceeded. An example of the calculation of the updated most probable trajectory
and associated off-boresight command is depicted in Figure 6.1
Figure 6.1: Example Calculation of an Updated Target Trajectory in the M.P.T
System and Associated Off-boresight Command
In this simulation, an initial off-boresight command of 2◦ was calculated to create
a target detection on the assumption of a non manoeuvring target trajectory. At
T=2.4s, a left turn by the target was detected. The distribution of predicted
target trajectories was subsequently updated considering an assumed 5s left turn
by the target which will occur between T=0s and T=35s. Predicted trajectories
which did not feature an initial 5s left turn were eliminated. The distribution
is then recalculated based on a 35s prediction from T=5s, to T=40s. The most
probable trajectory after the calculation of the updated distribution for the re-
mainder of the weapon flight (i.e between T=5s and T=40s) is then a trajectory
with no further manoeuvres. The absolute maximum yaw change available at
T=2.4s was 38◦.
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An off-boresight angle of 5◦ was calculated to produce a detection along the
new most probable target trajectory. This required a yaw change of 3◦. The
maximum yaw change which would then be available for subsequent trajectory
revisions would therefore be 35◦.
6.3 Example Engagement
A typical engagement of a manoeuvring target using this integrated system is
depicted in Figures 6.2 and 6.3
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Figure 6.2: Example Engagement of a Manoeuvring Target using the M.P.T
Integrated Fire Control System
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Figure 6.3: Example Engagement of a Manoeuvring Target using the M.P.T
Integrated Fire Control System plot set 2
From an initial state of [10000,-26,350,3]’, the target began an 8s turn to the left.
It continued on the resultant heading until T=16s. It then executed a turn to
the right, until interception by the weapon at T=35.035s. Manoeuvre detections
occurred at T=2.4s, T=6.5s, T=18.1s, T=22s, T=26.6s. The trajectory of the
weapon was updated at each of these time steps by the transmission of an off-
boresight command via the data link.
The trajectory of the weapon and the target in the XY plane is depicted in
Figure 6.2 (a). The IMM mode probabilities and the activity of the data link
including the periods whereby the fire control system was able to transmit off-
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boresight commands is shown in Figure 6.2 (b) and (c) respectively. The heading
of the weapon and the maximum yaw rotation (change) which can be applied at
each point in time during the simulation is depicted in Figure 6.3 (a) and (b).
The target was detected by the weapon seeker at T=29.045s, as can be seen
in Figure 6.3 (d), the fire control system transitions to the weapon terminal guid-
ance phase at this time.
The target did not comply with the 5s predicted state transitions. However
an intercept has been achieved by shaping the trajectory after launch on the
detection of target manoeuvres, considering only the most probable trajectory.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
The Most Probable Trajectory (M.P.T), integrated fire control system was bench-
marked against the same 80 random target trajectories used to assess the per-
formance of the Fire and Forget system. The results of which would determine
whether an integrated fire control system using this approach would still achieve
a performance increase against manoeuvring targets. The results of the simulated
engagements are provided in Figure 6.4
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Figure 6.4: M.P.T results
The weapon in the case of the M.P.T system successfully intercepted 65 targets
and failed to intercept 15. As in the F.F and S.A.S.S systems the area due to
the target deviation in Figure 6.4 has been calculated either using the point of
interception or the final location of the target at T=40s. The performance of this
system against each of the three types of target trajectory generated by the model
is presented in Table 6.1 along with the Fire and Forget (F.F) results obtained
in Chapter 3.
System N.M I.B.M M.T
M.PT 14/14 5/6 46/60
F.F 14/14 6/6 27/60
Table 6.1: M.P.T and F.F Results
Each failed intercept in the case of this system is classed as Failure Mode 1. Of
the 14 non-manoeuvring trajectories generated by the target model, the weapon
in the M.P.T system intercepted all 14 targets. Of the 6 manoeuvring trajectories
which could be intercepted before the target performed a manoeuvre, the weapon
in this system intercepted 5 targets. One of the 6 trajectories was classed as a
manoeuvring target fail.
168
The weapon in the M.P.T successfully intercepted 24 of the manoeuvring tar-
gets, which were also intercepted in the case of the F.F system. Three successful
manoeuvring intercepts by the F.F system where missed by the weapon in the
M.P.T system.
The weapon in the M.P.T system intercepted 22 targets which the F.F system
failed to intercept. The remaining 11 manoeuvring target trajectories generated
by the target model where missed by the weapon in both the F.F and M.P.T fire
control systems.
The performance of the weapon against non manoeuvring targets using this inte-
grated fire control system remains excellent with all 14 non manoeuvring targets
successfully intercepted. The results of the simulated engagements against ma-
noeuvring targets indicate that this system offers superior performance against
this type of target. The calculation of the χ2 value resulted in a probability of
0.002. This value is below that for statistical significance which supports the
initial conclusion that this system does improve the performance of the AAAW
against manoeuvring targets.
6.5 Failure Analysis
There are 3 possible causes why the M.P.T failed to produce an intercept in the
case of 15 simulated engagements .
In the first instance, the IMM does not make any miss detections. Therefore
on each manoeuvre detection, the most probable trajectory is successfully up-
dated. On the final manoeuvre detection and therefore most probable trajectory
update, the trajectory of the weapon has been suitably shaped such that a lo-
cation on the most probable target trajectory can be detected within the seeker
scan area at a given scan time. However the actual target trajectory places the
target at a location outside the scan area at that scan time. Therefore the target
will not be detected and the weapon will not be able to attempt an intercept.
The next possible reason for a failure is that considering only the most probable
trajectory can commit the weapon to a given target detection along one updated
most probable trajectory early in the engagement. When further manoeuvre
detections occur triggering the calculation of an updated target trajectory, the
trajectory of the weapon cannot be sufficiently shaped in response. The possible
overcommitment of the weapon can be explained considering the simulation de-
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picted in Figure 6.5
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Figure 6.5: Weapon Overcommitment in M.P.T Integrated Fire Control System
From the initial target state at T=0s, the target performed a 10s turn to the left.
At T=10s the target began a 25s turn to the right. Between T=25s and T=34s,
the target turned to the left. The target continued on the resultant heading until
T=40s.
Manoeuvre detections where made at T=2.4s, T=6.6s, T=12.5s, T=16.5s, T=21.6s
and T=27.2s.
The trajectory was successfully revised at the first 4 manoeuvre detections as
indicated by the data link activity in Figure 6.5 (b). At each of these 4 update
points, the target following the updated most probable trajectory would have
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been detectable by the weapon seeker. However at T=27.2s, the weapon tra-
jectory could not be updated in response to the updated target trajectory. The
weapon had been overcommitted to a detection along the predicted target tra-
jectory defined at T=21.6s.
The final reason why the M.P.T system can fail to produce an intercept is from
incorrect behaviour detection by the IMM component of the integrated tracking
and prediction system.
This system optimises the trajectory based on only one predicted trajectory, it is
therefore reliant on correct behaviour detection. A false positive by the IMM or
an incorrect manoeuvre detection (i.e. a right turn detected when the target is
actually turning left) will result a poor target trajectory prediction. In each failed
engagement, the weapon range to the target had been minimised to the seeker
detection range. However by shaping the trajectory on incorrect prediction, the
seeker will be oriented away from the actual target trajectory. It will be highly
unlikely that the actual target will be successfully detected. As in the S.A.S.S
system for a target detection to then occur the target must manoeuvre into this
scan area calculated on the incorrect behaviour detection at a later point in the
engagement.
The M.P.T system does not utilise a random optimisation process to calculate
the weapon trajectory. It is therefore possible to determine which part of the fire
control system failed in the case of the 15 misses by the weapon. The system
fails are provided in Figure 6.6 where IMM is a system failure due to an incorrect
behaviour detection, O.C is an overcommitment by the weapon during the en-
gagement and T.N.I.S.A is that the target is not in the scan area, with no IMM
miss detections or overcommitment by the weapon.
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Figure 6.6: M.P.T System Component Fails
In only 3 of the failed engagements, the target was outside the scan area cal-
culated on a correct predicted trajectory. In 8 of the engagements, the weapon
had been overcommitted by considering only one possible trajectory. However
the 65 successful interceptions would indicate that considering only one possible
trajectory within an integrated fire control system is an effective approach to
improving the performance of the weapon against manoeuvring targets.
6.6 Chapter Review
This chapter has discussed an integrated fire control system which will shape the
trajectory of the weapon after launch only if a manoeuvre is detected by the
IMM. The trajectory is shaped after launch considering only the most probable
trajectory of the remaining distribution of possible target trajectories. An inte-
grated system utilising this approach was shown to be effective against both non
manoeuvring and manoeuvring targets.
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Chapter 7
Integrated System Three -
Simulated Annealing and Most
Probable Trajectory (S.A.M.P.T)
This Chapter seeks to determine whether the performance of the AAAW against
manoeuvring targets can be improved utilising a hybrid integrated fire control
system. This system will utilise trajectory optimisation using simulated anneal-
ing and isolation of the most probable target trajectory. The theory of how both
systems optimise the weapon trajectory has been discussed extensively in Chap-
ters 5 and 6. The system will therefore be presented briefly considering the two
phases of weapon initialisation and in-flight trajectory revision.
7.1 Weapon Initialisation
The initial trajectory of the weapon is calculated considering 4 off-boresight an-
gles which will initially be assumed to be updated at T=0s, T=10s, T=20s and
T=30s. The trajectory is calculated using the simulated annealing algorithm.
The calculation of the initial trajectory therefore follows the same procedure as
discussed in Section 5.8.
7.2 In-flight Trajectory Revision
The trajectory of the weapon will be revised using the simulated annealing and
most probable trajectory algorithms. The use of either algorithm will depend on
the number of manoeuvre detections and the time steps at which the detections
occur.
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7.2.1 In-flight Trajectory Revision 0 Manoeuvre Detec-
tions
If no manoeuvres are detected by the IMM, then the trajectory of the weapon
will be revised using the simulated annealing algorithm at T=10s and T=20s.
At T=30s the most probable trajectory will be isolated from the remaining dis-
tribution of possible target trajectories. The off-boresight command required to
produce a detection along the isolated most probable trajectory will be calculated
using the remaining absolute maximum heading change.
If a detection is found, the off-boresight command 4, determined at T=20s, will
be updated and transmitted to the weapon. If no detection is obtained and the
maximum heading change has been exhausted, off-boresight command 4 deter-
mined at T=20s will be transmitted to the weapon.
7.2.2 In-flight Trajectory Revision Manoeuvres Detected
The trajectory will be revised twice using simulated annealing and one or more
times using the most probable trajectory approach. The final number of off-
boresight commands used to shape the trajectory will be either 4 or 7.
If a detection occurs between 2 planned SA updates, the latter update will be
brought forwards. For example, consider a manoeuvre detection which occurs at
T=12.5s. This detection is between off-boresight command 2 at T=10s and off-
boresight command 3 at T=20s. The trajectory revision at the latter time step
(T=20s) would be completed using a simulated annealing optimisation process.
The simulated annealing process performed at T=20s, would now be performed
at T=12.5s. If no further manoeuvre detections are made, then the most tra-
jectory approach will be used to fine tune the trajectory at T=30s provided no
target detection is made by the seeker.
If further manoeuvre detections are made after the third trajectory revision has
been completed using the simulated annealing algorithm, the trajectory will be
revised using the most probable trajectory method for each subsequent detection.
If no detection occurs between T=25s and T=30s, the trajectory will still be re-
vised using the M.P.T approach at T=30s. If a detection occurs in this time
interval, then the most probable trajectory approach will be used to revise the
trajectory at the detection point. The data link will subsequently be deactivated.
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7.3 Performance Evaluation
The simulated annealing and most probable trajectory (S.A.M.P.T) system was
benchmarked against the 80 random target trajectories generated to assess the
performance of the F.F, S.A.S.S and M.P.T systems. The results of the simulated
engagements are provided in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1: S.A.M.P.T results
Of the 80 simulated engagements, the weapon in the S.A.M.P.T system suc-
cessfully intercepted 54 targets. The performance of the weapon in this system
against, non-manoeuvring targets, targets which can be intercepted before ma-
noeuvre (I.B.M) and manoeuvring targets (M.T) is shown alongside the F.F re-
sults in Table 7.1
System N.M I.B.M M.T
S.A.M.PT 12/14 1/6 44/60
F.F 14/14 6/6 27/60
Table 7.1: S.A.M.P.T and F.F Results
Of the 44 manoeuvring target intercepts by the S.A.M.P.T system, 20 were also
intercepted by the F.F system. Of the 16 failed manoeuvring target intercepts,
9 where missed by the weapon in both the F.F and S.A.M.P.T. The remaining 7
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manoeuvring trajectories where intercepted by the weapon in the F.F system and
missed using the S.A.M.P.T system. The results of the manoeuvring trajectory
intercepts indicate that the performance of the AAAW within the S.A.M.P.T fire
control system against manoeuvring attacks is substantially improved over the
F.F system.
The calculation of the χ2 value considering the manoeuvring trajectories, resulted
in a probability of 0.002 which is below that of statistical significance. Therefore
as in the cases of the other integrated systems, the results of the χ2 test support
the conclusion of superior performance against manoeuvring targets.
7.4 Failure Analysis
In each of the trials using the S.A.M.P.T system, the random trajectory used
during the simulated annealing process of the S.A.S.S system was also utilised
in the simulated annealing process of the S.A.M.P.T system. This is because
the S.A.M.P.T was designed to determine whether using the M.P.T approach
after the SA trajectory optimisation component was a superior method to either
S.A.S.S or M.P.T. In the case of the 2 non-manoeuvring target fails, the IMM
produced 0 false detections.
7.4.1 Non Manoeuvring Target Fails
The reasons why the weapon will have failed to produce an intercept in the case of
two non manoeuvring targets are similar to those in the S.A.S.S. Considering the
failure analysis provided in Section 5.11.1, the simulated annealing optimisation
process would most likely have failed on one occasion. The weapon would then
have flown a non optimal trajectory which took it away from the target.
At T=30s, the most probable trajectory process would have been triggered. How-
ever the system would not have been able to calculate a trajectory which would
produce a detection along the most probable trajectory.
The system would have therefore defaulted to the trajectory calculated at T=20s.
The scan area associated with the non optimal weapon trajectory would not have
allowed the actual target to be detected at any scan time. Therefore the weapon
will have failed to detect and intercept the target.
176
7.4.2 Manoeuvring Target Failure Analysis
Just as in the S.A.S.S system, out of the 5 I.B.M fails only in one engagement did
the IMM produce an incorrect behaviour detection. In 2 of the 16 manoeuvring
target fails, the IMM produced an incorrect behaviour detection. In the failed
engagements where the IMM has not produced an incorrect behaviour detection,
then the trajectory optimisation process using the simulated annealing and most
probable trajectory approaches are the only possible system failure sources.
A failure by the most probable trajectory component can be excluded as the
system will either find or not find a possible target detection based on the up-
dated most probable trajectory. It will only update the weapon trajectory if a
detection is found.
The reliability analysis of the simulated annealing algorithm performed in Chap-
ter 5 would suggest that a failure by this algorithm will have only contributed
to a small proportion of the failed intercepts. Assuming that the trajectory op-
timisation was successful on each occasion, then the failure will be simply due
to the orientation of the seeker scan area to the target. The target will not have
been detectable within the area, initially calculated on a distribution of possible
trajectories and later on in the engagement a single probable trajectory.
The incorrect behaviour detections will affect the performance of the S.A.M.P.T
system in the same manor as the S.A.S.S systems.
The incorrect detection will change the shape of the distribution and associated
probabilities. Both the simulated annealing and most probable trajectory systems
will then optimise the trajectory on a poor prediction which is far more likely to
orientate the seeker scan area away from the target. In the failures where the
IMM produced an incorrect detection, the trajectory of the weapon would have
been shaped by both processes such that the target would not lie within the scan
area. In each of the failed intercepts the S.A.M.P.T had successfully minimised
the weapon range to the target to within the seeker detection range. Considering
the fails without incorrect detections by the IMM, then this integrated system
has been proven to be an effective method for improving the performance of the
AAAW against manoeuvring targets.
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7.5 Chapter Review
This chapter has the discussed the development and implementation of the third
and final integrated fire control system to be discussed in this thesis. An inte-
grated fire control system which considers multiple target trajectories initially
and then only the most probable trajectory later on in the engagement is proven
to be an effective method of improving the performance of the AAAW against
manoeuvring targets. This is apparent from a comparison of the number of ma-
noeuvring targets intercepted by the AAAW in this system and the F.F. system.
However the weapon in this integrated system did not successfully intercept all
of the 60 manoeuvring targets generated by the target model.
The potential reasons why the S.A.M.P.T system fails to intercept 2 non ma-
noeuvring and a number of manoeuvring targets have been outlined. The results
indicate that the hybrid system does not offer a further performance increase over
the S.A.S.S system and M.P.T systems.
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Chapter 8
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter firstly presents a summary of the research discussed in this thesis.
A number of conclusions about the results obtained from the three systems de-
veloped are then provided. The thesis then concludes with recommendations for
further work.
8.1 Summary
It was demonstrated that the addition of a data link to the AAAW will allow
the trajectory of the weapon to be shaped in flight by the transmission of one
or more off-boresight commands after the weapon has been launched. Each off-
boresight command is comprised of the current weapon heading and a required
heading change. The constraints of the original weapon design specified that the
absolute sum of the heading changes associated with n transmitted off-boresight
commands are limited to 40◦.
It was proposed that the ability to shape the trajectory of the weapon after
launch could improve the performance of the AAAW against manoeuvring tar-
gets, notably a small agile surface vessel which was representative of a small boat
threat.
In order to achieve the maximum performance increase of the AAAW against ma-
noeuvring targets, the limited retargeting (trajectory shaping) capability would
have to be efficiently utilised over the course of a potential 40s engagement. It
was postulated that this could be accomplished through the use of an integrated
fire control system which would seek to calculate an optimal shaped weapon tra-
jectory. A fundamental component of the integrated fire system would be an
integrated tracking and target prediction system.
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The tracking system was comprised of a pulsed radar model as the sensor in-
put and a Kalman filter based IMM Estimator.
The prediction component calculates the possible trajectories that the target
could follow over a maximum 40s weapon flight period. A Markov chain is used
to calculate the probability of the target following each predicted trajectory.
The two components were integrated such that as the IMM detected different
target behaviours, possible target trajectories could be eliminated. The distri-
bution of target trajectories becomes a better prediction of the possible target
behaviour as the engagement progresses.
Three integrated fire control systems where developed which, sought to calculate
the optimal trajectory considering the distribution of possible target trajectories
under different criteria.
In each of the three integrated systems, the AAAW demonstrated a substan-
tial performance increase against manoeuvring targets in respect of the initial
Fire and Forget system discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis.
8.2 Overall Conclusions
It can be concluded that utilising an integrated fire control system will improve
the average performance of a data linked AAAW against manoeuvring targets.
The statistical analysis of the results of each system, consisting of a series of χ2
tests, support this conclusion.
The results of the three integrated systems suggest that the M.P.T system offers
the greatest performance increase. This is because, the AAAW in this system
successfully intercepted the highest number of manoeuvring targets. However,
considering only one possible trajectory can over commit the weapon to a partic-
ular detection location.
In theory, the S.A.S.S system should offer the greatest performance increase as
the weapon trajectory is optimised, to allow the weapon to detect the target along
more than one possible trajectory. The issue with the S.A.S.S system is that the
simulated annealing process is computationally heavy, which for implementation
in an operational system would potentially require a significant level of comput-
ing power to achieve real time trajectory calculation.
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No further benefit was obtained in using a hybrid system when comparing the
performance against the M.P.T and S.A.S.S systems.
Though the integrated systems presented in this thesis have been developed
around the problem of an AAAW which is to intercept a small boat. The sys-
tems could be easily modified to consider other types of weapon and target, in
particular the original data link demonstrator ePavewayII which is an INS/GPS
guided weapon.
Instead of considering a seeker area, the reachable set of the bomb defined by
the INS guidance would simply be considering in the trajectory optimisation
process of each system.
8.3 Recommendations for Further Work
In each of the failed intercepts by all three integrated systems, the fire control sys-
tem had successfully minimised the weapon range to target to within the seeker
detection range. The failure was due to the orientation of the seeker to the target.
If this research is to be taken further, then the primary focus should be to deter-
mine whether the estimated target position and velocity obtained from the IMM
can be integrated into the trajectory optimisation process. In such a way that,
once the target is within the seeker detection range a final trajectory optimisation
step can be used to steer the weapon onto the target.
Consideration should also be given to exploring different off-boresight update
times as well as an increased number of off-boresight commands in the initial
trajectory calculation of the S.A.S.S system. This will allow greater trajectory
variation and may yield a more optimal weapon trajectory, further improving the
performance of the AAAW in this system against manoeuvring targets.
It would also be worth exploring a method of recording the state of the inte-
grated fire control system at each time step. This would allow a more in depth
failure analysis to be conduced for each system, especially in the case of the
S.A.S.S and S.A.M.P.T systems.
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